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ABSTRACT
A PEDAGOGY OF DISHARMONY: SUBJECTS, ECONOMIES, DESIRES
SEPTEMBER 2003
KENNETH BYRNE, B.A., BROWN UNIVERSITY
M.Ed., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ed.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Robert J. Miltz
This dissertation asserts the importance of acknowledging and incorporating
lack in the theory and practice of pedagogy. The alternative view, that identity can
be fixed, can be understood in Lacanian terms as a fantasy construction. Such
fantasies have powerful effects, sedimenting individual and social desires, and
blocking potential alternative subjectivities and social practices from emerging. The
dissertation therefore aims to challenge fantastic representations of the fixed subject
and the fixed social structure prevalent in educational discourse, and to argue
further that a differently oriented pedagogy, focused on acknowledging and
maintaining the lack or negativity at the heart of identity, may provide the
opportunity for these possible subjects and practices to proliferate.
This dissertation critiques the fantasies of humanism and of structuralism that
are widespread in educational theory and practice, arguing in particular that
v
widespread understandings of the relationship between subjects and economic
reality lead to a political impasse. Using Derridean deconstruction, post-structuralist
marxian economic theory, and Lacanian psychoanalytical theory, the dissertation
then explores discourses of subjectivity and economic reality in the context of the
Rethinking Economy project, an interdisciplinary qualitative research project in the
Pioneer Valley region of western Massachusetts. A symptomatic reading of the
project's texts argues for the powerful presence of fantasy in the economic narratives
of individuals, in the mainstream economic development conversation, in
progressive educational discourse, and in alternative, marginal, or daily economic
discourse.
The pedagogical moments of the project are used to illustrate an educational
practice that attempts to destabilize fantastical attachments. Based on this reading, I
propose a more general model for educational philosophy and pedagogical practice,
one which is based neither on an essentialist view of the subject nor on an
essentialist view of the social field and yet which is still foregrounded in particular
political and ethical commitments.
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PREFACE
My family moved frequently when I was young. When I was ten we moved to
another country; six years later we moved back to the same small town where we
had lived before. In the high school there I saw students who I had known in
elementary school. But it appeared to me that they had undergone some strange and
alien transformation. They moved uneasily through the hallways, or seemed
dangerous, or frightened; they seemed thicker or louder or more absurd than I had
remembered them. Sometimes their eyes half-acknowledged that they recognized
me also, as if they were looking up from the bottom of a deep well. Disturbed by
these ghostly encounters, I pretended that I didn't know my former classmates; I
looked at the floor and moved quickly past them down the hallway. What unnerved
me about these encounters was that they forced me to ask this question: If I had
never moved away, who would I be? Would my self, that I was then so sure of, be as
foreign to me as their former selves seemed to them? This was my first visceral
confrontation with the possibility that the notion of my self—my natural, true, and
essential identity, consistent through any contingency— was a comfortable fiction.
In retrospect, it was when I began writing this dissertation.
These days I still experience a similarly disorienting encounter, whenever I
travel to a place I have never been before. I experience it as a kind of vertigo, a
dizziness on the edge of an endless drop. It begins benignly, in the enjoyment of the
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new smells, the humidity of the air, the way the light hits the walls, the way people
speak, the strangeness of the doorknobs. Then I become overwhelmingly absorbed
in this question: What would it be like to live here? To take these roads to work
every day, to read this newspaper, to have my daily existence circumscribed by this
landscape, these buildings and people? Who would be my confidants, where would
be my haunts, and would I do if I were a person who lived here? With these
thoughts I feel an upsurge of hope; whatever vague and unnamed dissatisfactions
lurk in my present life would be lifted; whatever is missing, I would find it here.
Mixed with this hopeful sense of the possibility of another, fuller life, however, is
that troubling recognition that if I had lived in this place all my life, I would most
certainly be a different person than the person I am now. The vertigo increases. I
lurch over the edge of my solid person, as all the possible alternative lives— and
selves— rush past me like the walls of a canyon.
At this point I pull up with a kind of sudden nausea and say: Thank god I don't
live here! It doesn't even matter where the here is, whether grey, dull, and ugly, or
Paris. I reject it because I want to reassert the solid boundaries of my life, my
identity, my self. It's a kind of pulling back from the edge of the drop into darkness.
Someone described vertigo not as the fear of falling, but as the fear of jumping.
The subjective vertigo of strange places is both the fear of falling into another
identity (the recognition that this alternative is possible), and the fear of desiring to
make that leap. It's enough to make your head spin.
viii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
One day I read an article about this actor and there was a picture of
him which showed him kissing his wife, and then another one
when he was acting in a movie, kissing a woman who was playing
his wife in the movie, and he looked exactly the same in both
pictures. And I said to myself, he's a liar. He's lying in one of these
pictures at least. But then I thought— no. He's not lying, because
he s not pretending to be the same person in both pictures. Jesus
Christ! That actor's not lying. I'm the one who's lying, when I keep
on insisting that I always am the same person. What's that all
about? Why do I do it? Why am I struggling every day to play this
terrible character, this terrible character whose particular
characteristics are impossible to remember. I feel exactly the way a
criminal must feel trying so hard every day to stick to the story he
was telling yesterday, the alibis, the lies, the interconnected details.
It can't be done. You can't remember it all.
—Jack, in the feature film The Designated Mourner (1999)
Impossible Subjects
Freud speaks on a number of occasions of the three "impossible"
professions: analysis, education, and politics. He suggests that these pursuits are
impossible because "one can be sure beforehand of achieving unsatisfactory
results" (Freud 248). Analysands and analysts engage in interminable sessions,
without reaching a root cause of unhappiness. Teachers return home at night
always aware that no matter how well their class went they could have done
more; could have reached their students better or prepared them better for
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uncertain futures. Political activists achieve small strategic victories or even
wholesale revolutions, but suspect that it's one step forward, two steps back.
Another way of seeing the impossibility of these pursuits is that in none of these
fields is a final fixity or closure achievable; in each case a certain gap remains. In
analysis, the subject can never be cured of its inherent divisions; in education, the
individual can never reach a state of alignment between a true inner self, final
knowledge, and the demands of society; and in politics, the goal of a finally
harmonious society remains forever on the horizon.
This dissertation is located at one intersection of these three impossible
pursuits. But it brings together analysis, politics, and pedagogy not to resolve
them or to help master their unruly contradictions, but to illuminate and
reinforce the impossibility of identity's final resolution. One of this dissertation's
central goals is to question the assumption that the fundamental negativity of
identity can ever be overcome, and to assert the importance of acknowledging
and incorporating lack in the theory and practice of pedagogy. The alternative
view, that identity can be fixed, that the sliding of the signifier can be arrested,
that politics can achieve a fundamental and harmonious unity, and that the
educated subject can either assume a true consciousness free of ideological
distortion or assume its self-constituted true character, can be understood, in the
particular formulation of Lacan, as fantasy constructions. The focus of this
dissertation is on the fantasies of humanism and of structuralism, widespread in
educational praxis and, in particular, the fantasy relationship between subjects
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and what is seen to be economic reality. Such fantasies have powerful effects,
sedimenting individual and social desires, and blocking potential alternative
subjectivities and social practices from emerging. The dissertation therefore aims
to challenge fantastic representations of the fixed subject and the fixed social
structure, and to argue further that a differently oriented pedagogy, focused on
acknowledging and maintaining the lack or negativity at the heart of identity,
may provide the opportunity for these possible subjects and practices to
proliferate.
Subject and Structure in Educational Theory and Practice
The practice of education presupposes some relationship between the
individual and its exterior, however that exterior is represented— as language,
cultural values, religious practice, a body of expert knowledge, a practical skill,
the demands of a professional career, or a particular political or economic order,
among others . 1 The prevailing view in much educational theory and practice is to
see one or both sides of this relationship as having a fixed and solid identity.
Often this view appears in the form of humanism, in which the subject's identity
is fixed, essential, self-contained, and natural. Or it appears in the form of
structuralism, in which some larger structure or logic with a fixed, self-
constituting identity is the fundamental social determinant. The tendency to see
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subjects and/or social reality in terms of essentialist identity appears widely in
the work of progressive theorists and practitioners of education, to whom this
dissertation is principally addressed.
A brief overview of some influential progressive educational theorists of the
last three decades shows how the terrain in which subjectivity, politics, and
education intersect has been largely circumscribed by alternating pulls of
structuralism and humanism, both of which assume identity has a certain fixed
or fixable nature. Bowles and Gintis' Schooling in Capitalist America (1976) may be
viewed as an archetypal structuralist approach to education, an approach which
presupposes a subject formed within the requirements of a particular net of
political and economic forces. 2 Bowles and Gintis assert that education serves the
needs of the overarching capitalist structure, furthering students' alienation by
preparing them to take their place as commodified labor within that structure.
Similar structuralist elements appear in other progressive education theorists.
But many of these have sought to counteract their own structuralist impulses,
and thereby preserve space for individual human agency, by simultaneously
asserting an essentialist humanism, often assuming a centered true self— for
example, the subject with certain class interests, or the individual with certain
innate qualities which the current educational system crushes or distorts. Paolo
1 As Lacan writes, "the status of knowledge implies as such that there already is knowledge, that
it is in the Other, and that it is to be acquired. That is why it is related to learning. The subject
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Freire s problem posing" approach (1970) combines elements of structuralism
and humanism. Linked to Latin American liberation theology, Freire's work joins
a particular Marxist-empiricist analysis of the material structural causes of
oppression with a commitment to the liberation of the dominated, who, Freire
acknowledges, often participate in their own oppression; through education,
individuals may be empowered to reorganize their environment and develop as
subjects unalienated from their true needs and natures. Paul Willis' Learning to
Labour (1977), while accepting the premise of an almost omnipotent capitalist
structure, sees the institutions of schools as not only reproductive of oppressive
economic, political, and cultural power relations, but as sites of everyday
resistance, both by working class students and in some cases by their educators;
this aspect of Willis' work suggests that the individual is a centered self, with the
capacity for individual thought and action.
Finally, the attempt to balance humanism and structuralism may be seen in
the work of the U.S. theorists I refer to as the "critical pedagogists": Michael
Apple, Peter McLaren, Henry Giroux, and Stanley Aronowitz. Influenced by the
Frankfurt School of Marxist social theory (which sought to understand the
cultural superstructural elements of what they took to be modern capitalist
society), and following Willis, the critical pedagogists view schools as both the
results from the fact that this knowledge must be learned" (Lacan 1998, 96).
2 Though it can also be read for its anti-structuralist elements; see Aoki (1994).
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site where oppressive global capitalism operates to shape individuals as
consumers and docile workers, and as the site of potential resistance, where
individuals may find liberation from this alien and destructive consciousness.
These theorists attempts to balance structuralist and humanist arguments
have, however, resulted in a counterproductive juxtaposition of alternating
essentialisms— the centered identities of the individual subject and of the
political-economic structure. In other words, the limitations of an essentialist
structuralist argument (that is, leaving no room for human agency or alternative
non-teleological futures) compel these authors to include humanist arguments
which are equally essentialist and similarly limiting (for example, assumptions of
a singular and innate "working class interest").3 In addition, these essentialist
identities complement a view of education as liberation from false consciousness,
which is itself grounded in troubling epistemological notions of knowable
reality, truth, and falsity. In the view of these authors, traditional schooling
works to mystify workers' true relations within capitalist society, serving the
ideological function of inculcating a false consciousness of their true needs and
desires; on a large scale, the capitalist structure constrains human development,
and education serves the ideological function of directing individuals to see their
3 One example of the difficulties such an approach encounters can be seen in Peter McLaren's
paradoxical position on the role of education and subjectivity. He argues that schools should
serve to free students from a consciousness or a subjectivity as consumers in capitalist society
while at the same time arguing that it is impossible to have such an emancipated subjectivity, due
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needs and desires falsely in terms of capitalist commodities. Seeing social
dysfunction as a product of alienated subjects within a singular (capitalist)
structure, these theorists view progressive education in terms of liberation
through an encounter with the truth, or a true understanding of objective reality
(for example, Apple 1993, 1996; McLaren 1994; Aronowitz and Giroux 1991).
My aim in the following chapters is to present an approach to education
which resists the pull of essentialist views of either the subject or the structure as
centered entities, and which shifts the terrain of education away from a
truth/ falsehood model of knowledge. Against structuralist arguments that posit
a complete and self-evident identity for social reality (in particular, the economic
structure), theorists from a poststructuralist marxian tradition will be employed.
Against arguments that attempt to establish a humanist foundation, asserting the
singular reality of innate individuality, the dissertation will employ the work of
various theorists who have posed the unavoidably incomplete nature of the
subject, including those working in the Freudian psychoanalytic tradition. In
particular, the Lacanian formula of fantasy and its potential traversal will be
used to suggest how sedimented identities can be unfixed, in the process
releasing new desires and alternative subjective possibilities.
to the pervasive, inevitable, and unavoidable capitalist system, the global structure and
inevitably hegemonic economic form of contemporary social life (McLaren 1994).
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Overview of Dissertation
Investigating alternatives to the fixed identity of the subject and the fixed
economic structure prevalent in educational discourse, this dissertation proposes
an alternative in accordance with the notion of unavoidable incompleteness or
lack. The texts which will comprise the primary field of analysis for this
dissertation are transcripts of conversations generated by an interdisciplinary
qualitative research project, the Rethinking Economy project, which I have been a
part of for a number of years. The overarching goal of the project has been to
produce alternative understandings of regional economies in order to encourage
innovative forms of economic development policy and political activism.
Using Derridean deconstruction, post-structuralist marxian economic theory,
and Lacanian psychoanalytical theory, the dissertation explores discourses of
subject and economy expressed in this project. A symptomatic reading of the
project's texts argues for the powerful presence of fantasy in the economic
narratives of individuals, in the mainstream economic development
conversation, in progressive educational discourse, and in alternative, marginal,
or daily economic discourse. The pedagogical moments of the project will be
used to illustrate an educational practice that attempts to destabilize fantastical
attachments. Based on this reading, I will propose a more general model for
educational philosophy and pedagogical practice, one which is based neither on
an essentialist view of the subject nor an essentialist view of the social field and
yet which is still foregrounded in particular political and ethical commitments.
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Chapter 2 explores the prevalence of essentialist identity constructions, of
subjects or of the economic structure, in educational theory and practice, and
explains why such views should be rejected. Poststructuralist and antiessentialist
theories of deconstructive reading, marxian economic and cultural theory, and
Lacanian psychoanalysis are presented in chapter 3. These approaches, I argue,
are useful to counter the fixed identities of subjects and structures dominant in
educational theory. I suggest that alternative views of the economy and of
subjectivity, based on the unavoidable negativity of identity, create the space for
alternative economic subjectivities, desires, and practices to emerge. How these
approaches translate into the dissertation's methodology is described in chapter
4; this methodology consists of first deconstructively reading for difference, and
then exploring, via Lacanian theory, the relationship between subjectivity,
fantasy, and the experience of economic reality.
Applying these methodological approaches, chapter 5 offers one reading of
the transcripts of the Rethinking Economy project. This reading explores
individuals' complex relationships to the economy in terms of lack, desire, and
enjoyment. Chapter 6 argues for the importance of engaging with the fantasies of
the economy and of the sovereign subject in order to provide the space for alter-
native subjectivities to emerge. Pedagogical moments of the Rethinking Economy
project are used to suggest the possible contours of such an engagement with
economic and subjective fantasies.
9
Finally, chapter 7 presents the ethical case for a pedagogy self-consciously
oriented toward traversal, toward altering the subject's relationship to fantasy.
Such a pedagogy rejects the fundamental fantasy of fixed identities undergirding
both essentialist humanism and structuralism in educational discourse, and
becomes a political and ethical practice of acknowledging the constitutive
division at the heart of identity, both social and individual. This
acknowledgment entails surrendering our powerful attachments to visions of
unity, wholeness, and pure communication crossing the lack in identity. But we
should not feel disappointment over this loss. The traversal of fantastic
attachments offers us an awareness of abundance rather than simple lack, and
the possibility of inhabiting new subjectivities and enacting new social practices
in relation to surplus in the social field.
10
CHAPTER 2
THE IMPASSE OF FIXED ECONOMIC AND SUBJECTIVE REALITY
Introduction
This chapter focuses on how subjectivity, the economic structure, and the
relationship between the two are widely represented in educational discourse.
These representations have important ramifications not only for our
understanding of the purposes of education, but for our ability to inhabit
alternative economic subjectivities and engage in alternative social practices.
Though the discussion that follows is devoted largely to the work of the
critical pedagogists, the chapter begins with a discussion of a recently accepted
charter school application with a very different orientation towards what is
understood to be economic reality. Despite their differences, what unites the
critical pedagogists and the proponents of the charter school is a certain
discursive regularity that generates a similarly constrained subjective and
economic landscape. This is a landscape in which the economy is understood to
be self-evidently determinative of other, non-economic social relations, and the
problem of subjectivity to be one of a deficiency of knowledge about this
economic reality.
The Roxbury Charter High School
In the spring of 2002, the application for the Roxbury Charter High School
for Business, Finance, and Entrepreneurship (RCHS) was approved by the
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Commonwealth's Department of Education. "At the Roxbury Charter High
School for Business, Finance, and Entrepreneurship," the proponents of the new
charter school declare, our students will receive a rigorous academic program,
and they will gain an understanding of finance and economics so that they are
prepared to move away from poverty, and into a life where they are better
prepared to participate in America s tradition of achievement and prosperity"
(RCHS 2). Located within Boston's "Empowerment Zone," Roxbury is one of the
poorest neighborhoods in the city, with high levels of unemployment and a large
portion of its residents living below the official poverty line. As a document
explicitly linking educational practices, curriculum goals, and learning standards
to the world of work, business, and the economy, the RCHS application
illustrates one view of how subjects and the economic structure of society can
and should be integrated to produce an alignment of social, economic, and
personal well-being.
The RCHS could be seen as a liberal (and liberatory) initiative, orienting the
education of largely minority and low-income students towards
entrepreneurship and business. From this viewpoint, one could argue that the
school's approach is a useful and progressive way of overcoming the lack of
knowledge capital that prevents the poor from taking advantage of the economic
system, as a way of compensating for the knowledge that the more advantaged
receive from "good role models" in their families and thereby increasing equality
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of economic opportunity. In this vein, the authors of the charter application
quote from a Wall Street Institute publication:
Young people living in disadvantaged circumstances are less likely
to have good role models from which to obtain information about
financial matters. In most cases, they cannot look to families for
guidance about financial decision-making or to obtain practice
developing good investing and saving habits As our economy
moves into a more technology-driven system, those without a basic
appreciation of accepted economic principles are destined to
remain at the lower end of the economic scale and live a life of
poverty and struggle. (2)
An alternative, more negative reading of the charter school document could
make the case that the school will simply serve the needs of the existing
economic system rather than work towards its transformation. In other words,
the school will function as an ideological apparatus training students to be either
business bosses or, more likely, disciplined workers in a capitalist firm. Evidence
to support this view can be found in the educational standards section of the
application, where, under “Business, Finance, and Entrepreneurship Standards,"
the document asserts that students should be able to “Demonstrate the ability to
follow directions, read, write, and perform in a business-like manner" and
“Demonstrate responsibility, sociability, self-management, integrity and honesty,
and display these attributes to facilitate cooperative working relationships with
others" (4).
My interest, however, is not in condemning the Roxbury charter school
initiative as an inevitably retrograde political project, one that co-opts the
energies and desires of the poor and prepares them only to slot into existing
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oppressive relations. Such an outcome is certainly possible, but the inherently
unpredictable and contingent nature of both political and educational work
suggests we should resist predicting any inevitable outcomes. Rather, my
interest here is in how the document reveals certain assumptions about the
nature of subjectivity and the fixed identity of economic reality. I will argue
throughout this dissertation that it is important to challenge these widely
accepted assumptions if we are to make alternative social practices and
subjectivities visible, possible, or enactable.
The Roxbury charter school application represents the relationship between
subject and structure in terms of individuals either sufficiently or insufficiently
composed to fit into the fixed structure of "the American economic system" (2).
The poor have failed to "participate in America's tradition of achievement and
prosperity" because they as individuals have lacked certain knowledge, skills,
and behavior. To counter this deficit, the school expects that each student will be
able to "Explain the importance of taking responsibility for personal financial
decisions," "Analyze how career choice, education, and job skills affect income,"
"Assess personal strengths and weaknesses, utilize learned career resources, and
apply knowledge gained to develop personal goals," and "Design a plan for
earning, spending, saving, and investing personal financial resources" (4).
Though proponents suggest that the school will be an important component
of "community revitalization" (2), the focus of the document is clearly on the
individual rather than the communal. For example, of the almost infinite
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determinations of income level, the focus here is on issues of individual
responsibility (what one chooses) and individual sufficiency or deficiency (one's
level of education or skill). Students are expected, furthermore, to assess
individual characteristics and develop individual goals rather than to assess a
group s strengths and weaknesses, or to collectively develop group or
community goals. The importance of taking responsibility for communal
financial decisions is similarly absent; personal financial decisions are, implicitly,
the financial decisions of the consumer: the choices we make about how to spend
or save or otherwise allocate our resources (largely, from wages). In other words,
what is visible as legitimate or viable pedagogical practice in the Roxbury
Charter School application is limited to educating and enculturating the
residents of Roxbury to prepare them to assume roles as productive wage
earners, self-disciplined savers, smart consumers, and competent investors:
We believe that academically successful students who learn how to
earn, manage, invest, and contribute their money will become
informed decision-makers, educated consumers, and thoughtful
citizens. They will have a better understanding of how the
American economic system works, and they will be better prepared
to function successfully in it. They are more likely to become
productive citizens who can make positive contributions to their
families and their communities. (2)
This emphasis on both the individual and the economic structure to which the
individual must become enculturated produces a split; in the realm of the
personal, the individual worker-consumer must accept final and total
15
responsibility; in the realm of the economy, one must learn to fit in, follow
directions, have the appropriate skills, attitudes, and knowledge.
In this context, the planners of the Roxbury Charter High School for
Business, Finance, and Entrepreneurship build their educational intervention on
two related assumptions. On the one hand, there is a singular and unchangeable
economic system, an economic system which will reward those individuals who
satisfy its requirements; on the other hand, the problem of the subject is the
problem of a deficiency— a lack of knowledge about the economic reality. To
adequately participate in this economic system, an individual's gaps in
knowledge, skill, and attitude need to be filled in.
This notion of the deficient subject made whole with appropriate knowledge
is reflected in the application's Health Standards section, where, echoing the
Business Standards, students are expected to "Identify the major behaviors that
contribute to wellness," "Identify life-management skills and protective factors
that contribute to achieving personal wellness health goals," and "Identify ways
in which decision-making is influenced by character, family, and personal
beliefs" (RCHS 6). Here the deficiency of the individual subject takes on
specifically moral overtones, as the marginality of the inner city economic actor is
shown to be rooted in a kind of individual pathology; students are expected to
"Identify and analyze dietary plans, costs, and long-term outcomes of nutrition
and weight management programs," "Identify and distinguish among types and
degrees of sexual risk," "Analyze healthy ways to express emotions and to cope
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with feelings/' (RCHS 6). Interestingly, falling under the category of "Health" is
the requirement that students be able to "Describe the individual's responsibility
to be a wise and informed consumer, including how to plan a budget that
includes a spending and savings plan" (6). Issues of the undisciplined body
(unprotected sex, bad eating habits, uncontrolled passions) merge with the
representation of the subject's insufficiency in relationship to the economic
structure (lack of knowledge about how it functions, bad personal finance habits,
including lack of saving and poor money management) to produce a subject
whose incompleteness and social marginality are caused by the lack of a real
object: knowledge of economic reality. Once appropriately docked or attached to
this reality (via the internalization of correct knowledge), the individual can
assume all the rights and benefits of those who are accorded the status of full
citizen— subjects not of a king but of a sovereign economy.
The Critical Pedagogists
In the Roxbury Charter High School application, the economy is represented
as the singular and foundational reality, and the problem of subjectivity is a
problem of a lack— but a lack that can be filled. A similar view of the economy,
and of the subject in relation to it, can be seen in a group of educational theorists
with a different moral judgment on that economy. This is a group of progressive
leftist theorists and activists which I label for the purposes of this dissertation
"the critical pedagogists" — Apple, McLaren, Giroux and Aronowitz. While the
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critical pedagogists would likely condemn the Roxbury Charter High School for
its uncritical acceptance of the capitalist economy, and would likely oppose the
school's curriculum and standards, there is a clear line to be drawn connecting
the projects of the two groups of educators. Like the RCHS proponents, the
critical pedagogists view the economy as a given and self-evident structural
force. They also see the problem of subjectivity to be one of a lack which can and
should be filled, with a positive correct knowledge of economic truth. And, like
the proponents of the Roxbury school, the critical pedagogists' view of the
economy as an unchanging reality results in the evacuation of the economy as a
site of both currently existing non-capitalist activity and of potentially
transformative economic alternatives.
The Economy is Beyond Poststructuralist Critique
The critical pedagogists position themselves as poststructuralists or post-
modernists in certain regards— asserting that there is no ultimate sovereign
referent for human knowledge, that representations of truth are to be
problematized, that all texts are open to interpretation, that totalizing and
essentialist arguments are dangerous (see, for example, McLaren 1989, 182;
Aronowitz and Giroux 1991, 72; Apple 1996, 60). But when it comes to the
economy they are recalcitrant realists, advocates of a modernist and essentialist
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view of the economy, and of the necessary relationship between true knowledge
of this economic reality and liberatory political action.4
Michael Apple, for example, follows the familiar pattern of first praising and
then retreating from poststructuralism, asserting that he is aware of the dangers
of what he calls his "critical (and self-critical) structural understanding of
education, an approach which he says has historically promoted totalizing
grand narratives and unicausal explanations, and praising poststructuralist and
post-modernist criticisms of structuralist analyses, "especially when they have
arisen from within the various feminist and postcolonial communities" 5 (1996, xi-
xii). However, in the end, he asserts the ultimate limits of these approaches:
Yet, even though the "linguistic turn," as it has been called in
sociology and cultural studies, has been immensely productive, it is
important to remember that the world of education and elsewhere
is not only a text. There are gritty realities out there, realities whose
power often is grounded in structural relations that are not simply
social constructions created by the meanings given by an observer.
Part of our task, it seems to me, is to not lose sight of these gritty
realities in the economy and the state, while at the same time
recognizing the dangers of essentializing and reductive analyses.
(Apple 1996, xii)
4 After harshly criticizing what he calls "supposedly critical" educators isolated in ivory-tower
universities, Apple is quick to explain his position on "theory" and its relationship to politics,
knowledge, and a structuralist understanding of society: "This is not to say that theoretical work
is unimportant. It is crucial, but largely when it is organic to groups who both recognize and
struggle to deal with widespread relations of domination and exploitation" (Apple 1996, 116,
emphasis in original).
5 He fails, however, to explain why criticisms originating in these two "communities" should hold
such a privileged position.
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Similarly, in his 1995 article, "Critical Pedagogy in the Age of Global
Capitalism, McLaren spells out where the boundary— between what is real and
not-real, political and non-political, subject to poststructuralist critique and
beyond it -is to be drawn. This line must be drawn in accordance with what is to
him an overwhelming and transparent economic reality: "As a Marxist, I have
some problems with postmodern social theory— not in all of its manifestations
but in many of them. [...] The divine indeterminacy surrounding the signifier
must not deflect attention away from directly challenging capitalism's relations
of oppression and exploitation" (McLaren 1995,18).6
Political practice, for the critical pedagogists, must in the end be based on the
proper modernist understanding of economic structural truths. These truths, as
represented in their work, may be summarized as presupposing and reinforcing
a number of fixed identities and relationships: (a) society is determined by its
underlying economic form, which is fundamentally capitalist; (b) history is the
unfolding and expanding logic of global capitalism; and (c) true subjectivity is
distorted, colonized, and ultimately determined by and within this expanding
net of late capitalism. The critical pedagogists' project is an attempt to reveal the
solidified reality of these identities and relationships and build a politics of
liberatory pedagogy on such knowledge.
6 Attention should be drawn to the practice, here in this paragraph and widespread in all the
critical pedagogists' texts, of vaguely criticizing nameless, faceless theorists. They very rarely
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Society's Foundation in Capitalist Economic Reality
Sensitive to criticisms that their arguments have placed too much emphasis
on economic oppression, the critical pedagogists take pains to acknowledge the
existence of other forms of oppression which marxists have been accused of
neglecting, such as those in the fields of gender and race. Apple, for example,
asserts his awareness of these other issues: "In making my claims here, I have
brought together three kinds of arguments: cultural, political, and economic.
None of these is reducible to the others. All are necessary to gain a more complex
understanding of the limits and possibilities of educational work and of cultural
work in general" (Apple 1996, 115). In an interview, Apple further recounts an
epiphany in which he became aware of the need to "deprivilege" and "decenter"
the role of class in radical work, and place it "on a more parallel plane" with
other dynamics, such as race, gender, and sexuality (Apple 1993, 170).
In the end, however, "more parallel" does not mean "parallel," and Apple,
like the other critical pedagogists, maintains the privileged place for the capitalist
economy as the ultimately determinant power shaping society, history, and
subjects:
I think the relations that make up what we can objectively call
capitalism are much more oppressive than other kinds of relations
in many situations. In our (largely meritorious, as feminist theories
have brilliantly shown) attempts to move beyond class
provide quotations, or even identify individuals by name, to illustrate the positions they are
criticizing.
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reductionism and recognize how domination in race, class, gender,
sexuality, and other relations works, we have at times forgotten the
massive structuring forces that do exist. And because of personal
experience, perhaps because I grew up poor, I think that we must
in fact begin to think through what are the dangers of a position
that when taken too far rests totally on the notion that there are an
infinite multiplicity of discourses of power. It can too easily
support the notion that everything is an equal form of oppression,
isn't it? [. .
.] I must admit that in my heart of hearts I don't think
that all oppressions are equal, that I think there are vicious results
arising out of the national and international movement to bring all
of us the "benefits" of capitalist economies, cultures, and politics.
And it is not only an image; these are real objective conditions.
(Apple 1993, 176-7)
This passage reveals two related reductionist tendencies common to the critical
pedagogists: economism (the reduction of the complex social totality to an
ultimately determining foundation in economic relations), and capitalocentrism
(the conflation of a diverse range of economic activities under the sign of
capitalism). These two tendencies can be seen to work in concert: human
activities are seen to be determined in the end by an overwhelming economic
structure, and all productive, distributive, and consumptive activities are seen to
be tainted with the mark of the capitalist economy. Such tendencies can be found
combined in, for example, Apple's assertions that although he is not an economic
structuralist he believes that society is determined by its underlying capitalist
economic relations— that, in the end, it is self-evident that we "live under
capitalism" (Apple 1996, xi-xii; 1993, 177).
The term "capitalocentrism" comes from the work of the poststructuralist
marxian economic geographer J.K. Gibson-Graham. In capitalocentrism.
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capitalism is represented as the dominant term and other forms of economy are
defined in relation to it treated as capitalism s equivalent, opposite, or
complement, or contained wholly within it. In The End of Capitalism (As V\/e Knew
It), Gibson-Graham usefully explains the term by analogy with phallocentrism.
In phallocentric discourse, sexual difference is posed in binary hierarchical terms:
man is taken to be the singular human standard, and woman, because other to
this standard, is constituted as deficient with regard to man. Similarly, in
capitalocentrism "capitalism which is actually a specific economic form becomes
the very model or definition of economy. By virtue of their differences from
capitalism all other forms of economy fail to conform to true economic
specifications." Thus "difference is rendered as 'absence' or lack rather than as an
autonomous being" (Gibson-Graham, 35). 7 As Gibson-Graham has pointed out, if
we were to label the United States a "Christian nation," we would no doubt be
challenged for such a presumption which denies or makes invisible all those
activities, practices, believers (and non-believers) who clearly are not Christian;
7 McLaren, for one, is aware of the discourse of phallocentrism:
...within the mainstream social theory, bodies are constructed as objects of
research by modes of inquiry that produce a "fiction" of gendered identity.
Within such a fiction, identity is manufactured after the image of the male,
according to the dominant logic of opposition which sees women's bodies as
deviations from the male norm. In other words, mainstream research often
reflects the homogenizing logic reflected in the phallicism of dominant social
theorizing. It is important not to underwrite a view of gender which privileges a
phallocentric economy of the flesh and which rules out women's specificity.
(McLaren 1989, 198)
Despite this awareness, however, a similar process of exclusion and subordination is at work in
McLaren's own capitalocentric discourse.
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however, the description of the U.S. as a "capitalist economy" goes
unchallenged, similarly denying or making invisible all those practices which are
not capitalist
.
8
In the critical pedagogists, the particular economic form of capitalism comes
to stand for the economic itself, and economic alternatives to capitalism (the
existence of economic difference) are rejected as inconsequential or theoretically
non-existent. This plays out in the way processes, sites, and activities which
could be theorized as different from capitalism are instead conflated with or
made equivalent to capitalism, and in the way those which are theorized as
noncapitalisms are made to exist in a relationship of subsumption or
subordination to capitalism. There is a multitude of elements, forces, practices,
and logics which are made equivalent to capitalism at any one moment in the
work of the critical pedagogists. Market exchange, commodification, wage labor,
the enterprise, globalization, technological change, the profit motive, the logic of
self-interest, greed, violence, privatization, capital accumulation, global finance,
consumption, political domination, the oppressive exercise of power, racism,
patriarchy, disparities in wealth, environmental destruction, the school system,
degraded popular culture, third world suffering, and more, are all made
equivalent in some way to capitalism, to the singular economic form which is the
8 Ric McIntyre (1996) explores this issue in an article provocatively subtitled "Is There Capitalism
in America?"
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ultimate social determinant. At one point McLaren speaks comfortably of "the
logic of domination that informs the dominant white supremacist ideology of
patriarchal capitalism" (McLaren 1994, 333); at another he equates the cyberpunk
world of Bladenmner with "a new world order capitalism without restraint" and
concludes that "We are living in a world run by high-tech gangsters, genetic
engineers, and corporate criminals" (McLaren 1995a, 10) -stretching the chain of
equivalence not only from capitalism to self-interest, greed, and violence, but
also to the high-technology sector, the genetic engineering industry, and
corporate malfeasance of all sorts.
Most often, however, capitalism is made equivalent in the work of the
critical pedagogists to market relations and the expansion of commodification to
previously non-monetized relations:
What Weber missed was the incorporation of all areas of public and
private life into the money economy. There exists no autochthonous
and monolithic space of pure culture or uncontaminated identity—
everything has been commodified. Use value is now supported by
what Massumi calls "fulfillment-effect" or "image value." We are,
all of us, subjects of capital — the point d'appui between wage
relations and commodity relations, with commodification
representing the hinge between the future and the past. (McLaren
1994, 329-30)
All social activities, therefore, are enclosed within an economic structure which is
itself fundamentally synonymous with capitalism, as evidenced by the spread of
commodification. In similar fashion, the critical pedagogists see capitalism's self-
evident and inevitably expansionist march determining the movement of human
history itself.
25
The Telos of Late Capitalism
One component of the critical pedagogists' economistic and capitalocentric
narrative, directly linked to their view, as McLaren puts it, that "capitalism has
colonized all geographical and social space " (1994, 329), is a particular
teleological view of economic and social history. Represented as unalloyed and
unmediated, history exists "out there," in the past, and not in our theories about
it, to correctly understand history is to grasp its underlying order, its progression
through a series of discrete stages, each dominated and defined by a unifying
economic mode.
That history follows a trajectory determined by society's underlying
economic form is reflected in the critical pedagogists' frequent use of the term
late capitalism" to refer to the current stage of human history. McLaren asks, for
example, "How are students specifically positioned (in terms of race, class,
gender, sexuality) within the grid of late capitalist economic containment and
sociopolitical control?" (McLaren 1994, 329). Elsewhere he speaks of "...a shift
within late capitalism which sees all the continents drifting towards a single,
unifying, global culture" (McLaren 1995a, 6). Giroux states that "In effect,
postmodernism has provided a new discourse that enables us to understand the
changing nature of domination and resistance in late capitalist societies" (Giroux
1997, 197). And, with Aronowitz, he states that "Briefly put, the postmodern
condition refers to the various discursive and structural transformations that
characterize what can be called a postmodern culture in the era of late
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capitalism" (Aronowitz & Giroux 1991, 59). The phrase "late capitalism" locates
these texts within a particular body of twentieth century marxist thought; it
furthermore locates within this lineage the authors' arguments not only about
the nature of capitalism, but about capitalism's articulation with other modes of
production and social formations, their views on the periodization of socio-
economic ages, and their understanding of our current "postmodern" age as the
cultural expression of this unique period in the history of capitalism. It is useful
therefore to trace the history of late capitalism," as it points to the contingent,
partial, socially embedded nature of the economic discourse that the critical
pedagogists present as simple economic reality. It also reveals much about the
critical pedagogists' view of human subjectivity in the face of the economic
structure, and about the nature of the political impasse emerging from their
views.
The term can be traced to the economist Ernest Mandel, whose 1975 book
Late Capitalism itself exists in a complex relationship to a whole tradition of long-
wave analyses within marxist crisis theory, stretching back to Kondratiev,
Trotsky, and Schumpeter, among others, in the early decades of the twentieth
century. In Mandel's narrative, a tripartite periodization in the history of
capitalism is proposed: first, the stage of "competitive capitalism" emerged,
followed by "monopoly capitalism" (or the age of imperialism,) and then our
current age of what he terms "late capitalism," initiated some time after World
War II. Mandel's periodization thesis emerged from his efforts to trace a "long
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wave trajectory of capitalist development (as opposed to explanations of the
recurring boom-and-bust of expansions and depressions). His intent is to
demonstrate that capitalism, despite its apparent victorious global growth, is
endogenously evolving and passing through historical periods punctuated by
crises and leading to its eventual decline. Mandel's work therefore stands within
a long tradition of marxist crisis theories, theories which typically identify a
small number of key or fundamental logics, forces, drives, or inevitable
circumstances that will unfurl, or are in the process of unfurling, and spell the
system's inevitable demise. 9
A second important version of the late capitalism narrative, adapted from
Mandel's thesis but significantly divergent in important regards, is that of
Fredric Jameson in his influential and widely cited article "Postmodernism, or
The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism" (1984). 10 Jameson's article has had
particular influence among cultural studies theorists and among those
educational theorists and activists concerned with the relationship between
culture and economics; its influence is clear in the work of the critical
pedagogists, who find answers in Jameson to the question of why individuals
oppressed by capitalist society fail to acknowledge such oppression, let alone act
9 These might include, for example, a decline over time in the average rate of profit, the
introduction of technological innovation, or the contradiction between socialized means of
production and private ownership posed as inherent in capitalist social formations.
10 This article was the basis of Jameson's 1991 book of the same title.
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to overcome it; it also provides the critical pedagogists with a rationale for their
opposition to postmodern and poststructuralist thought.
Building upon Mandel s tripartite epochalization, Jameson associates with
each economic stage a distinct cultural dominant: competitive capitalism
coincided with the cultural stage of Realism; monopoly or imperialistic
capitalism with the stage of Modernism; and our current era of multinational or
late capitalism with the stage of Postmodernism (Jameson 1984, 78). In each
stage, a fundamental economic force— the ever-expanding engine of capitalism—
has dictated the era's own unique cultural expression. According to Jameson,
Mandel demonstrated that contemporary postmodern late capitalism constitutes
the purest form of capital yet to have emerged, a prodigious
expansion of capital into hitherto uncommodified areas. This purer
capitalism of our own time thus eliminates the enclaves of
precapitalist organization it had hitherto tolerated and exploited in
a tributary way: one is tempted to speak in this connection of a new
and historically original penetration and colonization of Nature
and the Unconscious.... (Jameson 1984, 78)
The new cultural force field of postmodernism has produced a "mutation in
space;" the human subjects caught in this new postmodern hyperspace have not
evolved in step with this mutation and thus do not possess "the perceptual
equipment" necessary to understand it (Jameson, 80). 11 In a point that echoes in
11 This of course raises the troubling question of how Jameson has been able to position himself
outside of the all-encompassing structure of this new postmodern space in order to comprehend
it. That he has been able to unlock its fundamental character through the application of a correct
theory (via Marx and Mandel, e.g.) resolves no paradox, as it raises the subsequent question of
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the critical pedagogists' depiction of postmodern mystification of the social
(capitalist) totality, Jameson's concludes:
So I come finally to my principal point here, that this latest
mutation in space— postmodern hyperspace— has finally
succeeded in transcending the capacities of the individual human
body to locate itself, to organize its immediate surroundings
perceptually, and cognitively to map its position in a mappable
external world. And I have already suggested that this alarming
disjunction point between the body and its built environment...can
itself stand as the symbol and analogue of that even sharper
dilemma which is the incapacity of our minds, at least at present, to
map the great global multinational and decentred communicational
network in which we find ourselves caught as individual subjects.
(Jameson, 83-4)
Clearly, these conclusions raise troubling issues for those concerned with
pedagogical and political work, and those interested in transformations of
economic practices. If social relations are ultimately founded on economic reality,
and this economic reality is fundamentally that of an inevitably expanding
capitalism at a stage in history in which all of the social totality has been
colonized, then what space is left for an alternative subjectivity, and for
alternative desires, practices, and enjoyments outside of that all-encompassing,
ever-expanding force?
how one is able to escape postmodern late capitalist mystification to the degree that one is able to
see and apply such a theory.
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Subjectivity Colonized by the Economic Structure
The critical pedagogists tend to view subjectivity in contemporary society as
tied in an essentialist and reductionist manner to a singular and self-evident
capitalist economy. The critical pedagogist who takes the Jamesonian thesis of
late capitalism to its most extreme position is Peter McLaren, who sees a society
in which identity, politics, and affect have already been devoured by an
omnipotent capitalism whose powers of incorporation are so total that
— quoting
Massumi's The Politics of Everyday Fear-"the capitalist relation has expanded its
reach to every coordinate of sociogeographical space-time" (McLaren 1995, 7). In
the following passage, when McLaren traces the evolution of subjectivity from
solid modernist forms to shifting postmodernist ones it is unclear whether he
believes that a new manifestation of subjectivity has actually emerged in this
new age of late capitalism; or that postmodernism has revealed that the
modernist assumption of "the secure, autonomous agent" was always hiding
identities "perpetually in composition;" or whether the postmodernist age has
simply deluded us into believing that our solid identities are actually fluid and
unfixed. 12 But, ultimately, he returns to the familiar formula which equates
capitalism with commodification and the mystification of true identity:
12 Fredric Jameson is much clearer on this point. Discussing the notion of "the death of the
subject" and the contemporary stress on decentering the formerly centered subject, he suggests
there are two ways of looking at the issue:
Of the two possible formulations of this notion— the historicist one, that a once-
existing centred subject, in the period of classical capitalism and the nuclear
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Formerly discreet and self-generating "selves" have given way to
the production of "terminals" or "generators" of subjectivity which
the other can plug into, depending on the systems of meaning in
which one is motivated to participate. This model of the self is
patterned on the cathedral of capitalism, that sanctuary of
consumption where we find a strange convergence of our
fragmented identities in the signifying structure of global
amusement culture we know as the shopping mall (McLaren 1995
15-6)
This late capitalist age produces subjects so alienated from their true selves, so
deficient in their knowledge of their own subjugated reality, that they become, in
McLaren's purple prose, quite literally insane; reflected in the educational
system, "the politics of consumption has terminated in classrooms becoming
asylums of the obsessed" (McLaren 1995, 16).
In this its final evolutionary stage, capitalism has overcome any internal
contradictions it may have once had, and has achieved a terrifying and
overwhelming dominance. Awestruck and dumbfounded, we are left with no
recourse but fear, and even this fear is something new to our age— "the hyperreal
formation of an entirely new species of fear" — and therefore alien to us. This
terrifying new stage signals a capitalism, like the Borg in Star Trek, advancing
without resistance:
I live not far from the UCLA campus in Westwood and nearly
every night I hear the wailing cries of drunken students, cries
family, has today in the world of organizational bureaucracy dissolved; and the
more radical poststructuralist position for which such a subject never existed in
the first place but constituted something like an ideological mirage— I obviously
incline towards the former; the latter must in any case take into account
something like a "reality of the appearance." (Jameson 1984, 63)
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which at once evoke the empty humor of Hee-Haw and the more
serious, reflective pain of youthful bodies responding to the slow
commodification of their will under late capitalism. [...] Massumi
argues that capitalism is co-extensive with its own inside such that
it has now become both a field of immanence and exteriority. There
is no escape. There is only fear. Fear, reports Massumi, is now the
objective condition of subjectivity in the era of late capitalism. In
this sense, it means something more than a fear of downward
mobility but rather the constitution of the self within a market
culture and market morality. (McLaren 1994, 329)
What are the repercussions of this view of subjectivity, which on the one
hand insists that there are true identities for subjects, rooted in their class
interests, and on the other hand presents a Borg-like ever-expanding capitalist
system that has created a society in which there is no escape from an imposed
insane subjectivity? Their views of subjectivity lead the critical pedagogists to
simultaneously call for an educational and political project of addressing the
deficiency in individuals self-knowledge and knowledge of the economic reality
determining their (false) subjectivities, while at the same time insisting that the
logic of capitalist expansion has colonized subjectivities to such a degree that
such knowledge is impossible. For example, McLaren argues for a pedagogy
based on disseminating knowledge of structural economic reality, but his
understanding of the power of that reality to determine subjectivity seems to
preclude subjects capable of being transformed by such knowledge:
We need to understand how identities are produced through
structural relations and constraints and the systems of intelligibility
we have historically inherited and invented and which produce us
on a daily basis. It means understanding the causes of oppression
and exploitation and the material effects of economic practices and
capitalist logics. (McLaren 1994, 330)
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In a later passage, McLaren asserts that critical educators must work to create the
conditions for the subaltern to "escape the labyrinth of subjugation, to make
critical counterstatements against the logic of domination that informs the
dominant white supremacist ideology of patriarchal capitalism" (1994, 333).
However, his subsequent pronouncements reinforce the inevitability of that
capitalist order's ultimate victory -a victory which has indeed already taken
place. In the very same paragraph in which he asserts that the subaltern can
escape the subjugation of global capitalism, he states that even "difference," a
potential tool which could have been used in the resistance to capitalist
domination, has already been co-opted by the enemy and used to strengthen its
global dominance, as "diversity in the public domain is challenged and delimited
by the privatization of 'univocality, exclusion, and exclusivity.' In other words,
diversity itself has become commodified in the interests of corporate capitalism.
Multiculturalism is one of the hottest commodities presently circulating in the
global marketplace" (1994, 333).
Aronowitz and Giroux similarly insist that what needs to be answered is
"how subordinate groups can struggle collectively to create conditions that
enable them better to understand how their identities have been constructed
within dominant and subordinate relations of power, and what it takes to
struggle for their own voices and visions while simultaneously working to
transform the social and material conditions that have oppressed them...."
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(Aronowitz and Giroux 1991, 73-4). They go on to insist that this struggle to
achieve understanding
— to fill in the deficiencies of knowledge about the
economy in oppressed individuals- cannot take place outside of that all-
encompassing capitalist order; indeed, they say, "the struggle for voice and
collective empowerment has to be forged within, not outside, the mediating
traditions and histories that link the center and the margins of late capitalism"
(Aronowitz and Giroux 1991, 73-4). This assertion again resolidifies the fixed
identity of the economy while simultaneously calling for an (impossible)
alternative subjectivity.
The Impasse
While the economy in all its concrete and horrific reality resides as a focal
point of the critical pedagogists' work, and as the monstrous structure which
their activism is intended to undermine, the manner in which they discursively
represent the economy, and the subjectivity determined within it, limits the
possibility of recognizing and enacting alternatives to that economic totality.
Firstly, the critical pedagogists' representation of the economy
simultaneously constructs the economy as a coherent, overpowering space of
capitalist domination at the same time that it abandons the economic as a site of
social construction, contestation, and potential transformation. This is so because
they would argue that imagining subjectivities outside of the hegemonic and
totalizing economy, challenging their fundamental reading of the economy as a
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centered capitalist structure, and directly engaging in alternative economic
practices are all by definition practices of duplicitous mystification (see, for
example, McLaren 1995,18). Any attempt to directly engage in (or at times even
acknowledge the existence of) noncapitalist activities is doomed to failure or co-
optation by an all-powerful capitalist totality. The only solution to their proposed
problem of the overwhelming economic system is its complete, revolutionary,
and almost instantaneous transformation.
Their project for precipitating this total social transformation is to provide
the population with the correct understanding of the economic reality, a direct,
transparent knowledge of its hard edges, clear dimensions, global effects, and
immanent logics. Pedagogical work, predicated upon a modernist position of
centered subjectivity and class identity, therefore assumes the familiar task of
eliminating false consciousness and making visible the totality of the capitalist
economy
—
producing and relying upon a subject position of true consciousness
outside of the capitalist economy which, paradoxically, the critical pedagogists
have shown to be impossible. Consequently, by building their economic
narratives on modernist claims about knowledge, politics, history, and
subjectivity, the critical pedagogists perpetuate a theoretical discourse which
only serves to marginalize their own efforts. If history has inevitably advanced to
produce global capitalism, if capitalism is so vast that we are incapable of
producing a subjectivity outside of it— so vast that there is no longer any
"outside" to it— then there appears to be little point in engaging in the kind of
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political work which the critical pedagogists themselves advocate. Their
economists, capitalocentric, and teleological representation of social reality has
constructed a world in which there is little hope for escape. Decrying the
submission of our wills to " late capitalism/' they have already ceded the ground
in theoretical terms in their discursive construction of economic reality.
Like the promoters of the Roxbury Charter High School for Business,
Finance, and Entrepreneurship, the critical pedagogists see economic reality to be
self-evident and determining other, non-economic social relations, activities, and
subjectivities. They also understand the problem of subjectivity to be one of a
deficiency of knowledge about this economic reality; liberatory politics is, for
both, predicated on the disadvantaged properly integrating correct knowledge.
For the critical pedagogists, young people are victims of a false knowledge. Their
subjectivities are distorted by a consumer culture which hides from them their
true situation, but if they could be given proper knowledge, this culture and this
economic reality could be overthrown. For the promoters of the Roxbury Charter
High School, when individuals' deficiencies (lack of knowledge, information,
attitude, or behavior) are addressed and filled, those individuals will become
satisfied full citizens, integrated with the economy.
Significantly, the language with which both the Roxbury school promoters
and the critical pedagogists speak of the economy lacks a rhetorical dimension;
language is transparent and intuitive, the medium through which real
knowledge is communicated. We may well ask by what hegemonic practices
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such views of a totalizing economic reality have become so dominant that they
apply in both projects, in the discourses of both the left and right, and ask if an
alternative political vision might not be better served by an alternative discourse
of economy and subjectivity. The following chapters will explore two approaches
to countering the essentialist structuralism and centered subjectivity which leads
to the impasse described above. The first is reading for economic difference,
based on Derridean deconstruction and marxian poststructuralist economic
theory. It asks. How might a technique of reading for economic difference make
alternative economic practices and subjectivities possible? The second is viewing
the subject as inherently one of "lack," a view based on Lacanian psychoanalytic
theory. This approach asks: By what processes, involving identification,
language, and the unconscious, do we come to be subjects who desire and act?
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CHAPTER 3
THE SUBJECT AND ECONOMY OF FANTASY
All, regardless of race or class or economic status, are entitled to a
fair chance and to the tools for developing their individual powers
of mind and spirit to the utmost. This promise means that all
children by virtue of their own efforts, competently guided, can
hope to attain the mature and informed judgment needed to secure
gainful employment, and to manage their own lives, thereby
serving not only their own interests but also the progress of society
itself.
-A Nation At Risk (1983, 4)
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it seeks to challenge the deeply
held economistic and subjectivist views dominant in educational discourse,
employing antiessentialist marxian economic theory to counter the former view
and Lacanian psychoanalytical subjectivity to address the latter. These
antiessentialist approaches to economics and subjectivity, relying on the notions
of contingency, overdeterminism, and incomplete identity, help to make possible
political options that are not visible within essentialist social theories, such as
those of the critical pedagogists or the Roxbury charter school proponents. The
second purpose of the chapter is to extend this antiessentialist critique by
applying the Lacanian formulation of fantasy. Identifying essentialist
constructions as Lacanian fantasy— constructions that suspend subjects in the
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desires of the fantasy narrative
-brings to the forefront the issue of desire in
subjectivity and politics (a point which will be further developed in subsequent
chapters).
The chapter will present a review of pertinent antiessentialist economic
theory, followed by a summary discussion of key aspects of Lacanian
psychoanalytic theory. The chapter will conclude by explaining the Lacanian
notions of fantasy and symptom, how they apply to the economistic and
subjectivist strains of educational discourse, and the importance of constructing
an alternative, anti-utopian political and educational project.
The Challenge of Poststructuralist Antiessentialist Economics
A number of poststructuralist, marxian-inspired social theorists associated
with the journal Rethinking Marxism and the Association for Economic and Social
Analysis (AESA) have challenged the reductionist economic assumptions so
prevalent in the work of the critical pedagogists (and of their conservative
opponents). These include the assumption that society is structured by its
economic relations, that the economy is essentially capitalist, and that anything
that is not yet capitalist is in a relation of subservience to capitalism. The work of
the antiessentialist economic theorists suggests a possible path around the
political impasse facing the critical pedagogists. If, rather than abandoning the
poststructuralist insights at the border of the putatively economic, the critical
pedagogists applied such insights to the discussion of economics, capitalism.
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schooling, and politics, novel approaches might become visible. Theorizing
capitalism as weak, disunited, and vulnerable to attack on multiple fronts; seeing
noncapitalisms as already existing, multiplying, powerful, and vibrant; and
accepting terms such as "the economy," "capitalism," and "class" as shifting and
unsettled social constructions rather than absolute extra-theoretic components of
reality might offer a number of advantages- strategically, politically, and
emotionally.
One antiessentialist marxian approach involves a process of reading for
economic difference rather than assuming the economy is a unified and unitary
capitalist field (Gibson-Graham 1996). This process of reading for economic
difference can be seen in light of the project of a number of recent feminist
theorists, such as Nancy Folbre, Marilyn Waring, and Lourdes Beneria. These
feminist theorists and activists have critiqued conventional representations of the
economy by pointing out that what has traditionally been seen as "woman's
work" has fallen outside the definition of legitimate or significant economic
activity (see for example Waring 1984). Challenging a definition of economy that
privileges traditionally masculine activities while making the feminine sphere
derivative, secondary, and non-economic, these theorists have pointed out that
when unpaid household and neighborhood labor (for example, childcare and
housework) are accounted for, as much as fifty percent of all economic activity is
excluded from labor force statistics and national income and product accounts
(Beneria 1992, 1996; Ironmonger 1996). Strikingly, this is the case in both rich and
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poor countries. Because these activities are invisible in national accounting
methods, social resources are not directed to their support; development is
linked to expanding firm, market, and paid forms of economy even when
expanding such relationships consequently places greater strains on other
"noneconomic" or "nonproductive" spheres, such as childrearing.13
Michael Apple, it should be pointed out, does acknowledge the important
labor that is performed in the household, though he frames it in familiar terms as
enforced labor dictated by an essentially patriarchal society oppressive to women
(Apple 1996, 85-90). 14 Just as patriarchy rules in the home, capitalism rules in the
economy and therefore "it is essential that we begin to understand more fully not
only the effects of the political economy of capitalism on the lives and futures of
youth, but the political economy of patriarchal relations as well" (Apple 1996,
86). While he recognizes the ideological violence of denying the economic reality
of domestic labor, Apple simultaneously reasserts a conventional definition of
13 In Michael Moore's recent documentary Bowling for Columbine (2002), we find a vivid and
disturbing example of the social consequences of privileging one form of economic activity
(capitalist wage labor) over unpaid domestic work. In one segment, Moore begins with an
incident in which a six-year old boy has shot and killed another child at school; investigating the
story behind the tragedy, Moore discovers that the boy's mother, in order to receive welfare
payments, was being forced to spend many hours a day away from home working two jobs in a
distant shopping mall. Still unable to pay her rent, she had left her son unattended at his uncle's
home. It was in this context that the child found his uncle's gun and brought it to school. See also
Russo and Healy (2000) for a discussion of how conventional economic development, privileging
industrial growth over housing and community, may be critiqued for replacing one economically
productive sphere with another. In the context of a proposed economic development initiative in
Holyoke MA, they ask how the household-based neighborhood economy could be supported
with an alternative development strategy.
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the economy as what takes place in the world of capitalist jobs and markets; it is
this economic reality which is fundamental and thus he concludes that changes
in the schools will not alter real socioeconomic, capitalist relations, which are the
basis of oppression. He concludes that what the poor really need are good, high-
paying, socially valued jobs: Finally, and perhaps most important it [securing
answers to the problem of dropouts and students who are at-risk] requires a
growing economy that has meaningful jobs at the end of one's school
experience" (1996, 89). Unfortunately he breaks off his analysis of domestic labor
soon after introducing the issue, saying, inexplicably, that "we cannot go into
detail here about this" (86). But in a fascinating footnote Apple offers the
observation that "most definitions [of what counts as a job] privilege male
definitions and give less attention to the work surrounding caring and
connectedness that in many societies women usually do. Thus, we need to alter
our very assumptions about labor and must support much greater diversity both
ideologically and economically" (Apple 1996, nll7, 134). This footnote opens the
door— a crack— to the possibility of seeing greater difference in the economy
itself, and therefore offers an opening to the antiessentialist marxian project.
Just as the feminist economists point to the ideological and political
consequences of particular definitions of the economy (as masculine, public.
14 For an alternative, more interesting exploration of the subjective and affective possibilities
associated with domestic labor, see Cameron, 1996/97 and 2000.
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visible, and valued), certain marxian economists have drawn attention to the
political and ideological consequences of defining the economy as singularly or
overwhelmingly capitalist. J.K. Gibson-Graham (1996) argues that it is both
possible and "potentially productive to understand capitalist hegemony as a
(dominant) discourse rather than a social articulation or structure. Thus one
might represent economic practice as comprising a rich diversity of capitalist and
noncapitalist activities and argue that the noncapitalist ones had until now been
relatively invisible' because the concepts and discourses that could make them
'visible' have themselves been marginalized and suppressed" (Gibson-Graham,
x-ix). With this in mind, Gibson-Graham investigates that rich diversity of
activities, reading for economic and class difference rather than sameness. She
asks, for example, how market exchange and commodification could be explored
without a priori folding them into capitalism, and how other economic processes
could be analyzed in such a way that they also are not folded into a single,
unitary (capitalist) process. This is a process of denaturalizing capitalist
dominance and viewing the economic field as a site of multiple, contradictory,
existing, and emerging capitalist and non-capitalist forms. As the anthropologist
Arturo Escobar writes, to give serious consideration to this questioning of
capitalism's global dominance, and to see "noncapitalisms always on the rise,"
"certainly supposes a different politics of reading on our part as analysts, with
the concomitant need to contribute to a different politics of representation of
reality" (Escobar 1998).
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Marxian Class Language
An anti-essentialist class language, based on concepts initiated by Marx in
Capital, and further developed by Resnick and Wolff (1987) and others, provides
a tool for reading for difference in the economy. Reading for economic difference
offers a powerful counter to the capitalocentrism prevalent in the work of the
critical pedagogists. Such a language of class-as-process offers a way of
perceiving and naming economic difference; it allows us to define capitalism in
such a way that its specificities are preserved, limited, and bounded so that
capitalism does not overtake and colonize the entire social landscape. One of the
focuses of Marx s Capital was on the way in which the production process
frequently involves the production, appropriation, and distribution of surplus
labor (that which goes beyond what is deemed, socially, to be necessary to
sustain the productive laborer). Marx theorizes capitalist relations of production
and appropriation of surplus in Volume I, and investigates the distribution of
surplus enabling those relations in Volumes II and III. His goal is to shed light on
the workings of capitalism but his class language also provides a flexible and
fluid method for analyzing a great diversity of economic relations other than
capitalism. Surplus, for example, may be produced not only in industrial
manufacturing or in capitalist firms, but in a wide variety of sites, including the
household, the school, the stadium, the temple, and the brothel. (See Class and Its
Others and Re/Presenting Class for a variety of applications of the notions of class
and the production, appropriation, and distribution of surplus).
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The ways in which this surplus is produced, appropriated, and distributed
assumes different forms; some of these include the ancient or independent form
(or "self-employment," in which an individual appropriates his or her own
surplus); slavery (in which an owner appropriates the products of a slave who
lacks freedom of contract); feudalism (in which surplus is appropriated on the
grounds of fealty or obligation); capitalism (in which an employer appropriates
surplus in the form of value from his or her wage employees); and communism
(in which those who collectively produce surplus collectively appropriate and
distribute it). These then are the various forms of "class process" (the particular
combinations of the activities of producing, appropriating, and distributing
surplus labor) that are the focus of this school of marxian analysis. Such an
approach does not begin with the individual as the foundation of social analysis,
as Marxists such as John Roemer (1982) or Erik Olin Wright (1985) have done,
and is thus distinct from those schools of analysis that pose "class" as an
agglomeration of individuals, based on their ownership or control over
resources, means of production, or wealth, and from those which pose a
fundamental class structure based on a power essentialism which divides the
population between those who are the "oppressed" or "dominated" and those
who oppress and dominate; indeed, viewing class as a process suggests that any
one individual may occupy, simultaneously and with potentially contradictory
effects, more than one class position (see for example Marx [1894] 1991, 498).
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Committed to a non-essentialist, non-reductionist position, this
poststructuralist marxian approach has an entry point of class that nevertheless
resists assuming any class or non-class process to be more essential or more
significant than any other (Cullenberg 1992, 69). Any particular class process is
complexly constituted (or overdetermined) by the entire social context (involving
everything from accounting procedures to cultural understandings of gender
roles to the natural processes contributing to productive inputs, and so on).
Therefore the different forms which the production, appropriation, and
distribution of surplus labor assume require a variety of economic, cultural, and
political conditions of existence, and these various forms and the diversity of
their conditions of existence can not be assumed to exist in any necessary
relationship (DeMartino 1993). For example, there is no one configuration of
property ownership or power relationship to which the class process of
capitalism (or communism, or feudalism, etc), corresponds in any necessary
fashion. The class language must be applied to each circumstance, with the
understanding that the analyst applying the language is making a partial,
partisan, always incomplete, complex, and overdetermined intervention.
Importantly, in this context, poststructuralist marxian economists have used
class language and reading for economic difference to challenge the fixed
boundaries, determined causalities, and supposed closed identities of essentialist
economic discourses of both the left and the right. They have done this by
asserting the discursive nature of knowledge, even economic knowledge.
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Because the AESA approach acknowledges the interpretive process in economic
analysis, it forces one to acknowledge also the inherent gap or negativity in
identity, the impossibility of an absolute closure built on absolute knowledge (a
point which will be discussed further in below). As Jack Amariglio has argued,
we must accept that economic “science” is discursive in nature:
Postmodernism brings to light the discursive nature of all
knowledge (including economic theory), and it refuses to see the
division between knowledge and other discursive forms as one
between the operation of science and reason and that of emotion,
sensuality, and so on. Discourse analysis of economic theory, at
least in postmodern thought, is not a question of ascertaining the
scientific core of concepts and methods; rather it is a question of
seeing how language and other discursive forms can produce the
meanings that determine partly our cognitive experiences of
economic reality. (Amariglio 1990, 16)
Accepting the process of reading for economic difference means acknowledging
the impossibility of a closure of the social totality around the master signifier of
the late capitalist economy. It also challenges relations of assumed hierarchy or
determinant causality; the closure of history implied by teleological theories of
economic and social development; and the inevitable colonization of subjectivity
in the face of capitalist expansion. Resisting essentializing or totalizing social
analyses or teleological historical visions, we are compelled to reformulate the
kinds of questions we ask when investigating social relations. While the critical
pedagogists see capitalist structures and relations of exploitation saturating the
landscape, from the macro-scale of the global to the micro-scale of individual
subjectivity, an alternative marxian approach addresses the complex
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heterogeneity of contemporary society. For instance, Apple offers the situations
which he finds in third world countries as examples of the "large-scale forms of
domination and exploitation" marking "what we can objectively call capitalism":
I must admit that when I am in Brazil, Thailand, and other
countries doing educational and political work and participating
with groups of people struggling to keep babies alive, to find
enough food to eat, to even get a minimum of schooling for their
children, when I work with others to build international
movements to support these people's struggles, because of all that,
I think the relations that make up what we can objectively call
capitalism are much more oppressive than other kinds of relations
in many situations. (Apple 1993, 176, emphases in original)
Reading for economic difference rather than homogeneity allows for a number of
alternative possibilities, including the possibility that the people Apple observes
in Brazil and Thailand are not engaged in exploitative capitalist activities— in
other words, are not wage employees producing surplus value for a capitalist
employer. Indeed, individuals suffering those privations may be involved in
feudal relations — producing surplus which is appropriated and distributed via a
network of feudal obligations. Some of them may be ancients, individually
producing and appropriating their own surplus. 15 Or at any one moment in the
day they may be involved in different class activities, occupying different class
positions (for example, a capitalist worker in an industrial factory, but a feudal
15 See for example the analysis in Stormes (1988) of the various class and non-class relations the
poor are involved in, beyond occupying the position of exploited capitalist worker.
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lord in his home, appropriating and distributing the surplus labor of others in his
household) (Fraad et al. 1994).
Allowing the possibility for such interpretations of these complex social
worlds permits us, furthermore, to explore the interstitial spaces of economic
difference and to ask additional questions, about the articulation of various class
and non-class activities. For example, even if a large number of the people Apple
is in contact with in Brazil and Thailand are employed as capitalist workers, we
might ask what class relations exist within the families of such employees. We
might explore the relationships, complex and contradictory, between capitalist
exploitation and (among others) the struggle to keep babies alive, to find enough
to eat, and to secure a minimum of schooling for their children, and find
alternative points where intervention might be effective.
Economic Difference and Educational Sites
Similarly we can apply marxian class analysis to educational sites and
processes. We can read existing educational practices for how they already
facilitate non-capitalist economic practices, resisting readings that uncritically
interpret educational practices as swallowed up by or implicated in the capitalist
social totality. A local high school, for example, may contain glimmers of,
experiments in, or even wholesale flourishing examples of communal, ancient, or
non-exploitative non-class economic activities. As I write this, I occasionally
glance up from my work and look out my window at an apple orchard across the
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street a part of the local vocational agricultural high school. Beyond it are barns
holding farm animals, composting bins for refuse from local restaurants, and
welding and carpentry shops where students are constructing components for a
nearby residential house. How might we theorize the activities that occur in such
a site? Holding a totalizing, colonizing view of capitalism, we may see them as
necessarily subordinate to and supportive of capitalism, if not indeed already
capitalist in nature. Alternatively, however, we might apply a narrow definition
of class and distinguish pedagogical activities enacting a whole range of class
processes; for example, the homes built annually by the vocational high school
students, with the donated labor of architects and building trades professionals,
sold on the open market, with profits returned to the next year's building project
may be activities simply marked by capitalism, or such a project may involve a
mixture of communal, ancient, feudal, slave, and non-class processes (Sowula
interview, 2001). By acknowledging the possible existence of such class
heterogeneity, we are better able to imagine and influence activities in our
schools which support our economic, political, and ethical commitments.
Similarly, by reading for class difference rather simply assuming capitalist
class predominance, we may question the tendency of the critical pedagogists to
view individuals' subjectivity under capitalism as tied in an essentialist and
reductionist manner to a commodification made equivalent to capitalism. How
might the marxian language of class help to shake the rather imposing vision of
insane or robotic consumers depicted in McLaren's work? In the first place, when
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class is understood as a complex, shifting, overdetermined process rather as a
definitive set of economic categories, the notion of a fixed class identity becomes
untenable. Without a notion of true class subjectivity, the ground establishing
false consciousness arguments falls away. Secondly, pushing McLaren's
metaphor, we may investigate ways in which a shopping mall and the
commodities to be found in it concretely have no inherent relationship to
capitalism
-the goods sold in any mall may have been produced under a wide
range of class processes.
Furthermore, we may even permit the possibility of consumption as an act of
resistance, undermining the capitalist class process while promoting other
noncapitalist class and non-class processes. In the Spanish Basque industrial
region of Mondragon, for example, communal noncapitalist firms produce
consumer goods for the market, sold not only in the Basque region, but
throughout Spain and Europe. Such sites also produce goods which serve as
inputs into other communal production processes. It is possible to theorize
consumption in the United States— for example, the purchases of goods and
services which schools make, the many purchases which students make— as
actions which have the potential to affect, positively or negatively, various class
processes. Here, we may think of the efforts of students at some US colleges, who
have organized campaigns to prevent their schools from buying and selling
goods bearing their schools' logos that are produced under child-labor or sweat-
shop conditions. While these are not specifically marxian in language at the
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moment, one can imagine campaigns directed towards purchasing goods
produced communally or by the self-employed, or against goods produced
under slave, feudal, or capitalist conditions. Indeed, in recent months, a worker-
cooperative located in Los Angeles, Sweat-X, has successfully campaigned with
such anti-sweatshop student groups to win university clothing contracts (Center
for Popular Economics "EconoTopia" website entry by Graham, Healy, Byme,
2002).
The current charter school movement, to take another example, has been
read by many of its opponents solely in terms of privatization, market relations,
profit logics, and commodification, and therefore solely in terms of the expansion
of capitalism. Certainly there are many grounds for criticizing the charter school
movement. By engaging in such conflations, however, progressive educators
may fail to see the radical potential for encouraging the spread of
noncapitalisms— in particular, non-exploitative economic class and non-class
processes— in this educational experiment. The mechanisms for establishing
charter schools may provide opportunities for alternatively organizing the
administrative, decision-making, and financial structures of schools, shifting the
processes by which the dividing line between surplus and necessary labor is
determined, and how surplus is produced, appropriated, and distributed (Byrne
1999). Rather than reading the charter school movement solely in terms of
encroaching capitalism, we may find opportunities for developing self-
consciously non-exploitative economic relationships within our schools.
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Similarly, the co-operative system of Mondragon can be read as an
uncomplicated story of co-optation by capitalism (see for example Kasmir 1996)
in which a sophisticated secondary and tertiary educational system is implicated.
Alternatively, reading for economic difference and resisting the conflation of the
market and capitalism allows for the possibility that a communal class process
exists (in one of its manifestations) alongside market relations and a hierarchical
management structure. The Mondragon educational system may then emerge as
both an economic process in itself (rather than an activity already and always
subsumed or supplementary to capitalism), and one which fosters alternatives to
the capitalist class process, alternatives which we may find extremely attractive
for a whole range of reasons.
From the perspective of an anti-essentialist marxian class analysis, we should
also not too quickly dismiss the curriculum of the Roxbury Charter High School
as simply and necessarily fashioning students to fit the needs of the capitalist
world order, either as exploited workers or as the exploiting owners of capitalist
businesses. One can easily imagine many of the "skills and information" goals of
the RCHS planners fitting a curriculum designed to prepare individuals to
participate in explicitly non-capitalist economic relations— either exploitative
(e.g., feudal), self-appropriating (e.g., ancient or independent commodity
producers), or collective (communally producing, appropriating, and
distributing surplus). For example, worker collectives in the U.S. share a great
deal of information and are eager to learn about how other collective enterprises
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function in relation to the state and federal tax codes, payment of dividends,
accounting practices, and so on. In the "Mathematics Standards" section of the
Roxbury Charter School application we find that students should be able to
Demonstrate understanding of specific terminology, concepts, and skill in
mathematics, and in applications of specific mathematical principles to business
procedures and financial management such as accounting, employee benefits,
and tax planning" and "Prepare, interpret, and analyze financial statements"
(RCHS 5). These could obviously be useful to non-capitalist and specifically non-
exploitative class processes. It is only by assuming a singular class identity for
economic relations that such approaches to schooling offer no hope of fostering
non-capitalism.
While McLaren, Apple, and the other critical pedagogists present a
pessimistic vision of an ever-expanding capitalist world order, they spend little
time discussing the contours of either noncapitalist economic activity or of
subjects occupying positions outside of capitalism's global net. Reading for
economic difference by employing marxian class language is a way of
maintaining a focus on the gap within the social field, of resisting the
institutionalization of an apparent closure of the social around the sign of
capitalism. This closure is, of course, not possible; it is not possible to corral all
possible meanings under the singular signifier of a global late capitalist totality.
But what should be emphasized here is that the unquestioned pursuit of
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closure
-impossible as it may be to achieve
-is a kind of fantasy, in the Lacanian
sense of the term. Such fantastical pursuits of fixed identity, fundamental unity,
and true speech beyond ideological distortion have potentially dire
consequences, including sedimenting individual and social desires and blocking
potential alternative economic subjectivities and practices from emerging. This is
a point which will be taken up in the next section of this chapter, bringing us to
the impossible closure attempted in the fantasy of the sovereign subject.
The Challenge of Lacanian Subjectivity
Subjectivity as a topic of philosophical investigation is of course neither a
recent nor a uniquely "Western" concern
.
16 Descartes, however, is a common
starting point for discussions of subjectivity, and it is in reaction to the Cartesian
subject that significant theorists have constructed alternative, anti-humanist
theories of the subject, which provide useful counters to the fixed subjects or
subjects of false consciousness to be found in the work of the critical pedagogists.
16 For example, Buddhist teaching has long been centrally concerned with the nature of the
subject, as in this passage from The Living Thoughts ofGotama the Buddha, where the Buddha
explains why he comes down neither on the side of those who see a true self nor on the side of
those who claim the self is merely an illusion:
If I, Ananda, on being asked by the wanderer, Vacchagotta, if there is a Self,
should have answered that there is a Self, this, Ananada, would have been a
siding-in with those recluses and brahmans who are Eternalists. If I, Ananda, on
being asked by the wanderer, Vacchagotta, if there is not a Self, should have
answered that there is not a Self, this, Ananda, would have been a siding-in with
those recluses and brahmans who are Annihilationists.... The wanderer,
Vacchagotta, already confused, would have been increasingly confused (and he
would have thought): "Was there not formerly a Self for me? There is none
now." (Coomaraswamy and Horner 1948, 149)
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The Subject of Descartes
The concept of the subject as an autonomous ego with a self-transparent
consciousness seems natural today, but (as Lacan and others argue) it is a
relatively recent cultural construction (Lacan S2, 4-7; Evans 25). This is the
Enlightenment subject, the "I" of Descartes' "I think, therefore I am" (Cogito ergo
sum). Ironically, this subject of certitude emerges out of Descartes' profound
struggles with doubt. In his Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), Descartes
declares that our senses sometimes deceive us and we must therefore reject the
notion that we can have a true grasp of reality through simple empirical
observation of the world. The most basic self-apparent facts may in fact be
deceptions, as when we dream but believe the dream is real. Pushing this doubt
even further, Descartes introduces the figure of an all-powerful demon, who
deceives him at every turn, creating an endless universe of illusions. From this
extreme state of doubt, in which everything, including the existence of God, is
unprovable, Descartes constructs his metaphysics of knowledge, which begins
with the one knowable truth: the thinking self-conscious subject. "Let him [the
demon] deceive me as much as he will, he can never cause me to be nothing so
long as I think that I am something" (Descartes, 64).
From this secured foundational identity — the essence of the subject is the
process of rational thought— Descartes deduces the existence of an all-powerful
and perfect God, who gave this gift of rationality to us. Cartesian science builds
upon the innate ideas planted within us by this divine force, in particular an
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innate mathematical logic. Here we have a model of the subject built upon a core
or foundational truth (in reason), swirling in a morass of often deceptive
empirical sensory data. Thus, the basis of knowledge is to be found in the nature
of the self-knowing "I." The world can be understood if we begin with the self,
and the self is synonymous with consciousness.
There have been numerous "anti-humanist" responses to the essentialist
identity of the autonomous Cartesian subject. One is the anti-subjective path of
Nietzsche and Foucault, who reject the category of the subject as a given in favor
of a view of the subject as an effect of power/ knowledge. The other is the path of
psychoanalysis, of Freud and Lacan, which maintains the subject as an object of
study, with certain structural characteristics, although these are not outside of
culture, language, or contingency.
Although various proponents of these schools of thought have exhibited
antagonism towards each other (in addition to their disagreements with the
common enemy, the essentialized self), there have been important efforts in
recent years by some theorists to bring these schools together, if not to merge
them then to see where they can inform each other and overcome deadlocks.
Their concern has been how to imagine a politics without the old metaphysics of
unity, whole, subject. There are some similarities or congruencies between,
broadly, Foucauldian and psychoanalytical/ Lacanian approaches to the subject.
Both reject the notion of the subject as an autonomous given. Mansfield argues
that both views direct attention to language as a central force in the general
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context through which the individual becomes a subject. Which aspect of
language or what role language plays in this process differs. For Lacan, it is the
operation of the signifier which is key; for Foucault, it is discourses of truth and
knowledge. To psychoanalysis, the Foucauldian tradition omits a fully fledged
definition of the nature of the subject. To Foucault, it is this very need to derive a
final and complete understanding of the nature of the subject that makes
psychoanalysis a 'totalitarian 7 theory, collaborating with power rather than
revealing some way of frustrating it-his understanding of the ultimate purpose
of theoretical work 7 (Mansfield 52). I intend to argue that the Lacanian notions of
subjectivity can in fact offer a non-totalitarian and potentially liberating
alternative to the Cartesian subject so prevalent in contemporary political and
educational practice.
The Subject of Lacan
After Freud's exposure of the unconscious, the subject could no longer be
aligned in a simple manner with ego and consciousness (Evans 26), for now it
was clear that there were other sources of knowledge that operated - to powerful
effect— outside of the self-knowledge of the conscious ego. Lacan's work
continues this challenge to the obviousness of the free and self-contained
individual and poses instead a subject who is always lacking a full identity. For
Lacan, the split subject (composed of the conscious "I" and the unconscious) is
not a sign of mental illness, but a general condition of subjectivity itself (Evans,
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192); or, put another way, in this sense all subjects share this mental illness, "the
human symptom par excellence, the mental illness of man" (Lacan, SI, 16, quoted
in Evans, 51). The Lacanian subject of lack, constituted in relationship to a
similarly lacking exteriority, is a powerful challenge to the essentialist economic
and other identities evident in the work of educational progressives like the
critical pedagogists. It also demands that we rethink the relationship between
individuals, reality, and desire.
One of the defining features of Lacanian theory is that it moves away from
the biologically determinist elements of Freud's theory and instead foregrounds
those unconscious forms of knowledge, and the very structure of the subject, in
the intersubjective and structural nature of language:
This is one of the essential things I said last time— analysis can be
distinguished from everything that was produced by discourse
prior to analysis by the fact that it enunciates the following, which
is the very backbone of my teaching— I speak without knowing it. I
speak with my body and I do so unbeknownst to myself. Thus I
always say more than I know.
This is where I arrive at the meaning of the word "subject" in
analytic discourse. What speaks without knowing it makes me "I,"
subject of the verb. (Lacan 1998, 119)
It is in this context that Lacan famously asserts that "the unconscious is
structured like a language" (S3, 167). Like a language, the unconscious is
dependent on a system of knowledge, grammar, rules, conventions— in sum, the
symbolic order of the culture. This indicates the radically external nature of the
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unconscious, which is often understood in conventional language as the most
intimate, secret layer of our individuality.^ It also indicates the inherently
incomplete and contingent nature of the subject because, following Saussurean
structuralist and poststructuralist linguistic theory, Lacan understands language
to be based on a system of difference, in which meaning is dependent on sliding,
shifting, and essentially empty signifiers, which are in turn always
metaphorically and metonymically linked to other signifiers. The signifier, Lacan
writes, "is constituted only from a synchronic and enumerable collection of
elements in which each is sustained only by the principle of its opposition to
each of the others" (Lacan 1977a, 304). In a typically poetic passage from "The
Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason Since Freud," Lacan describes
the signifying chain of language as "rings of a necklace that is a ring in another
necklace made of rings (Lacan 1977a, 153). It is within this contingent, sliding
linguistic system that the subject of lack is constituted.
Another way of understanding this subject of lack is through the cultural
constitution of the subject. The individual even before birth is enmeshed in a
social and symbolic system— provided with a name, a place in the familial order
and within the systems of meaning of gender, race, nationality, etc. As the
individual takes on this symbolic order, taking in language and social codes of
17
"If the unconscious seems interior, this is an effect of the imaginary, which blocks the
relationship between the subject and the Other and which inverts the message of the Other"
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behavior, what emerges is a subject but one who is constitutively incomplete, in
precisely the same way that an ultimate fixity of language is impossible
-as
words are insufficiently attached to the things they name. While the "I" of the
subject is so often experienced as a complete and whole identity, its final
meaning is continuously deferred.
In Lacan s work, the subject exists through a process of identifying with
something external to it, identification being "the transformation that takes place
in the subject when he assumes an image" (Lacan 1977a, 2). This identification is
a product of the inevitably incomplete subject. Through identification
— with an
image, with a signifier, in language- subjects attempt to fill in this constitutive
lack and achieve a sense of unity of self. One example of the power of
identification can be seen in the way obsessive sports fans identify with their
team. 18 Two recent autobiographical books, Nick Hornsby's Fever Pitch and Tim
Parks' A Season With Verona, capture the strange identificatory power the soccer
teams Arsenal and Hellas Verona, respectively, have over the two authors,
capable of triggering intense childlike emotions of obsessive love and
(Evans, 218). The imaginary is discussed below.
18 The physical consequences of fantastical identification are evident in the tensed muscles, raised
heartbeats, and profuse sweating of the fan in mid-game. It has also been demonstrated to change
the body's chemistry:
SALT LAKE CITY, Utah, May 22 Reuters - Researcher Paul Bernhardt and three
colleagues have found that testosterone levels in Brazilian soccer fans who
watched their country win the 1994 World Cup final increased by about 20 per
cent. Levels of the male hormone fell by the same amount in fans of the losing
Italians, Bernhardt said.
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aggressivity, loyalty and disappointment. Parks explicitly links the sense of
wholeness the fan feels swallowed up in the songs of the stadium to the religious
sublimity of singing in the church choir as a boy. "[Wjhat a dangerous thing it is
to be taken to a football game as a little kid and to enter into the song of a group
like the Brigate Gialloblu," he writes, referring to the hardcore fans of the
"Yellowblue Brigade" (Parks 2002, 175). "In a football crowd one moves
constantly in and out of the spell, in and out of the group, in and out of the law.
Singing together you are all-powerful, singing alone you are a fool" (Parks 181).
Parks is sensitive to the religious power of sport, to transport you temporarily
and make you feel whole and complete, and also to the idiocy of the
identification, revealed at those moments when its power temporarily fails:
unlike other transporting experiences whose function it
unwittingly seeks to replace, giving shape and direction to our
lives, football is nevertheless something we all stand outside of
from time to time. Then, like the man who hears his voice after all
the others have already stopped chanting, we feel vaguely
embarrassed and say: it's only a game. Ridiculous words! There are
other more important things, we say. Absurd! At which, we sense a
sudden emptiness. It's the emptiness of the temple robbed of its
gods. (Parks 188)
Identification sometimes loses its grips, but even when it is "successful," its
success is always incomplete or partial. No matter how much we may feel we
identify with the team's jersey, or the national flag for that matter, there is always
a surplus of meaning, of the "I" and of the jersey or flag, which escapes that
identification. Therefore, the status of the subject is one of failure. In contrast to
Althusser's notion of ideological interpellation (which was itself developed in
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relation to Althusser s reading of Lacan), we may see how, as Slavoj Zizek has
pointed out, Althusser failed to note this aspect of identification: we may be
hailed by a particular discourse (for example, patriotism, socialism, democracy,)
but that interpellation always partially fails (Zizek 1989, 43). This failure of
identification is inevitable; it is, furthermore, a condition of existence of
identification itself, or, in Derridean terms, its impossibility is its condition of
possibility. That is, a lack in the subject produces the need for identification with
an other, that identification can never produce a singular or complete identity for
the subject, and this gap between identification and the subject produces the
space in which the process of identification continues. In Parks' case, that
momentary recognition that there is more to life than football triggers a sense of
emptiness that only a return to chanting football songs in a packed stadium
seems to alleviate.
This process of subjectivity formation can be seen in the identifications of
individuals with national or ethnic identity, religious belief, professional
association, or their local sports team. It is also the case for identification in the
context of economic subjectivity. Later chapters of this dissertation will focus on
how individuals' subjectivity is formed in a relationship of identification with
representations of economic reality, and how desires are formed in relationship
to a sense of what might complete the subject in that economic order.
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Jhree Orders of Lacan
Lacan s views on subjectivity can be further understood in the context of
three Lacanian orders": the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real. These orders
should not be understood as developmental stages, as their effects are felt
throughout an individual's life. But there are certain sequential elements in the
process Lacan refers to as "the advent of the subject," related to the structural
position of the individual in a social, "transindividual" context. The imaginary
(from "image") is that stage in which an individual ego is formed, in a
relationship of identification with something external to it, taking on (or rather,
taking in) the characteristics of another. What Lacan terms "the mirror stage" in a
child's development is that period in which an infant recognizes him or herself in
a mirror; while still physically uncoordinated and disunited, the infant finds
reflected in the mirror a whole, unified self. A blurring between the subject and
the object occurs, as we identify with something external and different from
ourselves. In this sense, the subject comes into being through a process of
m/srecognition of itself (the being in the mirror is recognized as me though it is
not me). The imaginary order is thus marked by "deceptions" such as feelings of
autonomy, wholeness, unity, symmetry, and similarity, and by dual
relationships in which the self is perceived to be in symbiotic union with another.
The early child's relationship with the mother is such a dual relationship. It
should be pointed out, however, that the mirror stage is not simply a period of
65
infant development, but can be seen as a model for an inevitably alienating
division marking the human condition. As Warren Montag points out,
the mirror-stage, insofar as it represents the image of the subject
unequal and inadequate to itself, is not a stage at all. It is not a
moment in a process by which the subject would become adequate
to itself. It is instead the first theoretical device through which
Lacan defends the notion of the constitutive and necessary division
of the subject, a division that is never overcome or transcended,
from the force of the obviousness of the free individual subject
'
(Montag 1991, 37)
Imaginary identifications are how we develop a sense of unity of self. The
individual, however, is not formed solely through such imaginary relations and
identifications; rather, the subject emerges when a third element intrudes
— the
symbolic order. Here we have Lacan's version of the Oedipal triangle, one which
emphasizes the role of language, society, and the laying down of the Law. The
structural role of the father/ it should be pointed out, is in no way linked to the
sex of an individual. The role can be assumed by a man or a woman, or even by
an absent or abstract entity. "The true function of the Father," Lacan says, "is
fundamentally to unite (and not to set in opposition) a desire and the Law"
(Lacan 1977a, 321). The paternal function here is the disruption of the imaginary
dual relationship, a disruption which brings the individual into the social world
and the realm of language. Before language, the individual exists in a world of
perfect symmetry between demand and satisfaction. When the imaginary
relationships are disrupted by the symbolic order (the Law that prohibits the
infant from a complete and satisfying union with the mother,) the child begins to
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recognize the existence of a wider family and social world. Rules about behavior
and the curbing of the child's demands are introduced. By acknowledging and
accepting these rules
-the existence of the Law, the social network, the language
which preceded the child
-he or she identifies with and internalizes the Law,
pursues acceptable satisfactions, represses unacceptable desires, and experiences
guilt. This repression of unacceptable desires marks the formation of the
unconscious, and therefore marks the beginning of the split subject. Both
prohibitive and protective, the father mediates "the imaginary dual relation
between the mother and the child, saves the child from psychosis, and makes
possible an entry into social existence. The father is thus much more than a mere
rival with whom the subject competes for the mother's love; he is the
representative of the social order as such, and only by identifying with the father
in the Oedipus complex can the subject gain entry into this order" (Evans 61). To
identify with the father in this case is to accept and internalize the Law that
determines what is an acceptable satisfaction.
The third order in Lacan's scheme, the "real" (often written as "Real,") is that
which exists outside of the symbolic and imaginary orders; it is the "left-over" of
desire, the "surplus meaning" which language can never fully express or contain.
There is a dynamic of desire which we are all familiar with: Our desire is fixated
on an object and once that object is achieved, our desire shifts to a new object,
and shifts again when that object is achieved. The Real can be conceived as that
piece of our desire which is never satisfied; it is, significantly, that piece which
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we have so much trouble putting into language: "Yes, 1 got what 1 wanted, but
yet...."
Returning to the example of the football fan, if one asks a fan why they
support their team, whatever answer they come up with will fail to capture the
"real essence" of their identification. The content of the identification is
essentially empty. One might say that one loves one's team because one loves the
players on it; however, when the players move on to another team, or retire and
are replaced, the loyalty and fervor and depth of identification with the team
remains. One may feel intense feelings when one sees the team's colors, but the
essence of the team can not be found there; don't other teams wear the same
colors? Perhaps one understands that identifying with the team is a product of
your familial and cultural upbringing, but this fails to explain the intense
personal meaning that the supporter feels when watching the team win or lose. It
also raises the troublingly arbitrary nature of identification; if one grew up in a
different town or region or nation, would it not follow that one would identify
with another team? Which is the more true identification, the team you followed
as a ten-year old in Newcastle, or the one you follow as an adult in London? One
might say that one identifies with the team because one's father and older
brothers followed that team; this merely shifts the content of the identification to
another empty space, the space of another's identification. In other words, if you
love your team only because you are following the path of the love of others,
then the thrill of identification one feels when your team scores is not an
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expression of an innate inner self but a thrill located in some external hall of
identificatory mirrors.
If the content of each of these reasons fails to capture fully the experience of
identification, then we might say that there is something else, some irrational
kernel, some unnameable or inexpressible thing in the Real that "causes"
identification. We then experience this as a kind of commandment, from outside,
to identify in a certain way
.
19 The intimate experience of identification is felt as a
command from outside, from the unnameable Real.
From Desire to Fantasy
The relationship between the subject and desire
-the subject's own desire,
the desires of others, and the objects of desires— is an important element of
Lacanian theory. In subsequent chapters, desire's role in the formation of
economic subjectivity will be further discussed; this discussion will suggest that
the economy serves as a site where desires, compensatory enjoyments, the
pursuit of a symmetry between needs and satisfaction, and the dictates of the
Law are ever-present.
Once the subject comes into being, through the separation initiated in the
Oedipal triangle, there is a rift between the subject and the Other, marked by the
19 It is the same with religious faith; intense, immediate, intimate, it is also by definition not
something based on reason. It has been pointed out that to say that one believes in God because
God is good is a kind of blasphemy, because it means that one has used reason and cited
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Other's desire for something other than the subject. Subjects come into being,
therefore, in a process by which they confront the existence of the Other's desire.
Initially this desire takes the form of anything that intervenes and draws away
the primary caregiver's attention, whether that be the biological father, other
people, or other interests or concerns outside of the mother-infant relationship.
To overcome the gap, the infant attempts to line up its own lacking desirous self
with the lack or desire in the Other, attempting to become the cause of that desire
(Fink 1995, 54). The role of the paternal function is to assert the Law, via the
Oedipal process, that (imperfectly) interrupts the subject's attempt to be the
object that fills the Other s lack. In Freudian oedipal theory, this is the moment
where the father intervenes, enforces the incest prohibition, and insists that the
child seeks acceptable satisfactions elsewhere. Desire for a lost wholeness and for
occupying the role of the cause of the Other's desire are repressed, however, not
eliminated. Repressed into the unconscious, these desires continue to affect the
individual, returning in distorted form as slips of the tongue, repetitive
behaviors, and other signifiers, throughout adulthood.
In linguistic terms, the desirousness of the self and the Other is synonymous
with the lack of a final, essential, and positive content of the signifier. That is, no
single self-contained signifier can adequately capture the essence of either the
evidence to arrive at the conclusion that one must believe in God. Rather, one has faith — one
identifies with a religious belief— because one has faith; one believes because one believes.
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self (whose lack is always directed outwards, towards becoming the cause of the
Other s desire) or the Other, which is itself split, a site of desire. The lack of a
fundamental and final essence for the self or the Other- what Stavrakakis calls
the irreducible negativity of human experience" (Stavrakakis 107) -is deeply
unsettling. It provokes an anxiety that is alleviated somewhat by what Lacan
refers to as "fantasy," which projects meaning onto the Other and offers the
promise of a return to an imaginary wholeness, with Mother, Nature, True Self,
and so on. 20 From its position as split subject, within language and using the
tools of language, the subject retroactively attempts via fantasy to construct an
imagined unity which had been disrupted by the emergence of his or her own
subjecthood. Through fantasy, the split subject gains a kind of relationship or
connection with the Other through the object cause of its desire. What Lacan calls
the objet
-petit a” is (among other things) the unnameable cause of the Other's
desire, the thing that the Other lacks, whose absence prevents its full closure. As
Fink describes it. Object a can be understood here as the remainder produced
when that hypothetical unity breaks down, as a last trace of that unity, a last
reminder thereof. By cleaving to that rem(a)inder, the split subject, though
expulsed from the Other, can sustain the illusion of wholeness; by clinging to
20 Put in other terms, we attempt to fill in the lack by identifying with an Other, attempting to
offset the alienation and dislocation we feel. However, that Other is also lacking. Laclau and
Mouffe's view of hegemonic struggle is relevant here; there is an unavoidable gap between the
universal term and its concrete particulars and the attempt at closure or completion or
harmonious alignment never fully succeeds.
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object a, the subject is able to ignore his or her division. That is precisely what
Lacan means by fantasy... the divided subject in relation to object a" (1995, 59).
Clearly, no sigmfier can adequately express the positive content of the object
d. It is an impossible object in the sense that the Other can not achieve a final
closure, the metonymical and metaphorical nature of language can not be
arrested. Object a is that excess of meaning that appears to attach to a name, that
creates an illusion that there is something positive about the content of the
sigmfier. D. H. Lawrence s "The Third Thing" expresses something of its nature:
Water is H20, hydrogen two parts, oxygen one,
but there is also a third thing, that makes it water
and nobody knows what that is.
The third thing is the Lacanian Real, the substance beyond symbolization, the
thing that can not be put into words. For example, if you were to list all the
reasons why you love someone, no matter how long the list becomes, you are
still left with the feeling that "that's not it," that there is something more, some
other element which is not captured by the list. Indeed, the reasons listed, rather
than successfully explaining your love, actually represent the failure of
explanation, because they fail to capture that elusive other thing. (Words fail to
adequately capture the reality of my love, you may say; but as Zizek put it,
reality is always a symptom).
Object a has this elusive quality, yet fantasy persists in pursuing it, in its
attempt to paper over the disturbing gaps of the Real. Figure 1 (below) illustrates
the structure of fantasy. The dotted lines in the outlines of the subject and the
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Other indicate their incompleteness; the lack of a hard outline around object a
represents its essentially unfixable, unsymbolizable nature. Object a appears as
the missing element of the lacking Other, and it is this missing element that the
subject attempts to draw to itself, to recreate a supposedly lost wholeness. At the
same time, object a overflows the boundaries of the gap to be filled, representing
its elusive, shape-shifting nature.
subject the Other
Figure 1: The Structure of Fantasy
An example of fantasy, (and the elusive object a) may help to illustrate the point.
A colleague, Stephen Healy, and I have recently been doing research on practices
and discourses of "sustainable development" in the Pioneer Valley region. In the
course of doing this work we have come across a number of people whose
resentful attachments to a particular narrative of sustainability have struck us as
illustrations of Lacanian fantasy. There is, for example, "Stanley," a well-known
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proponent of sustainable practices and head of a non-profit environmental
organization in the region. In his daily interactions with others, Stanley presents
himself as an individual who embodies proper ecological practice, explaining
why he does not eat foods from outside one's biogregion, why he walks or rides
a bicycle rather than take a car, how he reduces waste and uses energy
efficiently. Stanley believes that every act of consumption, production, and
distribution can be made efficient and ecologically sound. For example, he shops
twice a year at a whole food supermarket and all the rest of his food comes from
bulk buying, buyers clubs, consumer coops for organic food, community-
supported agriculture plans, and so on. He believes that the current
environmental crisis is one in which people are alienated from and destructive of
nature; a break has occurred in the natural linkage between individuals and the
natural world. This broken unity, however, can be repaired. For some
environmentalists, a future utopia would involve a return to a pre-industrial age
and a turning away from the demands of business; but for Stanley humanity's
alienation from the natural world can be rectified through the application of
proper technology and personal and institutional responsibility. A clear-headed
understanding of the reality of the situation, reoriented business practices, and
technological advances (such as "dematerialization, biomimicry, 'zero waste'
molecular manufacturing, product stewardship, remanufacture, organic
production" [SSNE]), will ensure that a future state of efficiency and natural
integration will be achieved.
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Stanley's vision of a future restoration of a lost unity and wholeness has a
clearly utopian current, evident in the website of the non-profit organization for
which he works, where the organization's goal is expressed as helping
businesses, communities and individuals operate in alignment with how nature
really works. To do this, decision makers need accurate information, good
science, and a clear understanding of how human actions and natural systems
interact (SSNE). The website describes the organization's "Positive Vision of
New England 20 Years From Now," a world in which businesses "fully embrace
their inter-connectedness to all their stakeholders, as well as the natural world
and broader human society. They thrive on the boundless ingenuity and
dedication of fully engaged employees who see alignment between their
personal and professional values, and corporate, societal and ecological health."
In the world of 2020 there will be a natural alignment rather than an opposition
of economy and environment: "In 2000 we were busy poisoning the planet and
ourselves,— inadvertently but very effectively. Now, instead of our environment
and communities being continually degraded - the people, forests, meadows,
watershed, and oceans of New England are thriving, increasing in health and
productivity each year. Each year, air and water quality get cleaner than the year
before. Our revitalized urban population centers and eco-industrial hubs are
being integrated seamlessly into local ecosystems" (SSNE).
This promise of a return to a lost wholeness, of seamless integration,
alignment, and connection, of a unity with the lost world of mOther nature, is
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one of the features of the narrative of sustainable development that marks it as a
fantasy structure. The other defining feature of Lacanian fantasy is something
both required by fantasy and illustrative of fantasy's failure: the symptom.
Fantasy Produces the Symptom
In our encounters with regional proponents of sustainable development, we
found ourselves more and more intrigued by what we came to refer to as the
"purity discourse" of sustainability. When asked how their organizations or
businesses or governmental agencies were engaged in sustainable development
practices, a wide range of individuals offered a similar response. Their voices
revealing frustration and disappointment, they spoke about how ill-defined the
term had become, and how the term which had originally held so much power
had become degraded, imprecise, and coopted by other, contrary interests. For
some, these other interests were radical environmentalists with a hidden, anti-
business agenda; for others, they were businesses seeking to appropriate the
sustainable green label to help sell unsustainable products; for others still, they
were academic or government functionaries who had deflected the term from its
original path for their own individual advancement. As a consequence, many
interviewees declared that they had decided to stop using the term "sustainable
development" altogether because it had become so degraded, and they offered
various alternative terms which they believed captured the original true
meaning. Implicitly they held the view that when others adopted the new term.
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and used it, properly, with the same unambiguous meaning
-the true essential
meaning they themselves have associated with that term
-then the word could
be powerfully united with appropriate action to achieve the utopian end of their
fantasy longings.
This always-frustrated search for purity is reflected in Stanley's judgmental
view of others. His ire is directed at two targets: at people who fail to embody
pure ecological practice, and at the language that fails to maintain the purity of
its original meaning. "I am only interested in people who walk the talk," he says
in one interview. What has struck us is how much pleasure the purity discourse
appears to provoke in its proponents; how much enjoyment Stanley feels, for
example, in his self-righteousness and in his attacks on others for their failure to
embody purity of language and of action, the talk and the walk. This mixture of
pleasure and pain (the satisfaction of experiencing disappointment and
resentment) calls to mind one of Freud's patients, the Rat Man. The Rat Man
described to Freud a recurring image which tormented him: the image of the
woman he loved tortured with rats. His face as he described this horrific scene
was, in Dylan Evans' words, "a paradoxical mixture of horror and pleasure. But
only the horror is conscious, while the element of pleasure is hidden from the Rat
Man's awareness" (Evans 1996, 19). It is this paradoxical experience of pleasure
and suffering which so often marks the subjective experience of fantasy, as the
subject maintains both the beautiful vision of the utopian ideal and the sullied
enjoyment of one's feelings toward the object standing in the way of attaining the
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utopian end (Zizekl998, 209).* "If it weren't for X, wholeness could be
achieved." This force appearing to block the wholeness promised in fantasy is
the Lacanian symptom. 22
The symptom is constituted in the space of the fantasy's failure. Fantasy, like
identification, to some extent always fails: It promises much to the subject, but it
can not deliver. It can not create a harmonious and utopian unity, provide
meaning in the Other, eliminate the lack in the identity of the self or the Other,
cure social dislocations, or provide a pure language beyond the corruptions of
the sliding signifier.-3 Object n can not be attained, not because it is an impossible
object but because something or someone is blocking our attaining it. The
inherent lack is placed outside the fantasy— it is the excluded element, the
symptom, which disrupts the fantasmatic utopia.
21 The language of the critical pedagogists reaches its most poetic and impassioned notes when
describing the obstacles to a future harmonious order. Partly these pleasurable angers are
directed towards capitalism and the powerful; partly they are directed against those
poststructuralists whose antiessentialist social theories appear to deny the hard reality
foundation of the critical pedagogists' narratives. In this way, they are, like many leftists, in an
almost erotic embrace with capitalism. (See J.K. Gibson-Graham 1996; 2001.)
22 In medical practice, of course, the symptom is the outward manifestation of an inner illness;
blindness can be an indicator of diabetes, the way smoke can be an indicator of fire. In Freudian
psychoanalysis, the symptom is also a kind of signal, but one which is produced by the patient's
psychic structure; it is a kind of message, a signifier, from the unconscious to another. The patient
who describes a pain in her arm in a location where there is no physical nerve pathway, but
which carries some meaning in the patient's past, demonstrates a Freudian symptom. In the case
of Lacanian fantasy, the unclosable nature of the gap (the failure inherent in language, identity,
identification) is not acknowledged; this is a kind of trauma repressed into the unconscious
which then re-emerges as something external, in reality. The symptom can be seen then as "an
enigmatic message which the subject thinks is an opaque message from the real instead of
recognising it as his own message" (Evans 204).
23 Umberto Eco explored the history of the pursuit of the pure, original language in The Search for
the Perfect Language (1995).
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Paradoxically, the symptom therefore disrupts the fantasy at the same time
that it is produced and required by the fantasy; by domesticating and symbolizing
the source of failure in the figure of the alien, the fantasy is preserved, made
consistent. This is why Zizek says that fantasy is not the commonplace notion of
fantasy - the fantasy of the successful sexual relationship - but is, rather, the
fantasy of "why it went wrong": "For that reason also, the notion of fantasy is
ambiguous: beatific fantasy (the vision of the state of things 'before the Fall') is
supported by a disturbing paranoiac fantasy which tells us why things went
wrong (why we did not get the girl, why society is antagonistic)" (Zizek 1998,
209). Zizek: it is not the external enemy who is preventing me from achieving
identity with myself, but every identity is already in itself blocked, marked by an
impossibility and the external enemy is simply the small piece, the rest of reality
upon which we 'project' or 'externalize' this intrinsic, immanent impossibility"
(Zizek 1990, 251-2). Stavrakakis describes the symptom as "an encounter with the
real, with a traumatic point that resists symbolization":
The self-consistency of a symbolic construction of reality depends
on the harmony instituted by fantasy. This fantasmatic harmony
can only be sustained by the neutralisation of the symptom and of
the real, by a negation of the generalised lack that crosses the field
of the social. [. .
.] The social fantasy of a harmonious social order can
only be sustained if all the persisting disorders can be attributed to
an alien intruder. (Stavrakakis 65)
With this in mind, Zizek suggests a fundamental and constitutive link
between the Nazi and the image of the Jew in anti-Semitic discourse; to come to
grips with the traumatic and irresolvable antagonisms of society, with the
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failures to come to fullness, with "the generalised lack that crosses the field of the
social," the figure of the evil outsider was incorporated. Hence, the Nazi fantasy
produced the symptom of the Jew. It is at the same time clear that the content of
that figure which fills the structural role of the Jew in the Nazi fantasy is on one
level quite contingent. In other words, the Nazi's utopian fantasy could have
found a scapegoat other than the Jews (and Gypsies, homosexuals, communists,
et al); while there was a historical context for the focus on the Jews, the point here
is that any one of us can fill that structural role in the fantasy (Zizek 1989, 48;
Stavrakakis 1999, 105).24
Other fantasies follow a similar structural principle in which prohibition of
the impossible maintains the illusion that enjoyment could be attained if it
weren t prohibited by the alien, the scapegoat, the Jew. For some business
representatives, for example, the free-market economy promises to deliver a
harmonious and utopian state and various candidates fill the role of the
symptom standing in the way of the fantasy's actualization: particular cultural
values of a minority population, low educational standards, anti-growth zoning
policies, or anti-business taxes. For Tim Parks and the other denizens of the
brigate, if it weren't for the corrupt referees, the cabal of the wealthy teams, the
journalists, the owner of the team, a particular player who doesn't care enough,
24 Bush's "Axis of Evil" comes to mind here as a similar construction of paranoiac knowledge of
the evildoers who must be eliminated before a fantasmatic future utopia can be achieved.
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the team would be victorious and the fans' desires for satisfaction would be
filled. Stanley, who fails to achieve harmonious "sustainability" (wholeness,
unalienated labor and discourse, subjective completion, and so on) can take
pleasure in his criticism of others; by setting himself up to struggle against social
impurities (wasteful or ecologically destructive practices such as automobile use,
plastics, eating food from outside one's bioregion), Stanley can take pleasure in
the prohibited impossible: "If it weren't for those people and their filthy ways, I
could fully live sustainably."
Castration and the Phallus
Another way of understanding the compromise function of the fantasy-
symptom construction, simultaneously protecting the subject and prohibiting its
enjoyments, is through Lacan's variation on the Freudian concepts of castration
and the phallus; these terms add to our understanding of the Lacanian subject's
constitution as a desiring being. Again, it is important to emphasize that the
notions of castration, the phallus, and the Oedipus complex which Lacan
reworks from Freud are not to be understood in a biological or literally familial
framework but as a way of understanding how the subject's psyche comes to be
structured in relation, in particular, to its fundamental lack, as it relates to the
desire of the subject and the structure of language. In this sense, the terms of
family and biology, and the other concrete images Lacan draws upon ("mirror,"
"castration," "phallus," etc.), should be seen as directing attention to the
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linguistic structure of the subject. Here, castration and the phallus can be
understood in terms of (inevitable) lack and (impossible) fullness. In Lacanian
terminology, the phallus is (among many other definitions) the object that
satisfies desire, and castration is the absence of this object. Initially, for an infant,
the primary caregiver is seen as possessing (withholding, distributing) the
phallus; gradually, it becomes clear that the caregiver her- or himself is not a
complete being but one who also has a lack, as manifested in the desires that
intervene and draw the caregiver away. The caregiver (the mother figure, the
Other) is therefore castrated, and the infant desires to fill the role of the lacking
phallus. The paternal function is similarly a process of castration in the sense that
the emerging subject comes to accept the Law which says that he or she can not
be the phallus for the Other; this acceptance of castration is the final stage of the
Oedipus complex in Lacanian theory (Evans 23).
The phallus (like object a) is therefore an impossible object, because the
nature of desire is such that it can not be satisfied; there never is a single object
that stops the metonymical sliding of desire.25 Castration has a dual meaning; the
Other lacks the phallus, and is therefore desirous, and the subject accepts
castration of itself, in the sense that it gives up the attempt to embody the
25 Fink, in The Lacanian Subject, offers a helpful distinction between object a and the phallus.
Object a is not a signifier of desire, it is the Other's desire, or "real" desirousness. "The phallus, on
the other hand, is never anything but a signifier; in theory, just as in everyday language, it is the
signifier of desire. Object (a) is thus the real, unspeakable cause of desire, while the phallus is the
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phallus. Strangely, in this context castration is therefore the acceptance of the
prohibition against something which is already impossible. Castration is
therefore also an impossible act, because there is no possible phallus which can
be cut off or taken away. The striking thing about the paternal function's
enforcement of the Law is that it prohibits something which is impossible. The infant
can not achieve the position of the phallus for the Other because the Other is
itself an incomplete identity, devoid of an essential or self-contained positivity.
(Again, we may refer here to Saussurean poststructuralist linguistic theory for
justification. The phallus is a signifier," says Lacan, "the signifier intended to
designate as a whole the effects of the signified" [Lacan 1977a, 285].) The lack in
the Other can not be filled nor closure effected by any other subject, similarly
lacking, centrally voided.
It is impossible to be the phallus, yet the incest taboo, the castration complex,
the paternal invocation of the Law forbid it. It is as if there were signs along the
highway declaring it illegal for cars to defy the laws of gravity, under penalty of
heavy fines and prison terms. However, the Law does offers substitute
satisfactions. There is the enjoyment of following the injunction of the Law, and
the pleasure of transgressing the Law, even if only in fantasy. As soon as we see
those signs prohibiting cars that defy the laws of gravity, we may take a secret
'name of desire' and thus pronounceable" (Fink 1995, 102). The phallus is therefore “the signifier of
lack" (102).
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pleasure in immediately fantasizing levitation. The substitute satisfaction of
fantasy is enmeshed in the enjoyment of transgressing a law which prohibits the
crossing of an impossible void. Hence the Lacanian formulation of fantasy as a
compromise solution which establishes what we desire (levitating cars, the
perfect birthday present, union with the Other, filling in the lack in our
subjectivities) and, rather than addressing the traumatic, unspeakable core of this
desire (which is the lack at the core of all identity,) it offers the reason for our
inability to attain it: the Law prohibits it. The law therefore should be seen as a
pact rather than an imperative. The Oedipus complex represents the regulation
of desire by the law. It is the law of the pleasure principle, which commands the
subject to 'enjoy as little as possible!', and thus maintains the subject at a safe
distance from the Thing" (Evans 99).
The Problem with Fantasy
We might well ask here why, if there is indeed no full or prior or pure
meaning of "sustainable," no unity or fully harmonious relationship with an
Other, no possible return to a pre-subjectivity identity, there should then be a
prohibition against these things? What is the purpose of the prohibition against
the impossible? If we accept that there is no filling in of the void (that is, no
unalienated subject, society, or language, returned to its pure state), then we can
see fantasy as a defense mechanism constructed in the face of this traumatic
kernel. By constructing the prohibited impossible, fantasy allows us to fill our
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desire with an object, however impossible it may be. We might say that the
critical pedagogists, Stanley, and others are trapped in a kind of fantasy which
stages their desire for an imaginary wholeness (a return to a retroactively
constructed unity, with Mother, Nature, True Self, and so on), both protecting
them from their desire (they always find the impurity which drags it down,
taints it), and allowing this desire to continue in its familiar circuit. "The purpose
of fantasy is not to satisfy an (impossible) desire but to constitute it as such"
(Stavrakakis 101). Fantasy stages our desire in this compromise situation: it
protects us from the anxiety of the lack in the Other, and it gives a name to—
symbolizes— the thing that blocks the attainment of our desire's object. It allows
us to domesticate the inherent lack, but in such a way that the impossible fullness
moves from being impossible to being prohibited. It gives shape, a name, to our
desire and to why it is unattainable, without confronting or acknowledging the
unavoidable lack. Fantasy is a compromise solution because it maintains the
subject in a state of suspension: on the one hand fantasy stages what we should
desire, and on the other hand it identifies what stands in the way of attaining the
object of that desire (Stavrakakis 151).
Those who have applied Lacanian theory of the fantasy and symptom to
social and political theory have asserted that the left must struggle against the
dangerous fantasies that have historically suffused its projects. Stavrakakis, for
one, argues that utopian thinking "haunts our political imagination" and its
related ethics of harmony "obscures radical political possibilities" "beyond
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fantasmic politics/' and we need to "settle our accounts" with utopianism before
we can move on (Stavrakakis 158). This desire to get beyond fantasy is motivated
by the belief that fantasies, when politicized, attempt to enforce a closure on the
social; the inevitable by-product is a scapegoat who must be eliminated. This is
one of the reasons that Stavrakakis and others raise the specters of nazism or
Stalinism, as the dark clouds inevitably appearing on the horizon of utopian
thought.
Applying Lacanian theory to the study of economic subjectivity offers
opportunities for analysis that take us beyond these fears of totalitarianism. To
this end, this dissertation is less concerned with the dark social consequences of
fantasy and more concerned with what fantasy -and especially left fantasy
-
prevents us from imagining, what possible politics and what other orientations
of the desiring (economic) subject are precluded by fantastic conceptions of the
subject and economy. The critical pedagogists, for example, appear to take some
pleasure in their anger towards the capitalist totality and towards those who fail
to acknowledge its vast colonizing powers. Their clear understanding of the
contours of economic reality, the forces arrayed against and blocking a better
society, provide them with a certain satisfaction. In this sense, they are wedded
to the economy they so desperately rail against; longing for an alternative world,
yet desperately preserving the one they, in their discourse, construct and
reconstruct again.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH PROJECT AND ANALYSIS
Overview of Chapter
This chapter describes two inter-related methodological approaches: the
methodology of the Rethinking Economy project (its origins, goals, techniques,
and activities related to gathering the research "data") and the methodology
employed in the analysis of what that research produced. In both cases, there is a
focus on deconstructively reading for economic difference and on exploring the
subjective experience of individuals' relationship to economic reality, with the
goal of deferring conceptual closure or the institutionalization of a fixed and final
identity for either the subject or the structure (in particular, the structure of the
economy). Put in other terms, in both the Rethinking Economy project and in my
analysis of the materials generated by this project, there is a movement from a
politics of the signifier to a politics that also considers the role of enjoyment or
"jouissance" in our fantastical attachments to particular representations of social
and individual reality.
Context and Method of the Research: The Rethinking Economy Project
Origins and Goals of the REP
Much of this dissertation focuses on texts generated by the Rethinking
Economy project. Briefly, the overarching goal of the project has been to produce
alternative understandings of regional economies in order to encourage
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innovative forms of economic development policy and political activism. The
project emerged in the context of J.K. Gibson-Graham's work, in particular
Stuffed If I Know!': Reflections on Post-Modern Feminist Social Research"
(1994) and The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It) (1996). "Stuffed If I Know!"
describes a political project of "discursive destabilization" (219), focusing on the
subjective experiences of the wives of coal-miners on shift work in a working
class Australian community. In addition to this process of destabilization, the
project also sought to produce novel discourses that offered new possibilities of
identification
-a new discourse of mine shiftwork, a new identity of min
shiftworker s wife, and a new politics of mine shiftwork based on a recognition
of the interdependence of the industrial site and a larger community. The
Australian project, as post-modernist feminist social research, assumed no pre-
existing true subject positions or identities of these working class women, neither
in their social economic identities or their roles as women. The research involved
both community and university researchers in a project with specifically political
aims: the construction of new subjectivities in the process of conversation,
subjectivities focusing on the gender division of labor and the effect of industrial
practices and conflicts on domestic relations. Such social research does not
further fix individuals in their identifications, nor seek to relieve them of their
false consciousness, but may rather play a role in creating alternative discourses
and practices of gender, work, community, and economy.
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A key argument of Vie End of Capitalism (As We Knew It), also significant in
the design of the Rethinking Economy project, is that the economy is often
represented as singularly and systemically capitalist, in spite of the
acknowledgement that economic activity exists in a variety of non-capitalist
forms
-in households, amongst the self-employed, in alternative firms, and so
on. The research project was designed to highlight economic activities outside
the narrow focus of conventional economic development practice, an approach
which focuses on the attraction and retention of large capitalist firms employing
wage labor engaged in goods and service production for extra-regional markets.
The project has attempted to make visible in the economic landscape already-
existing non-capitalist forms which could provide the basis for an alternative
vision and practice of economic development. An important question was how
these activities, taking place in households, neighborhoods, schools and
churches, might contribute to the process of development if they were regarded
as part of the economy.
The initial orientation of the Rethinking Economy project was guided by
these earlier projects. It was also influenced by Foucault's call to acknowledge
and resuscitate subjugated knowledges (Foucault 1980). Foucault notes that
when global, universal knowledges are isolated and invested with the effects of
power, other knowledges are subjugated. He identifies two such subjugated
knowledges: (1) former knowledges that have been erased when later global
knowledges become ascendant and the discontinuities of history have been
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covered over by a smooth historical narrative; and (2) local or indigenous
knowledges. These exist but are marginalized, hidden, or exiled from what is
considered proper, "scientific," knowledge. Foucault argues that by recovering
and making space for these disqualified knowledges, we might effectively
criticize the dominant knowledges, that criticism "performs its work" through
such re-appearances and re-emergences. In this way, he suggests that we may
oppose dominant knowledges, and the effects of their centralising powers,
without either seeking validity within those knowledges themselves or
proposing to replace them with another global, unitary alternative (Foucault
1980, 84).26 Finding common cause with this aspect of Foucault's work, the
Rethinking Economy project has sought to highlight subjugated economic
knowledges and bring to the forefront the discontinuities of dominant, expert
economic discourse, while resisting the temptation of replacing one universal
economic narrative with another.
The design of the Rethinking Economy project was also centrally influenced
by Derridean principles of deconstructive reading, which resonate with
Foucault's call to bring to the surface what is exiled without instating an
alternative global knowledge. Deconstruction is Derrida's response to the
dominant and often unacknowledged metaphysics of Western philosophy, a
26 There are echoes here of Lacan's call for a traversal rather than replacement of fantasy
(discussed in chapter six).
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metaphysics that assumes essences, order, and originary foundations. This
metaphysics takes many different forms: a belief in a Divine Mind, the
privileging of speech over writing, or the notion of full self-consciousness,
among others. The translator of OfGmmmatology, Gayatri Spivak, offers a useful
summary of what she calls "deconstruction in a nutshell": "To locate the
promising marginal text, to disclose the undecidable moment, to pry it loose with
the positive lever of the signifier; to reverse the resident hierarchy, only to
displace it, to dismantle in order to reconstitute what is always already
inscribed" (Spivak, lxxvii).
The desire to see a central presence, origin, or authority generates binary
oppositions in which one term takes precedence over another, creating a
"resident hierarchy." In OfGmmmatology (1974), for example, Derrida points to
the attempts of both Rousseau and Levi-Strauss to establish hierarchical, binary
oppositions between Nature and Culture, and between speech and writing. As
Spivak points out, Derrida's goal is not to simply take the subordinate term and
make it superior (though this type of reversal is an important element in the
activity of deconstruction), but to reverse the binary and then through this
reversal demonstrate the instability of the binary relationship itself. In the
process, Derrida's deconstructive aim is to bring attention to the suppressed,
disruptive effects of language. As Christopher Norris asserts, "deconstruction is
not simply a strategic reversal of categories which otherwise remain distinct and
unaffected. It seeks to undo both a given order of priorities and the very system
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of conceptual opposition that makes that order possible" (Norris 1991, 31). For
example, in OfGrammatology, Derrida traces Rousseau's privileging of spoken
speech, associated with direct experience, truth, original meaning, and so on,
over written language, associated with the subsequent debasements and
corruptions of culture. Although Rousseau places speech prior to written
language, Derrida finds paradoxical evidence within Rousseau's own text that
written language must exist before spoken speech is possible. This evidence is
suppressed, but is brought to light through a deconstructive reading. By
reversing the privileged place of speech in Rousseau's philosophy, however,
Derrida is not attempting to assert the alternative binary, the priority of written
language, but to demonstrate that the categorical statements upon which
philosophy are based are themselves already unstable. Deconstructive
engagement therefore involves reading texts for gaps, contradictions, imposed
hierarchies, suppressed notions of origins, and so on. A repressed or subjugated
theme is identified and shown to subvert the professed order of the text. In other
words, the text deconstructs itself.
The influence of Derridean deconstructive practice may be seen in the initial
conceptualization and design of the Rethinking Economy project. One of the
project's key goals was to explore, reverse, and displace the usual binary
oppositions and hierarchical classifications of conventional economic language,
such as, in hegemonic development discourse, the privileging of capitalist over
non-capitalist, formal over informal, firm over household, market over non-
92
market, wage labor over non-wage labor, and production over consumption.
Reversing the terms of these binaries is a useful political practice for
demonstrating the importance of hitherto under-valued sites and processes, and
of the individuals who engage in these activities. The project makes use, for
example, of the work of feminist economists who have conducted time-use
studies measuring the economic contribution of the work that takes place in
households. These economists have used these studies to argue that such work,
invisible in national economic accounts, is both properly "economic" and
economically significant, equivalent to fully 30 to 40 percent of all "economic"
activity.
At the same time, the practice of displacement is a way of deferring the re-
instatement of a binary or hierarchized opposition. That is, to avoid arguing that
the household is in fact the more important economic site, from which social
wealth flows, and thereby preserving or furthering the ruling metaphysic of
central essence, displacement instead shows how the institution of the binary
itself breaks down its own boundaries. For example, we may find traces of the
household in the operation of the firm, and traces of the firm in the household.
We may "discover" mutual constitution of the formal and informal economies.
And we may find that there are multiple discourses of economy flowing under,
beside, above, and throughout those economic discourses which are presumed to
be hegemonic.
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Here, we have found the AESA school of anti-essentialist marxian economic
analysis (discussed in the previous chapter) to be a rich tool for exploring the
diverse economic landscape without asserting a realist economic ontology, or
instating the subordinate term as an alternative truth or metaphysical presence.
The AESA understanding of class-as-process, combined with the Althusserian-
Freudian notion of overdetermination (rejecting facile causal arguments for a
view of mutual constitutivity) and an anti-teleological view of history, permits
the economy to assume the character of an “event” (a set of diverse practices,
processes, and acts), open to contingency, chance, possibility, rather than
expressing a pre-determined, univocal, and unavoidable logic. At the same time,
being epistemologically opposed to both idealist/ rationalist and empiricist forms
of analysis, this approach resists the tendency to assert the truth of an alternative
understanding of reality (for example, that there is an underlying class reality
that other theories fail to capture). It therefore contributes to the deconstructive
process, providing another tool to help focus on and confront the assumed fixed
identity of economic and social reality.
Politically, opening up the previously fixed categories of economic discourse
and demonstrating them to be constitutively unstable is significant because it
creates opportunities for alternative economic practices and subjectivities to
emerge. By deconstructively reading for economic difference we avoid, for
example, the smooth alignment of oppression, exploitation, and consciousness
and the political appeal to some extra-discursive foundational truth that we find
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in the critical pedagogists. Deconstructive reading as practiced in the Rethinking
Economy project challenges the presumption that society is determined by its
capitalist or economic structure, and suggests that arguments based on such
views contain elements that contradict or undermine themselves. Deconstruction
also loosens up the fixity of subjectivities and opens up the possibility that other
subjectivities may emerge
.
27
Stages of the Project
The project set out to deconstruct hegemonic economic discourse, resuscitate
subjugated knowledges, read the economic landscape as a diverse field, and
enter the conversation around regional economic development with the goal of
opening up the possibilities for alternative economic subjectivities and practices.
The following section describes the stages of this project, from initial strategic
interviews, to focus groups with development professionals, to the recruiting,
training, and debriefing of community researchers, to the initial analysis of the
narratives these researchers produced.
27 The economic geographer Jenny Cameron demonstrates how feminist economic theory and
anti-essentialist marxian class analysis of the AESA school can be employed to rethink
individuals' subjective experience of economic activity, providing the space for the further
development of such alternative subjectivities and supporting alternative economic practices. For
example, in "Domesticating Class: Femininity, Heterosexuality, and Household Politics" (2000),
Cameron uses anti-essentialist class analysis combined with poststructuralist feminist theory to
see difference in the class relations (the domestic practices of producing, appropriating, and
distributing surplus) of the "traditional" household economy. Cameron argues that reading for
economic difference in such households can be a condition of existence for other desires,
subjectivities, and practices to emerge.
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Strategic Interviews and Focus Groups
The Rethinking Economy Project began in the summer of 1999 with a series
of strategic interviews with local progressive activists, NGOs, planners, and
other knowledgeable professionals in the western Massachusetts region known
as the Pioneer Valley (Hampshire, Hampden, and Franklin Counties). These
interviews served a number of purposes. One was to identify key mainstream
economic development actors in the business community, government, and non-
governmental agencies, who we would subsequently invite to participate in
focus groups in the next stage of the project. The strategic interviews were also
important for the larger goals of the REP, including creating a network of
individuals and organizations involved in a conversation on alternative
economic development; from these interviews we gathered information about
important members of the formal and informal network of individuals and
organizations who are active in the regional conversation about economic
development. In addition, we drew upon the contacts made during this stage to
identify and recruit community researchers who would conduct most of the
project interviews.
In the fall of 1999 we hosted two focus groups in the video studio at the
University of Massachusetts. The participants included government officials,
labor and community leaders, business executives, and planning professionals,
all of whom were identified through the strategic interviews as individuals
involved in the local economic development conversation. At the beginning of
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the focus group, each participant responded to two prompts that had been sent
to them beforehand: "What is the economic identity of the Pioneer Valley? What
are its strengths and opportunities, weaknesses or challenges?" and "How do
you see your activities or your organizations activities relative to that identity?
Are you trying to contribute to a regional strength, address a regional weakness,
or create a new regional economic identity?" These questions allowed them to
speak from their professional vantage points, and their answers offered
variations on the familiar themes of conventional economic development, one in
which a globalized capitalist economy makes demands and regions make
concessions. In their understanding of the economy, attracting and retaining
large capitalist firms engaged in export-oriented production is the only way to
provide people in the region with the well-paying jobs that can secure a high
standard of living.
Recruiting Community Researchers
The next stage of the project involved recruiting community members -
especially from groups usually seen as marginal to the economy or as non-
productive— to work with us as co-researchers, investigating and bringing to
light noncapitalist or nontraditional activities already existing in their
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communities through what we called "the community economic audit."® Our
aim was to find researchers who would reflect the diversity of the Pioneer
Valley, in terms of region, age, gender, race, and ethnic and linguistic
backgrounds, and in terms of the range of alternative economic activities in the
area. The decision was made early in the design process that community
researchers were to be paid, at the same rate as the graduate student researchers,
for all the hours they participated in the project, including attending the training
and debriefing sessions, and arranging, conducting, and listening to the
interviews. This was both an ethical decision and a practical response to the
reality that marginal economic actors are often pressed for time and monetary
income; without payment, many of the community researchers would have been
unable to devote any time to the project.
For pedagogical reasons— to create a comfortable atmosphere for speaking
aRd to facilitate both small group interactions and whole group discussions— we
decided to divide the community researchers into two groups for training
sessions . 29 At first we thought to organize these two trainings geographically,
one in the northern part of the Valley and one in the south, but we were
28 The term “audit" became attractive to us when we saw its links not to tax collection but to the
act of listening ("auditory," "auditorium," etc.)
29 We also conducted a third training session later in the process, when we were able to add an
additional group of community researchers, six teenage girls associated with an afterschool
program at the Springfield-area Urban League. The training, interviewing, and debriefing
procedures for this group were similar to those of the first groups, modified somewhat for the
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uncomfortable strengthening this regional divide, which too often marks local
political and cultural practices. We eventually decided to organize each of the
trainings based on thematic groupings, and then draw on the contacts
established during the strategic interviews to ask for suggestions of potential
researchers. For example, the theme "Agriculture" would point us towards
organizations that would help us to recruit, for the same training session, a
northern organic family-run farm operator with a Puerto Rican urban
community gardener from Holyoke to the south. Other themes included forms of
households, craft production, small entrepreneurs, and the various activities
associated with different religious beliefs.
We decided early in the project design process that we did not want to hire
community researchers anonymously- for example, through an advertisement
in the newspapers. We saw the hiring of researchers as an important aspect of
network-building, and of engaging in and renewing the economic development
conversation in the region. For this reason we turned to the organizational
contacts we had established in our strategic interviews to help us identify
potential community researchers: individuals who self-consciously participated
in alternative economic practices (such as co-operatives), were involved in their
communities in interesting ways, had an ability to identify community members
different time scale (compressed into one week of afterschool sessions) and to be more age
appropriate.
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involved in diverse economic activities, and were interested in the goals of the
project. Through this process we were able to recruit and hire a local artisan, six
high school students, a number of intermittently or self-employed individuals,
two retired people, a high school dropout, a maintenance worker, two social
service providers including one who works with drug users and one who assists
recent immigrants, and people involved in volunteering. A total of thirteen
community researchers were recruited for the first two trainings of the
community economic audit stage, twelve paid and one volunteer. In the end, two
of the researchers were unable to attend the trainings.
As the project evolved, the university researchers came to appreciate more
and more the central importance of the community researchers' own subjective
experiences of the economy, their various desires and attachments, in addition to
the diverse activities of the people the community researchers interviewed. In
this way, the community economic audit became an investigation into how
economic conversations (including the elements of desire, language, politics,
subjectivity) emerge, develop, and change. It is also clear to us that the particular
community researchers chosen brought to the project their own experiences,
agendas, interests, strengths and weaknesses which fundamentally altered the
project and, indeed, the university researchers who designed it.
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Training and Conducting the Audit
The first practical task of the training stage of the project was to develop
materials to train community researchers and prepare them to conduct
interviews with people they knew about their hidden, alternative, and non-
capitalist economic activities. But how should the community researchers
conduct their interviews? Given a day and a half of contact with a small group of
diverse individuals, how could we prepare them to do interviews about
something as nebulous as "the community economy"? And how could we
engage critically with their economic identifications without presenting
ourselves as having true knowledge of the economy? Should the interviews be
highly structured so the full lives of those interviewed would be revealed? Or
should they be unstructured so community researchers could direct them as they
saw fit? How could we best prepare the community researchers to investigate
activities which are usually considered unimportant or are not even visible to
many people— to the very people involved in those activities?
We explored a range of approaches to interviewing, from completely
unstructured interviews to very structured ones with a list of questions to be
asked and a sequence of activities to structure the interview (e.g., begin with the
time activity matrix, go through the whole 24 hours, highlight certain activities
for follow-up questions, etc). It was clear from the beginning that we were not
looking for an exhaustive coverage of all the hours of the day. At the same time,
we appreciated the value of forcing someone to actually consider each hour of a
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specific day and record every activity they were engaged in. This created a
balance/ tension between openness and closedness in the interview materials and
techniques-we wanted to encourage a more open vision of "the economy" but
we were considering exploring this open landscape through a very structured,
directed, and closed technique (the time-use study). At the same time, we
understood that time-use studies had been done before us, had been done better
than we could do them, and had already produced easily-referenced results.
There were, furthermore, niggling questions about the matrix; in the left-hand
column of the matrix were a set of activities somewhat arbitrarily chosen
(adapted from existing time-use survey forms). How could such a list capture the
range of activities that we were after? What about all those activities and sites
and practices that were not or could not be listed on that sheet? For example, it
was striking that there was no way to include in the matrix the interviewee's
involvement in a worker-owned collective. This placed great pressure on the
interviewer to be able to draw out the various implications of the activities
mentioned on the sheet. A highly structured form was to be used as a stepping
off point to explore a diversity of economic activities which the form could not
contain, and could not directly point to in many cases.
Ultimately, our intention was to design an interviewing process that would
produce a narrative of what people did in their daily lives that would then
become the basis for representing economic difference in both popular and
analytic languages. As such, we were less interested in exhaustively cataloguing
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how individuals spent each of the hours of the day than we were in encouraging
people to talk about the activities which are not typically seen as economic and to
come to see these activities in a different economic light. In the end, based on
preliminary feedback and after trying some exercises in an undergraduate class
at the University, we settled on the idea that if the researcher "got" the idea
behind the research project overall, then we could give each interviewer freedom
to conduct the interview as they saw fit We came to understand that we were
interested in the existing economic conversations, which required a training and
audit practice that involved listening and having an openness to various ways of
speaking about the economy. And we also understood that we had our own
ways of thinking and speaking about the economy that we wanted to openly
represent to the group of researchers we hired. This desire for double openness
informed the eventual design of the training process.
Although we decided to leave the interviewing process very open, hoping
that if the community researchers "got" the idea of the project then they would
be effective in exploring the lives of their interviewees, we also wanted to give
interviewers some fail-back structures, activities, or tools which they could draw
upon if they felt they were needed. Some of these tools were quite structured and
specific (for example, the Time Activity Matrix, adapted from models used in
30 In the undergraduate class, those students who returned with the best (most detailed, most
interesting) interview notes were those students who seemed to take a personal interest in the
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time use surveys) and others were somewhat less structured (for example, the
Interviewer's Guide, which offers a quick reference sheet for asking open-ended
questions to initiate discussion and follow-up questions for further probing. One
of the most helpful and most relied upon tool in the bag was the Iceberg diagram
(figure 2 below). This was also central to the training session for the community
researchers (discussed in more detail in chapter six). Many CRs used the
diagram, a metaphor for the diverse economy, to help structure their interviews;
it struck a chord for many of the people interviewed and helped them to identify
and discuss a wide range of daily activities they were involved in.
We recommended that each interview begin with the simple but powerful
question: "Tell me about a typical day for you." This was a way for the
interviewer to begin the conversation about a range of hidden and alternative
economic activities, without directly asking the interviewee to give an account of
such activities. As it turned out, many of the interviews required no other "tool"
than this initial question, which by itself was enough to trigger a conversation
that lasted one, two, or even three hours. Other interviewers drew on the matrix,
or a blank 24-hour clock, or the list of questions when in the initial stages of the
interview, or when the interview seemed to lag. Some interviews focused on the
24 hours preceding the interview as a way of capturing activities that the
interviewee would not otherwise be likely to talk about, or which seem so
activities they were exploring, using the materials as a guide rather than a form to be filled out.
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mention them to the interviewer.
natural" to them that they would not think to
The most successful interviews were ones in which the interviewers own
interest m the life of the interviewee came to the forefront and the conversation
developed a momentum of its own; less successful were those interviews in
which the interviewer followed the list of questions as if it were a formal survey.
And sometimes the person they chose to interview just did not end up to be that
Debriefing and Preliminary Analysis of Audit
The university and community researchers met again for debriefing sessions
interesting to them.
inforirml lenditiQ ..
,
illegal
* not for market
Figure 2: The Iceberg Diagram
to share what the CRs had found in their interviews and to attempt collectively
to analyze the contents of the interviews by relating them to the categories and
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terms introduced in the training sessions (in particular to the iceberg diagram
and the categories of paid/not paid, for market/ not for market, and
capitalist/ non-capitalist). It was also an opportunity to continue the conversation
begun in the trainings about the nature of the economy and its relationship to
issues of quality of life, development, and individual hopes and desires. (The
debriefing activities are described in more detail in chapter six.)
Community researchers conducted 69 interviews, with their friends,
colleagues, family members, and neighbors. Most interviews were with
individuals, but a number were with two people (domestic partners and/or
business colleagues), and one interview was with a group (a collective of artists
and artisans who owned and ran their own gallery). The interviews were with
students, hardware store owners, a stagehand, a poet, a factory worker, a
minister, a street hustler, an outreach worker, a bookseller, a tradesworker,
housewives, teachers, retired men and women, a babysitter, a social worker,
unemployed people, a weaver, a massage therapist, a janitor, a farmer, a clerical
temp worker, a nurse, a cook, an auto mechanic, a yoga teacher, and many more.
Two-thirds of the interviewees were women, one-third men; their ages ranged
from 15 to 85, with an average age of 43 years. Twenty interviews were
conducted in the more urban southern region of the Valley; eighteen in the rural-
suburban central region; and thirty-one in the mixed old industrial and small
town agricultural north. Just under two-thirds of the interviewees were white.
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and just over one-third were African American, Dominican, Puerto Rican, or
Asian.
The Products of the Research: Transcripts
Transcripts of 85 interviews (CR interviews plus strategic interviews), two
focus groups, two training and debriefing sessions, and assorted presentations
and workshop sessions, ranging from fifteen minutes to four hours in length,
were generated by the project. These transcripts were then coded, using NVIVO
qualitative research software. The initial coding structure used was based on a
nine-cell diagram developed during the project (see figure 3 below), which we
used to represent the diverse economy.
Transactions Labor Organizational Form
MARKET WAGE CAPITALIST
ALTERNATIVE
MARKET
ALTERNATIVE
PAID
ALTERNATIVE
CAPITALIST
Local trading systems
Alternative currencies
Underground market
Cooperative
Self-employed
Indentured
Environmental ethic
Social ethic
NON-MARKET UNPAID NON-CAPITALIST
Barter
Householdflows
Gifts
Volunteer
Housework
Family care
Communal
Independent
Feudal
Slave
Figure 3: The Diverse Economy (The Nine-Cell Diagram)
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The top row of the diagram represents what is conventionally taken to represent
"the economy." The shadowed rows below that mainstream vision represent
those activities, processes, and locations that are conventionally seen to exist
outside of or in a relationship of subservience to the economy proper. (It was this
nine-cell diagram that evolved into the iceberg diagram for the training of
community researchers.)
In addition to the initial coding system based on this diagram, as we read
through the first transcripts we also noted certain themes and created "free
nodes" (themes unattached to other themes), such as "quality of life issues,"
"environmental concern," and "localism." (See Appendix for a list of the nodes
developed). As we continued to read the transcripts, we added to and revised the
nodes, some of which we started to link in related families (referred to as "tree
nodes" in NVIVO). For example, under the trunk "care" we created various
branches of child care, elder care, and "health care." Other nodes remained
"free" and unattached, but recurring and significant. For example, the theme of
"economic subjectivity" emerged as a way to code passages in which
interviewees or interviewers spoke about their relationship to the economy—
how they understood their economic role, or their frustrations, pleasures,
dreams, or history in terms of their jobs, their parents' socio-economic class, and
so on. The more we listened to the tapes, the more important this theme
appeared.
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Having these nodes has allowed us to use NVIVO's search tool to quickly
call up transcript passages around a specific theme— for example, to generate a
list of passages in which an interviewee speaks of his or her sense of self in
relationship to their wage labor in a non-capitalist firm, or those passages in
which quality of life is mentioned alongside agriculture. Clearly the nodes used
are not mutually exclusive and one passage of an interview might be coded
using multiple overlapping nodes.
It also became clear, as we were coding transcripts and then generating
reports, that certain themes which had emerged during the debriefing sessions
-
the themes of generosity, gifts, and volunteer labor— were important recurring
topics of the CRs' interviews. Men as well as women were involved in this gift
economy, challenging the stereotype of the female volunteer and caregiver and
undermining the charge that "discovering" the gift economy means simply
putting a positive face on gender oppression and the extra burdens in women's
lives.
The process of reading the landscape for economic difference and
deconstructing professed binary hierarchies was present from the earliest
conceptions of the project. The first analyses of the focus groups, trainings,
interviews, and debriefings were carried out as these activities were taking place,
in informal discussions among researchers and in brief papers and notes. What
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follows is a description of the particular approach to the research that I have
taken in writing this dissertation.
Methodological Approach to Analysis
The Rhetorical Nature of Economic Discourse
This dissertation approaches the texts produced within the Rethinking
Economy project- transcripts of focus groups, trainings, interviews, and
debriefings— as expressions of economic discourse revealing various subjective
relationships to perceived economic reality. This approach to reading, which
focuses on the constructed, symbolic nature of economic discourses rather than
debating the accuracy of any particular representation of reality, is in alignment
with the work of a number of recent theorists who understand economic
discourses as fundamentally rhetorical interventions, marked by metaphorical or
literary structures, tropes, and means of persuasion. These theorists resist the
tendency to view economic discourses as either forms of pure speech reaching
towards greater and greater scientific or mathematical (i.e., "non-ideological")
representations of reality, or as inaccurate, ideologically-tainted, or mistaken
representations. Philip Mirowski (1989), for example, points out that much
neoclassical economic theory is steeped in the metaphors of force, energy, and
conservation imported from the physics of the nineteenth century. Deirdre
McCloskey (1998), although a proponent of the Chicago school of neoclassical
economic theory, which often attempts to ground its methods in appeals to a
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knowable reality, has asserted the rhetorical rather than the objectively
scientific nature of her own discipline. Reading the history of economic
thought through the lens of object relations psychology, the economist Susan
Feiner (1995) presents a psychoanalytical reading of neoclassical economics in
which its representations of exchange, rationality, individualism, and scarcity
express both conscious economic meanings and unconscious symbolic contents.
Not only academic or established economic discourse is open to such
approaches. The economists Jack Amariglio and David Ruccio (1999) argue that
not only must mainstream economic discourse be understood as dependent on
rhetorical and symbolic structures, but we must also treat very seriously what
has otherwise been dismissed as "ersatz economics," the daily understandings of
economics, the way people "in the street" discuss such economic issues as
NAFTA, the minimum wage, and industrial lay-offs. The anthropologist Stephen
Gudeman (1986) argues similarly that "local" economics is not merely a less-
scientific, less-organized primitive version of academic economics, but is itself
organized with its own discursive structures which must be taken seriously.
These theorists have justified and informed the dissertation's approach: to
treat the ways in which development professionals, "ordinary" people, and non-
economic academics in the field of education discuss "the economy" as both a
legitimate form of economic discourse, and (like their academic counterparts) as
a discourse marked by rhetorical modes which may be read for metaphor,
metonymy, and the revealing irruptions and dislocations of language.
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Derridean Deconstructive Reading
Like the philosophical discourse that is the focus of Derrida's project,
development and other economic discourses may be viewed as similarly
dominated by an underlying metaphysics of origin, center, presence, and pure
speech over corrupted writing. In the focus groups and in the interviews
conducted for the Rethinking Economy project, for example, speakers assert in
various ways their distrust of what could broadly be called "textuality," or the
unstable and always shifting nature of language. As will be seen in subsequent
chapters, the resistance to textuality, to the gap between signifier and signified,
or resistance to the Real, erupts in different contexts and in different ontological
assertions, of this is the way the world is/' or "this is the way the economy
functions." These confident assertions, demonstrating what Derrida referred to
as the "forgetfulness of origin," are often marked by contradictions or aporias
that signal the unsettling presence of the sliding signifier.
For example, local development professionals brought together for the focus
groups spoke of the self-evident truth of export-base development: the central
presence of the capitalist industrial firm as the "engine" for local economic
development. They explicitly dismissed household economies, service industries,
and the arts as secondary or derivative economic sites. As Rousseau asserts the
priority of speech over writing, the development professionals asserted the
centrality of (a certain form of) economic activity over the social or cultural
sphere. And, as Rousseau's own discourse could be read for paradoxical
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moments when the priority of speech is put in doubt, so too can the discourse of
the development professionals be opened to a deconstructive reading that
uncovers the opposite of what the speakers intend. Such a self-deconstruction
occurred, for example, when the focus group participants represented the social
or cultural spheres as essential conditions of the economic
— prior to and
necessary for its existence. That is, in place of an omnipotent economy to which
communities must concede, the economy became a set of activities embedded in
and dependent upon the larger social context, including schools, family, and
community life. Successful development was represented as an effect of other
social processes, outside the control of economic development practitioners.
Not only was this social context now emerging in their discourse as the key
condition of existence and essential foundation of a successful economy
(including the production of entrepreneurs and an educated workforce), but the
process of economic development itself was spoken of as undermining its very
conditions of existence. As one participant pointed out, full employment makes
caring for children next to impossible, even in wealthy communities. From the
perspective of the project of rethinking the economy, the conversation
acknowledged that nonmonetized household economic activity, including the
rearing of children, is essential to the functioning of the money economy. It was
thus an opening through which a hidden (noncapitalist) economy was revealed,
and recognized as consequential for capitalist development.
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From Deconstruction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis
From its inception, the goal of the Rethinking Economy project was not
simply one of changing the way the economy is represented, but of producing
new languages of economy which would in turn make possible new
identifications and new subjectivities. Ernesto Laclau offers one way of
understanding this process, through his work on politics, hegemony, and the
signifier (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Laclau 1990). Laclau sees politics as the
unending struggle over the signifiers through which identifications occur. For
example, in the Rethinking Economy project we can argue that the universal
notion of “the economy" or “the economic" has certain concrete particulars
attached to it (in an ultimately contingent manner) through which the universal
becomes operationalized, and in relationship to which individuals become
formed as subjects. Through a process of (temporarily) attaching different
particulars to the universal notion of the economic we might enable a different
set of identifications or subjectifications to take place. Thus, a hegemonic struggle
over the signifier— for example, the struggle to assert the notion of a "diverse
economy" rather than a “monocultural" one— becomes a practice of
resubjectification in which alternative desires (for what to do, or what to be)
become possible. If the notion of “monetized market exchange" is no longer
attached to the signifier "capitalism," and "capitalism" is no longer attached in a
simple one-to-one relationship to the signifier "economy," those opposed to the
exploitative practices of capitalism and unwilling to contribute to such practices
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as an employee or as a capitalist employer may see the option of participating in
a worker cooperative as a viable alternative-engaged in for-market, monetized
production in a non-capitalist yet still "economic" practice.
Laclau argues that capitalism (like any hegemonic term) comes to occupy a
position of dominance because it is able to incorporate elements of what is
exterior to itself: "Inasmuch as capitalism always had a constitutive outside, its
domination can never be merely imposed through the internal development of
its logic, but must be imposed through the hegemonization of something
radically exterior to itself" (Laclau 1990, 56). This suggests that capitalist
hegemony is neither natural nor inevitable, but is constituted contingently in
struggle and therefore open to potential alternatives. In the context of the
Rethinking Economy project, for example, we may argue that if, through political
struggle, "quality of life" becomes unhinged from its naturalized association
with capitalist economic development, it also becomes available to other forms of
economic practice.31
Yet what is the process by which such a hegemonic shift takes place? One
may view it in terms of "persuasion," but as Laclau points out (in the context of a
critique of Richard Rorty), it is no easy matter to answer the question: "What is it
31
"The more dislocated is the ground on which capitalism operates, the less it can rely on a
framework of stable social and political relations and the more central this political moment of
hegemonic construction will be; but for that very reason, the more extensive the range of
alternative political possibilities opposed to capitalist hegemonization will also be." (Laclau 1990,
56)
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to persuade? (1991, 89). Persuasion, he suggests, is "an operation that involves
making somebody change her opinion without any ultimate rational foundation"
(89). Using the example of the alcoholic seeking to reform herself and suppress
the desire to drink, Laclau says that "From the point of view of the desire there is
only repression— that is, force. And this argument can be generalized" (89).
Laclau argues further that persuasion- the process of instituting a hegemonic
shift— takes place when one hegemonic operation no longer offers the subject a
coherent order, and another narrative steps in to fill the gap:
the process of persuasion is frequently presented as if somebody
who has a belief in A is presented with a belief B and the
suggestion of moving from one to the other. Things never happen
this way. What happens is rather that new elements enter into the
picture and that the old rule is unable to hegemonize them.... Very
frequently the new rule is accepted, not because it is liked in itself,
but just because it is a rule, because it introduces a principle of
coherence and intelligibility in an apparent chaos. (Laclau 1991, 94)
Seen in this light, we may view much of the training of community researchers as
a process of destabilizing the conventional economic discourse, of introducing
new elements that the old rule could not hegemonize— for example, by
introducing the iceberg diagram as an alternative view of the economy, or
showing the "idiotic" contradictions represented by newspaper headlines
(described in chapter 6).
This view of how one hegemonic discourse gives way to another suggests
that force is unavoidably implicated in discursive politics. It also, however,
suggests a rather automatic process, and a number of questions remain: What are
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the political and pedagogical issues involved in attempting to effect such shifts?
What is involved in 'persuading" subjects to identify with different particulars,
to shift to a new language game? Is it simply a question of offering an order in
the midst of chaos? Why are certain orders rejected in favor of others? Why are
there attachments to old orders, even when they are shown to be incapable of
hegemonizing new elements? This is what Laclau, Zizek, and Butler refer to as
"the strategic question of hegemony: of how the political field is constituted, of
what possibilities emerge from an approach to the political field that inquires
into conditions of its possibility and articulation" (Laclau, Zizek, and Butler 2000,
3).
In the course of designing and conducting the community researcher
training for the Rethinking Economy project, we found ourselves addressing the
various attachments that individuals have to particular economic narratives
("old orders"). Many of the community researchers, for example, understood
capitalism in terms of concentrated power and wealth, as the fundamental source
of gender and racial inequities and ecological destruction, global in reach, and
beyond the abilities of ordinary people to alter. They were so strongly attached to
this vision of capitalism— as a force which must be both submitted to and
opposed — that one could argue that their desires were in effect defined by
capitalism. In the middle of the first training weekend, for example, when
listening to the tapes of the day's activities we saw that the community
researchers' own investments— their pleasurable attachments in their hatreds—
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were interrupting their ability to see alternatives. Capitalism was the social
landscape establishing the parameters of how they understood their own
desires -and they did not necessarily want to give up the enjoyment they felt in
this capitalist landscape, the enjoyment of understanding and resenting capitalist
economic reality.
Offering an alternative landscape of the "community economy" was one
strategy for de-linking capitalism and desire, and for cultivating an alternative
kind of economic subject. But the experience of confronting anti-capitalist
enjoyment made us understand that we needed a theory of the subject, one that
addressed the questions of identification, desire, resistance, and enjoyment.
Consequently, in the midst of the project we began to shift our focus from
subjectivity in terms of the sliding signifier and the Derridean-Foucauldian
inflected aspects of the project to considering the psychoanalytical notion of the
subject. Gabriela Delgadillo, a fellow researcher and a Lacanian analyst, was
influential in providing the research team with a theoretical understanding of the
subject in Lacan's work.
Laclau himself suggests that both deconstruction and the Lacanian notion of
the subject may be helpful in understanding the way identifications operate in
new language games, and contribute to the project of radical democracy:
It is not possible to do away with the category of "subject": what it
points to is part of the structure of experience. What is possible is to
deconstruct it: to show its internal — and unavoidable— aporias, the
undecidable opposites that inhabit it and, in this way, to enlarge
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the field of the language games that it is possible to play with it
(Laclau 1996, 57)
Looking back on this shift in focus, I find a parallel in what Zizek referred to as
"two complementary procedures of the 'criticism of ideology'" (Zizek 1989, 125).
The first is a deconstructive strategy; the second is a consideration of the
subjective experience of enjoyment and fantasy:
— one is discursive
,
the "symptomal reading" of the ideological text
bringing about the "deconstruction" of the spontaneous experience
of its meaning
-that is, demonstrating how a given ideological
field is a result of a montage of heterogeneous "floating signifiers,"
of their totalization through the intervention of certain "nodal
points;"
— the other aims at extracting the kernel of enjoyment, at
articulating the way in which— beyond the field of meaning but at
the same time internal to it— an ideology implies, manipulates,
produces a pre-ideological enjoyment structured in fantasy. (Zizek
1989, 125)
These two procedures— deconstructive reading to highlight discursivity and
psychoanalytical analysis of the role of fantasy and enjoyment— have become the
principal approaches I have employed in analyzing the transcripts generated by
the Rethinking Economy project.
To say that there is a transition from differentiating the economic landscape
through deconstruction to a consideration of the psychoanalytical aspects of
economic subjectivity is not to suggest, however, that there is a simple
correspondence between the projects of Derrida and Lacan. In "For the Love of
Lacan" (1998), Derrida describes the relationship between their two projects as a
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kind of "chiasmus," or criss-cross. 32 According to Derrida, in the mid-1960s, as
Derrida was deconstructing philosophy and showing its reliance on
metaphorical and literary writing (undermining the originary foundations in a
kind of purer speech before the corruptions of secondary writing), Lacan was
attempting to bring psychoanalysis to the condition of philosophy. As such,
Derrida admits that Lacan's discourse was "too philosophical" for him, "too
much at home with the philosophers" — "too much at home with all those with
whom I was in the process, not of breaking, which makes no sense, as I've said
countless times, but of reconsidering all the contracts" (Derrida 1998, 56).33
Yet there are clearly overlapping concerns in the work of these two theorists.
The Derridean practice of deconstructive reading is a methodological approach
that highlights the instability of categorical closure. The more systematically a
discourse attempts to achieve a cohesive, smooth, historical narrative the more
the sutures papering over the constitutive gaps become apparent. Put in other
terms, this suturing may be seen as an attempt to corral the surplus meaning
("the senseless remainder," "the traumatic real") which is inevitably generated
by attempts at closure, at fixing disruptive textuality. These are themes that
resonate throughout Lacan's work.
32 Chiasmus is an inverted relationship, suggesting a kind of crossing, as in the Greek letter chi: X.
33 For example, Lacanian discourse is "too much at home with a Sartrian neo-existentialism
(which he finds in Lacan up to Ecrits, "where the discourse of alienation, authenticity, and so
forth prevails" [56]).
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Derrida himself asserts a congruence in their different projects. (The criss-
crossing chiasmus is, as I understand it, as much a coming together as it is a
moving apart). In the end, he says that deconstruction is at heart "an experience
of the impossible":
There is no point in recalling here once again that deconstruction, if
there is any, is not a critique, still less a theoretical or speculative
operation methodically carried out by someone; rather, if there is
any deconstruction, it takes place (which I have said too often, and
yet once again in Psyche
,
to dare to repeat it again) as experience of
the impossible. (Derrida 1998, 54-5)
It is this experience of the impossible that connects the deconstructive approach
to reading (for economic difference, to reverse and displace binaries, to place in
question the metaphysics of presence), which undermines one hierarchy (that of
speech over writing) while resisting its replacement with another (for example,
that of writing over speech), with the Lacanian practice of analysis (which seeks
to shift the relationship between subject, fantasy, and symptom without
replacing one fantasy structure with another). What connects these projects is an
understanding and acceptance of the paradox of the real.
Significantly, Derrida describes deconstruction as an "experience" rather
than a critique or methodical operation; Lacan similarly is dismissive of those
who would turn psychoanalysis into a formulaic method of analysis. Neither
deconstruction nor Lacanian analysis can be simply viewed as a "methodology,"
secure in its techniques and confident in establishing the grounds of its own
knowledge. Consequently, rather than making use of an established
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methodology, it is the approach of this dissertation to ask certain questions and
produce analyses that focus on the experience of the impossible in the context of
economic subjectivity. In particular I am reading texts for metaphysics of origin;
for moments when the fantasy and symptom structure appears; for various
reactions to the traumatic experience of the impossible; and for glimpses
su88es^n8 traversals of fantasy. Doing so, I argue, is a pointedly political
methodology, with a particular understanding of the "truth" of research.
Politics, Analysis, and "Truth"
For Foucault, the political (and, I would add, pedagogical) responsibility of
the intellectual is to investigate truth. The intellectual's role should not, however,
be one of distinguishing ideological distortion from the truth beyond ideology,
or of establishing his or her own correct scientific practice, but of "ascertaining
the possibility of constituting a new politics of truth. The problem is not
changing people's consciousnesses— or what's in their heads— but the political,
economic, institutional regime of the production of truth" (Foucault 1984a, 74).
Truth, for Foucault, cannot be separated from power; truth is always produced
by constraint and truth produces the effect of power (72). Consequently,
each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth:
that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function
as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to
distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is
sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the
acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with
saying what counts as true. (Foucault, 73)
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The intellectual's role is not one of somehow liberating the truth, but of
"detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic,
and cultural, within which it operates at the present time" (Foucault, 75).
Foucault is therefore less concerned with who dominates, why they dominate,
what their goal is in this domination, and more with how subjects are
progressively constituted through various forces, practices, desires, and
thoughts.
Lacanian psychoanalytical practice can be positioned in a similar stance
towards truth. While the purpose of ego psychology (a branch of psychology that
Lacan strongly opposed throughout his life) is to bring the patient to health by
strengthening the ego, with the result that the individual is better able to accept
reality, the truth of the real world,34 Lacanian analysis is based upon a non-
medical model of psychoanalysis, one which places the analyst and analysand in a
different relationship to truth. Patrick Colm Hogan (1990) points out that Lacan
describes analysis as a "proces While there is no exact English translation of
"
proces," with the term suggesting both "process" and "proceeding," Hogan
34 This view of the individual and its relationship to knowledge and reality is mirrored by the
false consciousness arguments implicit or explicit in many political and pedagogical projects,
including those of the critical pedagogists. An opposite view of politics can be found in Laclau,
Zizek, and Butler (2000), who argue that "no social movement can, in fact, enjoy its status as an
open-ended, democratic political articulation without presuming and operationalizing the
negativity at the heart of identity" (Laclau, Zizek, Butler 2000, 2). In other words, politics should
not be understood as the final filling in of the gap of identity — of fixing what is broken or closing
a wound — but as a process built upon the openness of that gap. Anti-totalitarian and democratic
politics should both acknowledge that the gap is present and resist the urge to close it.
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argues for “proceeding" because this is in tune with what Lacan has argued for
elsewhere
-that is, the rejection of a medical model for analysis and preference
for a juridical model (8-9). Rather than seeing the analyst/ analysand relationship
as one of doctor/ patient, Lacan's juridical model views the relationship as what
Hogan calls “dialecticians in a quaestio/ the Latin for proces/ which of course is
cognate with the English question' and 'inquest'" (9). In the place of medical
diagnostics, we have therefore the juridical model of speech: not a patient's
relationship to normality, but the subject's relation to the law; a relation not in
terms of sickness, health, and cure, but in terms of truth. To this end, Hogan
directs us to Lacan's insistence that “all usage of the term for truth has a juridical
origin" (9).35
Finally, the relationship between analysis and truth— resisting the reduction
of the question to one of “error, illusion, alienated consciousness, or ideology" -
can be found in both the Marxian and Freudian methods of analysis— the
analysis of commodity fetishism and the analysis of dreams. Zizek, in The
Sublime Object ofIdeology (1989), asks “how was it possible for Marx, in his
analysis of the world of commodities, to produce a notion which applies also to
the analysis of dreams, hysterical phenomena, and so on?"
The answer is that there is a fundamental homology between the
interpretative procedure of Marx and Freud— more precisely,
between their analysis of commodity and of dreams. In both cases
35 The quote is from Lacan's Seminaire XX: Encore, 1975, 85.
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the point is to avoid the properly fetishistic fascination of the
content supposedly hidden behind the form: the "secret" to be
unveiled through analysis is not the content hidden by the form
(the form of commodities, the form of dreams) but, on the contrary,
the "secret" of this form itself The theoretical intelligence of the form
7
of dreams does not consist in penetrating from the manifest content
to its hidden kernel," to the latent dream-thoughts; it consists in
the answer to the question: why have the latent dream-thoughts
assumed such a form, why were they transposed into the form of a
dream? It is the same with commodities: the real problem is not to
penetrate to the "hidden kernel" of the commodity — the
determination of its value by the quantity of the work consumed in
its production-but to explain why work assumed the form of the
value of a commodity, why it can affirm its social character only in
the commodity-form of its product. (Zizek 1989, 11)
Freud probed how it is that repressed unconscious knowledge takes on the form
of the dream as it is related in common speech; how the unconscious takes a
certain form in language. Marx asked how the social nature of our beings— the
repressed knowledge of our necessarily social existence— comes to take the form
of commodity exchange, in which we speak of things (including, significantly,
wage labor) as having a particular monetary value, determined by such factors as
a free market" for goods and labor. This suggests that Marx was less interested
in what we might call the latent content of the economic dream than in the
question of why it took the form of this dream. What function did it serve? What
were its effects? Likewise, Freud was less interested in what we could call the
real psychic economy and the false consciousness of the ego than he was in the
way knowledge is constructed, how it assumes its form in language, and how
that form relates to repetitive patterns of suffering.
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Following Foucault, Lacan, Freud, Derrida, and Marx, this dissertation
rejects a research methodology based on a depth model of truth, in which the
researcher's task is to uncover the hidden or underlying truth or reality. In the
Rethinking Economy project, we rejected outright the belief that an
understanding or language or experience of "economy" is nothing but a simple
reflection of a transparent reality, or an accidental and meaningless confusion.
But we were also careful not to get caught up in finding the real kernel (the real
meaning of the dream, the real calculation of value)
-in other words, "the real
economy, the secret content behind the visible form. Hence, in conducting an
anti-essentialist marxian class analysis, determining the line between surplus and
necessary labor or between productive and unproductive labor, or the
assignment of one process of production, appropriation, or distribution to a
particular class or non-class category is not a question of revealing an empirical,
extra-theoretic truth (the "fetishistic fascination" with a hidden content).
Foucault, Lacan, Freud, Derrida, and Marx suggest that it is productive to
investigate the forms that truth assumes and the various effects of these forms. In
the audit stage we were not concerned with a false consciousness argument, or
with injecting marxian language into a mind free of such concepts. We were not
interested in asking questions about the CRs' "real economic relations" which
exist beneath their "false" or falsely perceived economic relations. We were not
interested in examining the latent meaning of the manifest content of their
relations and activities. Our project is concerned with the question "What is the
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economy?" but our concern is not with finding the correct answer to this
question; it is with the process by which this question is formed, and with the
effects of how we attempt to answer it.
We ask, for example, what might be repressed when people speak of the
economy and their relationship to it, and how might repressed unconscious
knowledge be found in their speech? What are the various forms that
individuals' investments in this or that economic reality take? How do these
forms in turn constrain alternative discourses, subjectivities, and practices? What
are the concrete consequences of the narratives through which subjects speak of
economic realities, and express their libidinal pleasurable attachments to such
narratives?
In the following two chapters, I will attempt to use such questions to guide
my symptomatic reading of transcripts generated by the Rethinking Economy
project. As will be seen, these readings do not attempt to provide a more
complete description of the real economy, nor to offer a supplement to
conventional economic discourse. They are not attempts to provide the correct
answer to the question of "what is the economy?" but to suggest that no matter
what answer we have to this question, there could always be another. The space
that this relationship to truth opens up is, I will suggest, a political space and one
in which the issue of the subject— its desires, resistances, and enjoyments— come
to the forefront.
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CHAPTER 5
LACK AND FANTASY IN THE RETHINKING ECONOMY PROJECT
Introduction
In this chapter certain key elements of Lacanian subjectivity— lack, fantasy,
the symptom, castration, the Law, enjoyments, desire— will be applied to
transcript evidence drawn from the Rethinking Economy project to frame
various individuals' complex relationships to the economy and to desire. To the
degree that fantasy sets a scene that papers over the lack in the Other, fantasy can
also be seen as a defense against castration. The defenses of the individuals
represented below fall under two broad categories of response to irredeemable
lack. In the first, the economy enacts the paternal function, instituting the Law
prohibiting individuals from the position of the phallus, and providing the
substitute enjoyments of either submission to or transgression of that Law's
dictates. In the second defense, the fantasy of a future utopian harmony is
maintained, the attainment of which is thwarted by the symptom of the
economy. This fantasy offers the substitute enjoyments of resentment and anger
directed toward the disturbing alien force of the symptom economy that blocks
this final subjective and social closure.
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The Economy as Paternal Function
For a number of individuals who spoke in the context of the Rethinking
Economy project, the economy enacts the paternal function, permitting a certain
degree of enjoyment, but only within circumscribed boundaries: "Enjoy as little
as possible!" There is clearly a tentative, temporary, and compromised balance
between what one must give up and what one is permitted to enjoy. The
economy is experienced as a somewhat mysterious but omnipotent force, either
bestowing or withholding rewards depending on the subject's behavior. Even
the grateful recipient of economic reward lives with the possibility that the
economy will turn rapidly and take away those rewards and bestow them on
someone else (through the mysterious but ultimately meaningful mechanism of
market competition). This position was most clearly articulated by members of
the focus groups, convened by the project to discuss the region's economic
development path.
Allan and Tom
The planners and development professionals convened for the REP focus
groups emerge in the transcripts as subjects obedient to the powerful, though
sometimes bewildering, economic law. We found this contradictory mixture of
obedience and mastery, of expert knowledge and ultimate impotence in the face
of the economy, most forcefully expressed by a member of the Western
Massachusetts Economic Development Council, who explained that the
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Council's role is in part to create an identity for the region that would prove
attractive to high-paying industrial firms:
One of the things that the EDC is trying to do to effect this identity
shift is through a strategic plan that we put together last year to try
to identify those businesses and jobs that we should be trying to
attract, that create a quality job that really affects the standard of
living here. [...] So we've focused on telecommunication and
information technology as one area, one niche, obviously because
it's already burgeoning in Eastern Massachusetts and we think we
have a better shot at attracting some Eastern Mass companies.
Everything we are doing, the industrial parks we are developing,
the marketing strategies we are using, is revolving around this
strategy of attracting those kinds of jobs.
However, this development professional also asserted that ultimately the
economy is not something that can be mastered: "The economy kind of works on
its own— it always has worked on its own and what we are trying to do with
economic development resources that we bring to bear is shift the trend line a
little. Move this ship, a little, off its predestined course, if you look at past
history, without really expecting to effect the background job growth that we
know is going to happen if none of us were here." Here, the speaker has
identified with the economic order in its role as omnipotent Law; as a subject of
that Law he views himself as subservient to it, even as its dictates are never fully
understood. His job is to please the economic order, and if done properly his
reward will be a shift in the path of the economic ship, in the terms of his
metaphor; yet at the same time he acknowledges that the economic order is a
force which we are essentially powerless to fully understand, direct, or control.
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The paternal function of the economy, instituting the Law, prohibits the
speaker from directly experiencing a wholeness or closure of identity, from
directly possessing or occupying the role of the phallus. (This may explain why
the fantasy of the planning departments, as fantasies go, appears quite dry and
uninspiring. It aspires to a state in which we have pleased the economy, but live
in fear that we may fall out of favor at any minute, as those economic rewards
shift to our sibling rivals.) In exchange, the speaker enters into a pact with the
economic Law, enjoying the substitute satisfaction of submission to its idiotic
(because ultimately inexplicable) injunctions.
The speech of the economic development professionals expresses the
suspended or compromise nature of desire under the Law; this is so most clearly
when they discuss the issue of Equality of life." Economic development is
intended to increase quality of life, but, as they say on a number of occasions, it is
necessary to give up quality of life in order to have development. On the one
hand, the focus group participants are quick to list the high quality of life factors
in the Pioneer Valley region: a sense of community, a lack of congestion, a more
"spiritual, less materialistic" outlook, access to the arts and nature, and so on. But
at the same time, as Allan Blair asserts, quality of life can only be ensured by
attracting investment from outside the region, creating an environment pleasing
to the economy: "So we need to avoid having these statements about quality of
life be a proxy for a no-growth philosophy, because that is self-defeating. This
quality of life that we enjoy also requires money. It requires contributions to the
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quadrangle to have a wonderful museum, planetarium and library system. It
requires the same thing in every community up and down the Valley. Without
the money you don't have the quality of life. So there is a balance here that we
need to remember."
This formulation of "we must give up quality of life in order to get quality of
life" illustrates perfectly the compromise nature of following the dictates of the
Law s command of "Enjoy, but as little as possible!" It is reflected in the
contradictory language of the development professionals, as with the planner's
assertion that "We just need to open our mind to the right places for [growth] to
happen, so that we can balance this need for revenue that we all need for the
things we enjoy against the way we want to live." Here the signifier of money
(revenues) stands in for all the things we desire ("the things we enjoy"); but at
the same time there is the clear acknowledgment that money also undermines
our ability to live "the way we want to live." Just as fantasy stages our desires
and simultaneously explains why they can not be attained, the economic
development model expresses how our desires are both enabled by and
frustrated by the economy (jobs, money, development, capitalism, growth, and
so on). This same attitude is expressed by another participant in the focus
groups, from the city of Springfield's Planning Office:
But I think in many respects some of our greatest strengths are our
greatest weaknesses. Clearly I think in terms of quality of life.
Western Mass is a somewhat, having been in both Boston and
Western Mass, I can attribute to the fact that the pace is little
slower, the congestion is not here, but also the value is not here in
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terms of real estate and in terms of employment opportunities. If in
fact the only variable that anyone ever considered was quality of
life, we probably have 6 billion people in the Western part of the
state. But obviously it's only one of many. I think we here in
Western Mass tend to overvalue that particular element or that
particular characteristic because we have it. In fact, we lack a lot of
what a more congested, urban center can provide in terms of
multiple job opportunities, multiple academic opportunities, many
more cultural opportunities. Although we have some of that in
Western Mass, it is only a microcosm of that which you can get in
other urban centers. To that extent, it clearly is quality of life that
means a lot -it clearly meant a lot to those of us who opted to come
out here. [...] So obviously quality of life is important, but it is only
one of a whole series of variables that you have to consider.
The economic planners confidently articulate the self-evident authority of the
economic Law. Certain planning decisions can be made— concerning zoning for
industrial development, taxation, environmental legislation, workforce
preparation, advertising, and so on— and the economy may be attracted to the
region, rewarding it with development. If, on the other hand, for some reason the
economy bypasses the region, we can be assured that the implacable economic
law has been followed. In this regard, competition (as in the competition among
regions to attract industry, for example) serves to paper over, while symbolically
institutionalizing in economic discourse, the contingent and unpredictable nature
of development. If another region wins out, it's because we failed in the
marketplace.
The economic Law here is not a repressive structure so much as an
internalized set of injunctions. Through the planners, the authority of the
economic law speaks; like priests, the planners' authority comes not so much
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from their personal attributes (their intelligence, style, education) as from their
role as conduits of the authority of the economic Law. At the same time, there is
a gap in their identification with the Law. As Zizek (following Pascal) points out,
identification- the internalization of the Law
-never fully succeeds. There is
always a left-over, a residue, "a stain of traumatic irrationality and
senselessness." And it is just this left-over that ensures ideological submission:
"it is precisely this non-integrated surplus of senseless traumatism which confers
on the Law its unconditional authority" (Zizek 1989, 43). To accept the authority
of economic reality" it is necessary to experience that reality as both a command
and as incomprehensible.
In other words, if the Law were not irrational, our obedience to it would only
be a following of our own reasons and intentions. Our obedience and the Law's
authority require that the Law be senseless. The only real obedience is external;
obedience out of conviction (internal) isn't obeying authority but simply
following our own judgment. As Kierkegaard said, it is blasphemous to say that
you believe in God because he's good. Rather, if you believe, then you see God's
goodness (Zizek 1989, 37). Zizek puts this in terms of the psychoanalytical
concept of the superego:
far from hiding its full authority, this traumatic, non-integrated
character of the Law is a positive condition of it. This is the
fundamental feature of the psychoanalytic concept of the superego:
an injunction which is experienced as traumatic, "senseless" — that
is, which cannot be integrated into the symbolic universe of the
subject. But for the Law to function "normally," this traumatic fact
[of its radically contingent character] ... must be repressed into the
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unconscious, through the ideological, imaginary experience of the
meaning" of the Law, of its foundation in Justice, Truth (or, in a
more modern way, functionality).... (Zizek 1989, 37-8)
Zizek sees both transference and repression at work. Transference is the
supposition of truth or meaning behind the Law (which follows the Freudian
and Lacaman formulation that transference is the belief in the subject who is
supposed to know; i.e., the analyst). We repress the fact that authority is not based
on truth or meaning, but is senseless and inconsistent, and we furthermore
repress the fact that this first repression is a kind of structural necessity of
authority itself; that for the paternal function to operate, there must be obedience
and obedience is based on the internalization of something which is not
understandable, or symbolizable.
Fantasy therefore can be seen not in terms of an illusion which we construct
to escape reality, but as a narrative that structures our social relations and serves
to mask the traumatic kernel — that element beyond language or symbolization—
of reality (Zizek 1989, 45).36 In other words, the enunciations of "economic
reality" of the economic development planners offer a kind of escape from the
trauma of the real.
36 Zizek relates this "real kernel" to what Ernest Laclau and Chantal Mouffe refer to as
"antagonism," "a traumatic social division which cannot be symbolized."
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Grace
A number of the people interviewed by the community researchers in the
project could also be seen as submitting to the paternal function of the economy.
They enunciate the reality of the economic order, an order that demands things
from them at every turn. They either submit, with resignation, or they submit
while harboring resentment, or they do both of these but also enjoy transgressing
the Law, as in the case of Grace.
Grace is a soft-spoken middle-aged woman, a resident of one of the rural
hilltowns in the area. She was raised in a well-off suburb in Connecticut, but
rejected the materialism of that lifestyle. She had children when she was very
young, and moved around from Florida to Tennessee to Michigan doing various
manual labor jobs before coming to the region. She has been living for the past
eight years in a goatshed she converted to a small house; she has no electricity or
running water. She's a part-time nurse in the nearest large town, but treats this
job as a necessity, a source of income and health insurance. (Two of her three
children attend an expensive boarding school.) She is more passionate about her
other jobs, growing and selling plants on her land and having her own
landscaping business. She engages in barter and other non-traditional economic
activity (for example, bartering yardwork so she can take hot showers,
performing a marriage in exchange for an outhouse built near her home,) and
she's very passionate about land, Yankee farming culture, and spiritual matters;
she describes herself as a born-again Christian.
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Grace speaks of money and economy throughout her two-and-a-half hour
interview. In the context of the world she has carved out for herself, these terms
take on various contradictory meanings, emotional associations, and ethical
valuations. On the one hand, she views "the economy" as something external;
wasteful; antithetical to the spirit, community, and nature; cold and demanding.
She equates it with her mother's overflowing closets when Grace was a child in
Connecticut, with the people in the suburbs who make too much money and
spend it on useless things like aftershave and refrigerators full of condiments
they never use. When she speaks about an old dairy farming family in the
hilltown where she lives, describing their notions of money, frugality, honesty,
work, and family, "the economy" is related to what is external - money, greed,
selfishness, shoddiness, not doing things with a commitment to the right way.
However, at the same time, Grace describes the lives of the dairy farmers in
terms of an other economy, one which is more authentic and true to the human
spirit. When she describes the Yankee farmers as "economizing," the term stands
for self- and family-reliance, for not being wasteful or greedy, and for looking at
the long-term. As for example in this passage in which she describes the burial of
one of the old farmers:
Frankie's uncle died about a week ago. His uncle was one of the old
Shelburne farmers. His uncle died, and Frankie dug the grave
himself. Up in Hawley. In that clay-y, rocky soil. He dug the grave
himself, with his cousin, Chris, and another relative, the three men
dug the grave themselves. And we went to the funeral Monday and
then went up to Hawley, and they carried the casket over and they
put in on top of the grave, they had a kind of support and they just
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leave it on top of the ground. Then everybody left and Frankie was
there, and I said, Frankie, what are you going to do. And he said,
well. I'm going to fill it back in. And he said he didn't want to see a
bulldozer or back-hoe come in and push the soil in on top of his
uncle, and so.... I told him I'm not leaving then. I had a dress on,
and I actually, in my dress, me and Chris, shoveled that soil back
in. Chris and I shoveled and Frankie got in the grave, and I learned
something pretty interesting- they don't just throw the soil back
into the grave, you have to pack it all around. So Frankie got in
there with a crow-bar that had been in his family for three
generations, and a stick, and as we threw the soil in, tapped it all
around. I don't know; I think that has something to do with
economy, but I m not sure. [Lnughtcr] That he didn't want to pay
somebody else to do that.
While Grace says that she wants to learn this economy from the old dairy
farmers, she admits that she is still subjected to the dictates of that other, external
and paternal economic Law. Indeed, the polyvalent language with which she
speaks of economy, money, wealth and poverty throughout the interview
suggest a subject position of both submission to and transgression of that Law.
For example, she expresses her conviction, based in part on a friend's reading of
her astrological charts, that she will one day be both wealthy and famous:
He told me that I would be wealthy, so we'll see if that's true. He
said in my chart that I'm destined to be wealthy and famous. Not
famous like movie stars, but like the other kind of famous? Where
people who know about what it is you do — like you and I know
who [Name] is, or herbalists know who Dr. [Name]... That I'll be
known, yeah. [...] I know that I'll be wealthy, but you know what? I
also know that I'll be wealthy when I no longer need it. And
sometimes I think, why? Why wait, why not now, y'know? But I
think it's part of this journey that, for me, and for people who are
watching me— I notice that there are a lot of people watching me
now. Like, literally watching me, on that piece of land? And all my
neighbors? I mean it's fascinating, when somebody buys a piece of
land and builds a house. And I think that it's important that I do it
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with my little income. And that somehow I have faith that it is
possible.
Here Grace enjoys the fantasy of a future material abundance and social esteem
at the same time that she resists or inoculates herself from this desire, by
projecting the attainment of the fantasy into a future state when she will no
longer have those needs, or those desires. This allows her to maintain her desire
for such a future while protecting herself from its dangerous implications- the
implication, for example, that in order to achieve material wealth she will need to
submit herself more fully to the established economic order, like the society
ladies of the Connecticut suburbs she has sought escape from. Like the
development professionals in the focus group, Grace asserts that it is imperative
that one does good work, (attempt to shift the path of the ship; work hard and
live frugally), so that ultimate rewards arrive (from the economy or from God via
the economy,) even if the connection is somewhat mysterious and based on faith.
The pleasure she takes in this fantasy of a future harmonious state of wealth
and fame exists alongside a transgressive enjoyment of living counter to the
demands of the paternal economic Law, the law which dictates that we be
gainfully employed, live in homes with electricity and hot showers, keep our
food in refrigerators. Grace understands much of her unconventional lifestyle as
economically transgressive behavior. She takes satisfaction in the fact that her
house is not up to code nor legally her possession; her nursery business, though
based largely on monetary exchange, is more often than not based on customers
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leaving money and a note; her adolescent children are embarrassed to bring
schoolmates home to see how she lives, simply, spiritually, without waste or
want. In this respect her small income, seven-day-a-week work routine, and lack
of material luxuries is experienced less as a burden than as a kind of pleasure,
and she enjoys describing to the interviewer the precariousness and financial
insecurity of her position. (A small passage from the interview reveals how
deeply Grace has identified herself as an economically marginal subject.
Although she earlier describes her affluent lifestyle growing up in Connecticut,
in this passage she portrays herself in the following way: "When I was, I think I
was twelve, maybe even younger when I started, I mowed lawns for a living."
This for a living is no doubt a slip, is a telling indicator of her subjective self-
understanding.)
For someone who asserts that she has chosen a lifestyle explicitly outside of
conventional monetary concerns, Grace talks a great deal about money. (The
word "money" itself comes up 174 times in the course of her interview.)
Throughout the interview she speaks about how she is saving money to buy
property or upgrade her house or pay off her truck; how she doesn't spend
money on luxuries; how her children don't understand her desire to live without
expensive new clothes; how much she made from sales of her plants; how much
she donates to her church; how much the other nurses make and how they waste
their salaries and live in debt. As much as she tries to live a life outside of money
relations, money seems to dominate her thinking, erupting in her language
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throughout. In this sense her transgressions appear to be still tied to or
embedded in the larger economy or economic reality; the more she is focused on
escaping it, the more she is focused on its contours. In this respect, she is like the
critical pedagogists, who seek to transgress the iron law of the capitalist economy
but return again and again to its power and presence, prohibiting, permitting,
and defining where enjoyment (submissive or transgressive) is to be found.
The Economy as Symptom
Whereas Tom and Allan maintain the economic development fantasy in
which the economy rewards those who submit to its senseless demands, and
Grace maintains the fantasy of the economic law by transgressing or sneaking
around its dictates, other interviewees in the Rethinking Economy project
maintain the fantasy of a utopian and harmonious state just beyond the obstacle
of the symptom. Filled, like Stanley, with the certain knowledge that it is the
economy (in the form of money, commodification, industrialization, wage labor,
capitalism) standing in the way of this utopian pre-, post-, or non-economic state,
they maintain their compromise desire in the light of fixed identities, of true
subjectivity and concrete structural realities. Like the critical pedagogists they at
times appear satisfied and almost content with their resentments toward the
symptom economy, and, like a reluctant analysand forced by others into
analysis, they would not necessarily enjoy having their fantasies lifted.
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Sid
Sid, the co-owner, with his wife Sally, of an organic food business in one of
the hilltowns of Western Massachusetts, speaks at length about the alienating
realities of our current economic situation and his hopes for the future. For Sid,
individuals are missing something, but to retrieve that missing object and
become whole again is not impossible; lack is not the inescapable condition of
subjectivity
.
37 The economy not only fails to fill the lack, it actively stands in the
way. "The economy," Sid says, "is not supporting our fulfillment." Subsequently,
It s a.
. . It's a hell. It's a living hell." The economy penetrates all facets of life and
is responsible for individuals' alienation from their true innate identity and
inherently spiritual nature:
Our present economic order is not serving our need to become who
we really are. That's our basic need, our need to love, receive love,
give love, to become who we really are... If our economy is not
serving that, then our economy is a failed economy, no matter how
large the gross national product is, or no matter how successful in
its own limited sphere a business may be, if it's not serving the true
spiritual needs of the people then it's a failed economy, and it's a
disruptive economy. Because it's not serving the human spirit.
[Agitated
,
voice rising, strained, incredulous
:] Whereas in this economy
right now, there's a denial that there's even... that there even is a
human spirit!
It is the economy which stands between us and a spiritual, ecological, healthy
society in which individuals and community are re-united. This desire for a
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return to a lost wholeness
-an identity without lack, a world in which there is no
gap between individuals, others, and nature
-is evident in Sid's vision of
Shangri-La:
The bounty of nature is unbelievable. And New England, this area,
this region where we could live, if people... were, y'know, woke up
to that economy, the economy of abundance, and the economy of
community, and the economy of spirit, we, this Pioneer Valley
would be an unbelievable, flourishing, biodiverse, over-, it'd be a
garden valley and it'd be like coming into Shangri-La. People
would be working, with the land, working together, making music
together, writing poetry,...and they would have their health...
In the utopia beyond economy, the spiritual is acknowledged and nourished;
individuals assume their real identities; society is built around loving and being
loved; there is no alienation between physical labor and the laborer; the natural
connection with the land which the economy has robbed from us is restored; and
fundamental needs are taken care of as people live and work together towards a
common good.
Significantly, in this vision of the future (or return to an authentic past) the
common good is clearly understood by all; there is no gap between various
individuals' understanding of what "the good" is. In this vision, language is self-
evident and resumes its former, ancient role as transparent conduit of truth. This
fantasy vision assumes the positive content of essential truths, and sustains a
37 In this regard Sid falls squarely into the camp of the object relations school of psychology, who,
unlike Lacanians, suggest that incomplete egos can find a satisfying wholeness or unification of
being.
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vision of language in which the gap between the signifier and the thing it
signifies is closed. We speak, and the truth emerges; confusion is lifted, the
Tower of Babel crumbles:
Insofar as we're open to, willing to be in truth to ourselves, and
truthful, and seeking truth and learn to face misconceptions within
ourselves which violate those truths, then we have the possibility of
really getting somewhere, y'know, together. And that is inclusive
and honors the primacy of the whole and that honors the
community-nature of the self.
Clearly antithetical to the Lacanian understanding of subjects, society, and
language all structured around a fundamental lack, Sid's fantasy constructs a
world in which subjects are restored to an original wholeness (corresponding to
the infant's undifferentiated union with the world), the Other's desire or lack
aligns with the subject and closes around a fundamental positive identity, and
language escapes metaphor and metonymy. Subsequently, in a world in which
there is no conflict between need and fulfillment, there would be no need to
repress inappropriate desires, no paternal function would be instituted to patrol
enjoyment, and the unconscious would no longer exist. In Lacanian terms, this is
a fantasy of the end of language, and of subjectivity itself .38
38 One should go further and say that in this utopia, framed by Sid as the most ethical society,
there would be no ethics; because there would be no gap between words and what they signify,
between direct transparent knowledge (e.g., "this is obviously the common good,") no conflict
between different understandings of truth, then there would be no gap between knowledge and
the act— no space of doubt within which the ethical decision must be made. This is a point made
by Derrida (1996).
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Sid s subjectivity is formed in a relationship of identification with what he
calls the economic order; that is, although he may not like it, he still views the
Other as possessing a positive (albeit evil) identity, and it is this representation of
the economic order which Sid has "taken in," internalized, and in relationship to
which he has come to view his self. The force blocking a harmonious closure or
unity or final completion of identity is fingered, and Sid's subjectivity and his
desires are temporarily (and imperfectly) stabilized in this compromise
construction around the symptom.
Lily
Lily is an environmental activist and educator, working with one of the local
colleges in a program involving primary and secondary schools in the area. In
the interview Lilly traces her concern for the environment back to her childhood;
when upset she would go into the woods, where she would become calm, feel
whole and at peace. As an adult she loves to go out in fresh snowfall, when
everything else comes to a halt, and read the landscape for the tracks of animals,
deciphering their otherwise hidden movements. She takes note of these magical
moments when what she describes as the "secret world" of nature and animals
erupts into her life. They provide her with a glimpse of the underlying unity
between people and nature, which is the positive content of our being. She
became an environmental educator in part because she wanted to bring to other
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people the spiritual benefits of re-linking ourselves with nature, to rejoin (return
to an original unity) people and nature, restoring this original link.
Lily understands that all of our efforts to live more harmoniously, however,
are thwarted by the economic system. She is confronted daily with the ethical
problem of how to live in this world without supporting or being co-opted by the
overwhelming economic reality. Like Sidney, Lily and her partner try to, in her
words, "avoid corporations" as much as possible, buying their food in bulk from
Northeast Cooperatives, for example, or from the small cooperative market
where she also sometimes volunteers. But paying rent, earning a wage,
supporting the system through taxes, all these involve her inextricably in a
cohesive unitary system that she abhors. "The system's got me in a tough place,"
she says. "I want to step out."
I would like to, in addition to not being forced to pay taxes, for war
and other evildoings, I would like to not to have a checking
account, I would like to not have an ATM card, I would like to not
have a car, I would like to not have school loans. [Laughter.] [...] I
just, uh, I want to start living. And I realize that all the cues that I
got about how to do that up to now are wrong. They were all about
making you, uh, just a piece of machinery, you know, for the
machine, so they can rape and wreak, and uh, I want to be part of
the solution.
Her fantasy is that of a pre-economic identity outside of that machine, a
community in which the boundaries between individuals and society, and
between humans and nature simply no longer exist. She describes her fantasy
vision of a society of barter, universal caring, wise use of resources, unselfish
labor. It is a vision of both independence and community, suggesting that when
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one imagines the possibility of both individual completion and social closure.
one can imagine a society in which both can take place simultaneously, around
the same object a. It is a world without conflict or harm of any sort:
I guess the need for intentional community wouldn't be there
[laughs], my fantasy world, because the whole world would be one
big intentional community. But, in the short term, that's what I see
creating or finding a place where people are mutually supportive of
each other, as much as possible, independent, self-sufficient,
growing your own organic food, and eating what was in season,
and uh, not having, to uh, go to a job, not being dependent on fossil
fuels, of the grid, helping people with child raising, child-care, you
know because it was a joy? You know everyone sharing that, so
that the children were always with someone that really wanted
them to be with them at that point.
As in Sid's fantasy, in Lily's utopian community there would be a transparent
language based on a common understanding of truth: "I guess my community of
choice would be my partner, and other people that are awakening and aware
and addressing the issues, and talking the truth."
The symptom preventing the attainment of this utopian and harmonious
unity is the economic system. For example, in the following passage, Lily talks
about how the economy "perverts" the natural relationship between community,
quality of life, and the satisfaction of basic needs. Corporations have figured out
that what we want is community, love, fulfilling relationships. They take
advantage of our lack and our desire for fulfillment and use it against us,
dragging us deeper and deeper into an economy based on false satisfactions.
But the reality that [the corporations] have been given the power to
make us unhappy [...]. [The corporations say,] We cannot allow a
self-sustaining community because, we're not tapping the
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marketplace, you know it's just a continuation of colonialism, what
happened when we first lived here. And discovered America
[laughs], we're still discovering, we're going to tap out every last
inch of the earth, and every last cell now, you know, we're
patenting life forms now, genetic make-up, and now we're
screwing that up. It s really scary, it's like the last frontier. In that
mov, in that video, advertising and the end of the world, they've
actually got a scheme to put billboards in space that would be the
size of a planet. Costing millions of dollars. So, so you know. Coca
Cola might spend, you know, a billion dollars to have its slogan
floating out there around the earth. I don't know what happens,
how our values get so perverted. It seems to come out of this big
aching chasm, you know, where people's needs aren't truly being
met, but they aren't taking the time to figure out how to address
that. You know, what are the needs, and properly identify them,
and then realize that they can't be met by stuff.
This passage suggests that Lily is aware that "capitalism hasn't got it," hasn't got
the missing piece that we desire, though capitalism takes advantage of our desire
to believe that it can provide us with that missing piece. Like Sid, however, she
does not acknowledge or accept the impossibility of filling that fundamental
void. Capitalism is a false messiah, or a cargo cult, but in her vision there is the
possibility of fulfillment, a true messiah, a positive identity for an attainable
object a. Lily understand that "capitalism hasn't got it," but not that "the Other
hasn't got it" either.
Lily is a very busy activist. She understands that the system must be fought
on all levels, and she is afraid it may already be too late: "And I'd really like for
the world to embrace [a world without harm], and then I'd be able to stop
fighting everything that is harming. And it's hard to see progress with that,
because, it's still pretty hopeless. Someone said recently that all we have done is
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slow them down, you know all the work we've been doing, slowing them down,
and, that's not enough." She admits, understandably, to being exhausted with
the fight, which being systematic in her vision must be fought on almost every
front. Although she continues to be active in various organizations (supporting
organic farming, opposing genetically-modified food, for example,) Lily says
openly that she would like to retreat from the battle into her own unified
community, of her self and her partner.
You know, [my partner] does most of it because I'm still a wage
slave, but I can see myself in the future, if we get this job in
particular, you know, we can take the time to make bread and do
all these things that I used to have some opportunity to do and I
don't really any more. Urn, I mean, there's nothing that would
make happier than if I didn't have to be so involved in this,
activism. You know, if I could just be involved in creating a
beautiful community and contributing. You know I'm tired of
fighting against the system, the machine.
This is a vision of closure, of the community of the domestic kitchen, of two
people baking bread together, enclosed in a private space. Elsewhere Lily speaks
of her belief that supernatural "helpers" brought her and her partner together; in
this relationship she finds a kind of completion, and believes that "we kind of
create one very amazing person together."39
39 The bread-making strikes me as a kind of idealized infant-mother act, even if she never did this
with her actual mother; the domestic hearth and her (hetero)sexual relationship becoming
melded here, as she simultaneously turns away from the intruding, domineering, frustrating,
(paternal), economic system.
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Beyond Fantasy? Sally's Economy
For Allan, Tom, Sid, Grace, and Lily, a solid economic reality undergirds the
identifications through which subjectification occurs. Others in the project,
however, reveal an interesting awareness of the unstable contingency of their
economic identifications. While Sid presents a fantasmatic projection of the kind
of utopian world he would like to live in, placing the economy in the role of the
symptom preventing such a utopia from being realized, his wife Sally more
quietly explores the weirdness of the economic identifications we suffer and
enjoy.
At one point in the interview she describes her relief over her brother's
decision to move in with and take care of their elderly mother. She feels relief
that she will not have to make that difficult choice herself. All the same, she and
her brother will need to provide for her economically. This discussion triggers
other thoughts for Sally, including the enigmatic statement that "we've all lived
in a very... virtual, almost, economy for I don't know how many years, certainly
way before I was born." She continues, tentatively, about something she refers to
as "the force field around the economy":
So, it brings up other kinds of economic... questions? And also, a
whole other topic which probably I won't get into very deeply
but... the... the force field around the economy when you were
growing up. I grew up with a single mother. My father died when I
was three. And my mother was a schoolteacher and raised my
brother and I on her salary, and that was very stressful, and I heard
her more than once crying in the evening, when I was in bed and
she was working on schoolwork and maybe doing the taxes or
something, or balancing her checkbook, crying over money. So,
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that's, everyone has their own
-I call "force field," but the dynamic
around economy in their own personal home as they grew up, and
I happen, y know, [Sid], who's very different, he might want to
share about that, he might not, but, he grew up with a
different...economy, a different family economy than I did,
y'know. And, to see how that affects one's choices later in life and
one's feelings about money and feeling about lack, and how you
can work with that, y'know, in many ways. But I still have a
difficult time not feeling like I'm lacking resources, and I tend to
get things on sale, and try to buy bargains, and to come out of a
place of really not having that much money. That has a reality and
a non-reality to it, clearly. It's something that I've been sort of
becoming.... Where we come from around money and why in this
particular time-frame since our births, where some of those
attitudes and emotions were shaped. I find that very fascinating,
and think that people who study [gentle laugh],... it's an area which
I'm just sort of promoting as something of real interest.
I just wanted to say, thinking about this study? That certainly
somewhere in this iceberg.
. .is this sort of psychology of money and
a person's childhood, and that, that piece is very underlying,
underwater.... It really affects everything you do.
Sally is struggling here with powerful themes: she feels guilty about not being
able to, or not choosing to, take care of her elderly mother, and she understands
this guilt to be connected to her understanding of herself as having a certain
economic reality, a scarcity of money or time to be able to take care of her
mother. Following this observation, she immediately brings up what she calls the
"force field" of the economy, the notion that certain patterns in your life are laid
down in childhood and affect how you are today; for her, a lack of money and
her mother's suffering which she observed as a child made her as an adult very
sensitive to not having enough; like a child of the Depression era, she can not
shake the feeling of "lacking resources." At the same time, she sees this self-
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identity, this understanding of self, as contradictory: it has "a reality and a non-
reality to it; they both lack and do not lack the necessary material resources.
Sally is struggling in her own way with the issue of how a particular
perception of reality (here, in terms of an economic reality) shapes our self-
understanding, and at the same time presents back to us a complicated picture of
our true situation; the economy as a force field” whose power stretches from the
distant past to effect present understandings of reality. The economy emerges
here with multiple and contradictory faces: as a powerful reality whose effects
linger; as the echo of some traumatic past suffering carried forward into the
present; and as a deceptive "non-reality," something which is not real, perhaps
even empty, but which carries the effect of truth. She appears to be intrigued by
the force field, the process by which something unreal can shape her sense of self
and affect her actions. Her fascination here can be seen as a description of her
awakening to the unconscious— including the power of fantasies, their
relationship to guilt and suffering, and the intriguing possibility that things that
appear real and powerful may in fact be essentially empty, place holders for
other sliding significations. She is also speaking here of the process of
identification, and of her interest in exploring the disturbing self implicated in
our weird economic identifications.
Her inquiry into the fantasy of the economy and of the subject fixed within it
offers us an introduction to the Lacanian notion of traversal of fantasy, a topic
which will be discussed further in the next chapter.
152
CHAPTER 6
TRAVERSAL OF FANTASY
The most aberrant education has never had any other
motive than the well-being of the subject.
-Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, 256
Introduction
In chapter 2, 1 discussed the tendency among many progressive education
theorists to assert essentialist identities, a tendency which leads them to adopt
the contradictory arguments of economic structuralism (in which subjectivity is
ultimately determined by an essentially capitalist economic structure) and
essentialist humanism (in which subjects have true identities outside of the
structure, identities which the educational system either suppresses or liberates).
I have argued that this attachment to structuralism in the economic/ political
sphere and humanism in the cultural/educational sphere leads to an ironic
congruence with the image of the world held by the critical pedagogists'
conservative and liberal opponents. More importantly, it also creates an impasse
leading to the abandonment of the very political project which these progressive
educators would ostensibly seek to encourage and participate in— that is, it leads
to the evacuation of cultural and educational work as authentic political work
with the potential for substantially transforming economic practices.
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Overcoming the impasse of the critical pedagogists involves, I have argued,
challenging both of these essentialist formulations. As presented in chapter 3,
poststructuralist and antiessentialist marxian economic and cultural theory can
be employed
-through a deconstructive reading for economic difference- to
challenge assumptions about a society driven by an endogenous structural logic
of economy, while psychoanalytic and poststructuralist theory offer ways of
viewing the subject that question the assumptions of the various fixed subjects
dominating educational theory. These negative critiques are necessary to call into
question the assumed identities of the social totality and the sovereign subject; in
this chapter I will suggest how, beyond negative critique, a positive pedagogical
project might be imagined.
From the perspective adopted in this dissertation, an essentialist view of the
economy and a conventional view of the sovereign subject are both forms of
fantasy. These fantastic forms are conditions of existence for certain
subjectivities, as they frame or stage desires; this was illustrated with narratives
from the focus groups and audit stage of the Rethinking Economy project in
chapter 4. To encourage alternative subjectivities it is necessary to engage with
these fantasies and the identifications they engender.40 One stage of the
Rethinking Economy project offers, I believe, a glimpse of such a political and
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pedagogical project: an attempt to deliberately engage with the economic and
subjective fantasies (involving dreams of wholeness, of subjection to and
transgression of the Law, and of the forces that appear to prevent the attainment
of a lost wholeness) and to lay the foundation for alternative subjectivities to
emerge. This is an approach which
-following Yannis Stavrakakis' forceful call
for an ethics of disharmony41
-might be called a "pedagogy of disharmony."
Such a pedagogy seeks to destabilize the fantastic frame of educational and
political projects still steeped in a metaphysics of order, wholeness, and purity.
Its goals include the destabilization of the sovereign subject (the fundamental
fantasy of the subject, the essential "I" seeking an ultimate but maddeningly
elusive closure) and the underlying social fantasies of self-evident meaning,
identity, and closure. This approach, furthermore, points towards a different
relationship with fantasy itself— something that was neither an accomplishment
nor an avowed goal of the Rethinking Economy project, but was a theme that
emerged retroactively in our understanding of this stage of the project .42
In this chapter, I will further develop the notion of pedagogy in terms of
Lacanian subjectivity and fantasy and discuss how such a pedagogy might be
40 As the left has discovered, it is not enough to engage on the level of science and reason, or on
appeals to reality, to dislodge such desires for the (capitalist) Law. See Graham, Healy, and Byrne
(2002).
41 Discussed in chapter 7.
42
"We do not receive wisdom, we must discover it for ourselves, after a journey through the
wilderness, which no one else can make for us, which no one can spare us, for our wisdom is the
point of view from which we come at last to regard the world." (Marcel Proust)
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understood in light of Lacan's view of the aim of analysis— what he termed "the
traversal of fantasy" through identification with the symptom. Such traversal of
fantasy and identification with the symptom has been proposed (most notably by
Zizek, Stavrakakis, Chow, and Glynos) as a model for what political practice
should have as its aim. I will suggest that a similar aim could structure
pedagogical activities. To this end, I will describe the training of community
researchers in the Rethinking Economy project and suggest that the training and
debriefing of these researchers represents in a nascent form an example of such a
pedagogy of disharmony.
The Lacanian Aim of Traversal
Ego-psychology and object relations have been the two schools of
psychology that have conventionally informed approaches to education. Ego-
psychology, with its focus on strengthening the ego so it may better adapt to
social realities, is reflected in the practices of those educators who
simultaneously seek to strengthen the fantasy of the sovereign self (emphasizing
self-reliance, independence, and so on) while at the same time invoking the
reality of the economic Other as the force to which one must adapt and direct
one's energies .43 Pedagogy reflecting an object relations psychology takes a
different path, less attuned to social adaptation but similarly assuming as a
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pedagogical goal the subject's healthy unification. Rather than strengthening the
ego or returning it to a lost wholeness, however, the aim of analysis in Lacanian
theory is to undermine the ego's fixity. Posing the human subject to be
fundamentally and by definition incomplete, a subject desiring completion,
Lacanian analysis aims for the analysand to come to the recognition that there is
no inherent, originary identity for any subject; neither is there an inherent,
originary identity for the Other. A pedagogy aligned with a Lacanian view of the
subject as radically and inevitably split would have a similar aim: the traversal of
fantasy through which the subject becomes destitute, identifies with its symptom
(for example, Stanley identifying with inefficiency, or members of a worker-
cooperative with conflict), and becomes capable of an action that is not directed
towards the Other .44
Traversal of Fantasy and the Analyst's Technique
The Lacanian analytical aim of traversing fantasy does not mean eliminating,
overcoming, outgrowing, or evolving beyond fantasy. Such formulations suggest
that one can be a subject without fantasy. Lacanian theory argues that it is not
possible to be a subject (in language, enmeshed in the symbolic order, split into
43 For example, see the business textbook used at Smith Vocational High School, Hubbard and
Hailes' Small Business Management (1988).
44 In this view of subjective identity and its rejection of wholeness as a goal, Lacanian theory more
closely resembles the theory of subjectivity in certain forms of buddhist training (such as the
education of Zen monks as described in Jan Willem Van der Vettering's three autobiographies or
in D. T. Suzuki's Training of the Zen Buddhist Monk) than it resembles other schools of psychology.
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conscious and unconscious) without fantasy and desire. Traversal is, rather, a
different relationship to fantasy - which suggests also a different relationship to
desire .45
As we have seen in the transcript excerpts from the audit interviews and
focus groups, there are powerful pleasures attached to fantasy, to obedience to
the Law, and to the symptoms that frustrate the attainment of the object of our
desires. The intimate relationship between desire and the Law suggests that such
pleasures associated with fantasy are based on transgressing the Law, and are
therefore still fundamentally within its dictates. That is, the pleasure of breaking
a law— even in fantasy -is actually a capitulation to that law, and to one's
subjugated position in relation to it. As such, transgression supports the fantasy
of the Other as the subject supposed to know -the authority that judges us, that
knows us better than we know ourselves, that structures our enjoyment. As the
realm which rewards us for our hard work, intelligence, sacrifice, motivation,
and so on, and as the stage upon which we identify ourselves as productive
members of society, "the economy," "economic reality," and "economic law"
occupy for many this position of the Other.
45 Again, intriguing analogies to Buddhist thought present themselves. In Buddhist thought,
desire causes suffering. The desire not to desire, however, is also a form of desire, with attendant
disappointments and suffering. One solution to this dilemma is the following: It is not that "I do
not desire" or "I desire not to desire" or "I desire not to desire not to desire," ad infinitum.
Rather, the proper response is to say "There is no I."
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Lacanian analysis seeks not liberation of the subject from the Other, but
liberation from the suffering associated with the fantasy which says "I am a
subject, subjected to the Other." The Lacanian psychoanalyst Bruce Fink
describes the process of analysis as composed of two stages. In the first, the
analyst side-steps the analysand s demands in order to encourage the
analysand's desires to come to the fore" (Fink 1997, 64).46 For example, the
analysand may demand that the "doctor" declare what is wrong with him or,
more likely, how to get back some of the pleasures which his symptoms formerly
afforded him. Initially the analysand experiences frustration when the analyst
refuses to provide something to fill in the gap or void, but then becomes
intrigued by the enigma of unconscious desires. In this second stage, "the analyst
must bring about a revamping of the analysand's interpretation of the Other's
desire and a shift in his or her subjective position, which is based on this
interpretation" (Fink 1997, 64-5). This is the stage of traversal of the fundamental
fantasy, the fantasy that there is a decisive and central authority or meaning in
the Other.
The first stage might be referred to as dinlectization (of desire) and
the second as reconfiguration (or traversing, of the fundamental
fantasy). [...] [T]hey constitute crucial logical moments of
"subjectification," whereby the analysand moves from being the
subject who demands (as well as being subject to the Other's
demand) to being the subject who desires (as well as being subject
46 This is a shift from $0D to $0a.
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to the Other's desire), and then to being the subject who enjoys
(who is no longer subject to the Other). (Fink 1997, 65)
What are the analytical techniques for pursuing the aim of traversal, of
establishing a different relationship to fantasy, symptom, and desire? A Lacanian
analyst does not simply address an analysand's symptoms, from a position of
greater knowledge, by saying. Look here, you are clearly engaged in fantasy
and these symptoms you have are products of your own mind." Occupying this
position of the subject supposed to know, as Fink points out, interferes with the
aim of analysis because the analysand will either reject the analyst's
interventions as the actions of a rival, thereby solidifying their already existing
fantasy/symptom formation, or the analysand will identify too readily with the
analyst -the kind of ego strengthening which Lacan was so critical of in
contemporary American psychology (Fink 1995, 88; Lacan 1977a, 131). That is to
say, the "solution" is not the substitution of one, more correct fantasy for
another; we must be careful not to assert variations of either the false
consciousness argument, that revelation of reality will set you free, or enact the
model of analysis in which the analysand is encouraged to identify with the
analyst's healthy ego. Lacanian analytical practice suggest that both of these
approaches merely strengthen the fantasy of the self and the Other— thereby
producing entrenched subjectivities.
Fink frames the failure of the analyst in this situation as a failure to effect a
shift in the relationship of the analysand to his or her desire:
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For by responding to the analysand's demand for advice and
interpretation, for understanding” of his or her symptoms, the
analyst gives what he or she has ("knowledge”) instead of what he
or she does not have (lack, in other words, desire), and encourages
the analysand to demand rather than desire, to remain alienated
rather than separate. (Fink 1995, 88)
Rather than presenting him- or herself as the holder of knowledge, the Lacanian
analyst occupies the enigmatic position of "embodied desire." Refusing to
replace one fantasy with another, the analyst maintains a position of constant
desire for "something else," with the aim of "shaking up the configuration of the
analysand's fantasy, changing the subject's relation to the cause of desire" (Fink
1995, 62). The analyst "disappears" (becomes a "person under erasure") so that
the analysand may more easily use the analyst as a "blank screen" upon which to
project unconscious thoughts and desires (Fink 1997, 31-2). Drawing attention to
the constant presence and authority of the analysand's unconscious with
techniques such as free association, interruption, punctuation, and suddenly
terminating the session at a moment when the unconscious erupts in the
analysand's speech, the analyst comes to occupy (temporarily and provisionally)
the place of the analysand's own unconscious, reflecting it back to him or her.47
But a key precept of Lacanian theory (and one with particular relevance for
pedagogical and political work) is that an individual's unconscious is fundamen-
47 Typically, the analysand will at first reject expressions of their unconscious as a product of him-
or herself and project them onto the analyst; it is the analyst who has a "dirty mind," always
looking to read inappropriate things into ordinary innocent speech.
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tally a social product. Lacan famously asserted that "the unconscious is
structured like a language and like a language is dependent on a system of
knowledge, grammar, rules, conventions- in sum, the symbolic order of the
culture. This indicates the radically external nature of the unconscious, which is
often understood in conventional language as the most intimate, secret layer of
our individuality. Through Lacanian analytical practice, the analysand is
confronted with an unconscious which is the Other; the radically different Other
which speaks through the analysand's own statements (parapraxes, slips of the
tongue, and so on).
Initially, this Other's desire is named— a naming which is static and
unchanging ("I want that; that thing that I am being denied or prohibited from
having.") When a fixed name is attached to what the Other desires, the subject
may be unable to act, and remains subjected to the Other (Fink 1995, 65). Fink
describes traversing the fantasy, on the other hand, as an "increasing
'signifierization' — a turning into signifiers— of the Other's desire" (Fink 1995 65).
In the traversing of fantasy, the Other's desire is brought into the movement of
signifiers
,
the basically meaningless elements which only "make sense" in the
context of difference within a system of other signifiers.48 In Lacan's reading of
Hamlet (1977b) Hamlet can act only when, during his duel with Laertes towards
48 This is Lacan's debt to Saussurean linguistics. See Lacan, “The Agency of the Letter in the
Unconscious or Reason Since Freud," in Ecrits: A Selection, 146-78. Here Lacan describes the
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the end of the play, he is able to realize that the king is a stand in for the phallus,
the signifier of desire, of the Other's desire. Only when the king is recognized as
a signifier can his power be understood in relationship to the symbolic order.
Similarly, when the economy is understood as the king, as the omnipotent force
or the final authority with the power to reward or prohibit full enjoyment, the
individual may, like Hamlet, feel unable to act in the face of such power. The
only satisfactions may come from submitting to the economy's demands on you,
or from sneaking around and transgressing its injunctions.
From Psychoanalysis to Pedagogy
Clearly, there are great differences between an analytical setting and the
setting of a formal, non-formal, or informal educational activity— chief among
which is that the people who participate as students in educational activities do
not usually choose to do so because of a personal crisis in which their symptoms
no longer provide them with sufficient satisfactions. My point in drawing a
bridge between psychoanalysis, pedagogy, and a political "institutionalization of
the lack" is not to argue that teaching should follow the form and content of
Lacanian analysis (suddenly ending a class, for example, or continuously
interrupting students' speech by pointing out their slips of the tongue). Rather, I
hope to suggest that a different understanding of subjectivity and the process by
"signifying chain" as "rings of a necklace that is a ring in another necklace made of rings" (Lacan,
163
which subjects' relationship to desire is altered in analysis may be a useful way
of framing educational practice, and one that can be seen in explicitly political
and ethical terms. Given one of the many possible representations of the
individual
-as a seed; a cog in the machine; a cluster of DNA; a blank slate; an
equal subject of the law; an alienated subject of commodification, false
knowledge, and inappropriate desires; and so on- educational practice pursues
certain ethical and practical paths. If a different view of the individual, as an
incomplete subject whose unconscious is structured like a language, were more
widespread, how might the practice of educating such a subject change? And
how might the horizon of possible alternative subjectivities be broadened?
Shoshana Felman, the literary critic and teacher, has explored some of the
links between pedagogy and psychoanalysis and between analytical and literary
interpretation. She asserts that "the lesson to be learnt about pedagogy from
psychoanalysis is less that of 'the application of psychoanalysis to pedagogy' than
that of the implication of psychoanalysis in pedagogy and of pedagogy in
psychoanalysis" (Felman 1982, 26). Felman speaks of "implication in" not
"implications for” because she is interested in how each of these activities is
already present in the other. Freudian psychoanalysis, for example, is explicitly a
teaching activity in that the knowledge of the unconscious is "taught," to both
the analyst and the analysand: "Psychoanalysis is thus a pedagogical experience:
1977a, 153).
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as a process which gives access to new knowledge hitherto denied to
consciousness, it affords what might be called a lesson in cognition (and in
miscognition), an epistemological instruction" (Felman 1982, 27). Furthermore,
Felman relates how psychoanalysis informs the epistemological concerns of
pedagogy, one of the implications of Lacanian theory being that there can be no
such thing as "absolute knowledge"; this is the "epistemological principle of the
irreducibility of ignorance which stems from the unconscious" (Felman 1982, 29).
Knowledge, therefore, is not a matter of filling in the gaps with a positive
content, and ignorance is not lack of knowledge but the desire to ignore the
knowledge which is present. In this light, "Ignorance is thus no longer simply
opposed to knowledge: it is itself a radical condition, an integral part of the very
structure of knowledge" (29). I understand Felman to be suggesting that there is a
mobius-strip like relationship between ignorance and knowledge, rather than a
linear spectrum or binary relationship. The more one "knows" with certitude, the
more one engages in an exercise of strengthening the ego that asserts that
knowledge, which is a form of ignorance, or ignoring the knowledge that in the
unconscious: the radical exteriority of the unconscious and the implication of the
subject's "knowledge" in that ignorance. For ignorance is connected with
forgetfulness and repression— it is "an active dynamic of negation" (Felman 30):
Teaching, like analysis, has to deal not so much with lack of
knowledge as with resistances to knowledge. Ignorance, suggests
Lacan, is a "passion." Inasmuch as traditional pedagogy postulated
a desire for knowledge, an analytically informed pedagogy has to
reckon with "the passion for ignorance." Ignorance, in other words.
165
is nothing other than a desire to ignore
; its nature is less cognitive
than performative; [. .
.] it is not a simple lack of information but the
incapacity — or the refusal— to acknowledge one's own duplication in
the information. (Felman 1982, 30)
What is this information, and in what exactly is the subject implicated? Although
not present in Felman s discussion, I understand that what is repressed in this
model of ignorance is the knowledge that the subject is implicated in the
symptom, the symptom that attempts to paper over the void in identity. The
subject is implicated in ignorance precisely because he or she is a speaking
subject, a subject of language, whose speech reflects "an unconscious structured
like a language." Resistance to interpretation is a resistance to acknowledging the
presence and force of the unconscious, its radical exteriority, and the
metonymical nature of language, the contingent, temporary, relational, and
essentially empty nature of the signifier.
Here Felman s assertion that teaching "is not the transmission of ready-made
knowledge, it is rather the creation of a new condition of knowledge" is useful
(Felman 1982, 31). This new condition is in part a product of the relationship
between the analyst and analysand. Although the analysand initially supposes
that the analyst is the one who has the unique knowledge that they are seeking,
this is not actually the case; what the analyst does have is what Lacan calls
"textual knowledge," defined by Felman as "knowledge of the functioning of
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language, of symbolic structures, of the signifier, knowledge at once derived
from— and directed towards— interpretation" (Felman 1982, 31).49
The analyst-teacher/ teacher-analyst uses this textual knowledge (a relational
knowledge, not a static body of knowledge) to foreground the operations of the
unconscious, the symbolic order, and the metonymical functioning of language
(its fundamentally negative and relational character). This is how the new
knowledge condition can be produced in the analytical and pedagogical
relationship:
For teaching to be realized, for knowledge to be learnt, the position
of alterity is therefore indispensable: knowledge is what is already
there, but always in the Other. Knowledge, in other words, is not a
substance but a structural dynamic: it is not contained by any
individual but comes about out of the mutual apprenticeship
between two partially unconscious speeches which both say more
than they know. Dialogue is thus the radical condition of learning
and of knowledge, the analytically constitutive condition through
which ignorance becomes structurally informative; knowledge is
essentially, irreducibly dialogic. (Felman 1982, 33)
Felman's insights into the epistemological implications and literary interpretive
characteristics of Freudian analysis are helpful for exploring the analytical-
pedagogical moments of the training and debriefing stages of the Rethinking
Economy Project. Moving beyond Felman's focus, the discussion of these
activities will suggest how a Lacanian analytical theory of the subject and its
49 Of course, each particular case will require a unique interpretation; there is no singular and
final interpretation for all individuals. This is another reason why the analyst must constantly
"ignore what he knows" (Lacan, quoted in Felman 1982, 32).
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relationship to fantasy, traversal, and desire can inform pedagogy as a political
and ethical act, with specific implications for alternative economic possibilities,
the broader implications of which will be discussed in the concluding chapter.
Training and Debriefing of Community Researchers
The audit stage of the Rethinking Economy project had three components:
the interviews conducted by the community researchers (CRs); the training of the
CRs to conduct these interviews; and debriefing sessions to conduct initial group
"analyses" of the contents of the interviews. As detailed in chapter 4, the CR
training and debriefing components became a critical focus for the university
researchers. Lengthy discussions around the design of the trainings and
subsequent debriefings reflected our evolving understanding of the importance
of identification, subjectivity, and our own political engagement with these
issues. It is clear that among the university researchers there has been more
discussion about these components than about the content of the interviews
themselves; it was in the trainings and debriefings that we were confronted with
expressions of a capitalist imaginary and of economic fantasies and had to arrive
at a process, or orientation, through which we could engage with these various
fantasies without reasserting an alternative and similarly fantastic "solution."
This orientation involved a stance toward the language with which economic
reality and subjectivity is represented. Significantly, throughout the two-day
training and post-interview debriefing of community researchers, the facilitators
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avoided defining the term "economy" or "economic/' resisting the urge to
evacuate one definition and fill it in with another— in other words, frustrating
the community researchers' desires for fixed and stable identities. Certain
activities were designed instead to draw attention to the ambiguous, contingent,
and contradictory nature of the language with which we speak of the economy.
Four of these activities will be briefly described below, followed by a discussion
of how they illustrate a "pedagogy of disharmony."
The Three Questions Activity
In this exercise, the first small group interactive exercise of the training, the
community researchers were broken into pairs and given three folded slips of
paper. They were asked to open them in sequence, when cued, and to try to
answer the question they found there— not to think too much about their
answers, but to say the first things that came to mind. We did not ask them to
write down their responses; the point here was to generate discussion, without
worrying about being correct.
All six groups found the three questions progressively more difficult to
answer. They responded with some degree of self-assurance to the first
question— "How's the economy doing?" — remarking for the most part that
although everyone is talking about how good the economy is, they don't seem to
see it in their lives or in their communities. We see this, for example, in the
following exchange between Rita and Kris:
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Well, I think it's probably not doing very well, to tell the
truth. We are, you know.... Wealth is getting distributed
badly, and whereas the rich people are getting richer, the
poor really are getting poorer, and I've been reading a lot of
stuff about that— so I think there 7 s really something
drastically wrong with our economy that we have such a
tremendous disparity between rich and poor. [...]
I think the economy in our world is definitely, as far as
distribution goes, is very poor. Very poor. And I think that
when you look at it that way, world-wide, that the poor are
getting tremendously poorer, and the rich are getting richer.
Or in this exchange between Patrick and Sam:
Patrick: How's the economy. In my life, not so great. [Almost bitter
laughter.] Uhmm... I dunno... What do you think?
Sam: My... Y'know, supposedly it's doing OK, and we're doing
well, although there's some question of ... what's happening,
y'know, is it going to start to turn yet, but it's still doing OK.
On the other hand, I still have the sense of— is it really doing
all right— is it a false sense of security in the economy. I'm
not so convinced. Y'know, I'm expecting, personally,
something to chip away at it and then suddenly we find
ourselves in a strange situation where it's not that good at
all.
Patrick: Right. I'm starting to see that most of the time I'm finding
that you're seeing all kinds of help wanted signs everywhere
and I think what I've come up with in my own head of why
it's because there's so many jobs out there because they
won't pay a decent wage where you can work forty hours
and still survive doing it, uhm....
Most responded to the second question— "How are you involved in the
economy?" — with a little more hesitation or tentativeness, first offering the ways
in which they are engaged by necessity (taxes, buying necessities, receiving a
wage from their employer) in the monetized formal economy, and then
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stmggling to think of other, more alternative ways (likely due to their awareness
of our project's concern with this notion of "alternative"):
Well —
I
pay taxes. [Laughter.] So... I'm involved in that way.
I'm... I'm very... maybe it's bad or in some ways good for
me -I am very... I like to buy a lot [laughter]
-I'm very
consumer, y'know,....
You support the local economy! [Laughter]
Or from Rita:
Inez:
Mary:
Well, I certainly do pay taxes, and just did have to pay
something, and I do earn a certain amount of money, I did
teach last semester and earned some money for doing that. I
try to buy locally, as much as I can; I go to Bread & Circus
and buy there whatever things I can find that have been
produced locally, and I go to the Amherst common market
in the summer and buy those things....
Or again, from Patrick and Sam:
Patrick: "How are you involved in the economy?" [Long pause.] Get a
paycheck? [Laughter] How are you involved in the economy.
What does it mean?
Sam: Jeez, I don't know. [Laughter]
Patrick: Good, I'm glad somebody else doesn't know.
Sam: No, I don't know. Umm....
Patrick: Let me read that again. How are you involved in the
economy. I'm involved in the economy because I drive a
vehicle and use gas, so that's... one side.
Sam: How's your spending? Do you buy a lot of gadgets, and
uh....
Patrick: I buy a lot of lottery.... Which is just... just, ... Tax. It doesn't
seem to help. Uhm. How are you involved in the economy?
That's a hard question.
Sam: It is. It's very hard without any qualifiers. I mean, obviously
there are paychecks, maybe investments we have,... all our
purchases,... foods,... uh....
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Their responses to the third question- "What is the economy?" - ranged
from stumped silence, to struggling through contradictory reactions...
Uhm.... That's a hard question to answer for me. Only
because there are so many questions in my mind around it. I
think the economy is... the... anything that has to do with the
circulation of money, in any way. And money buying
materials and then, y'know, how it... it doesn't recycle but...
uhm.... anything that has to be paid for basically, and,
y'know, has to do with money.
Rita: But didn't you talk about giving away things and not selling
them?
Kris: Right
,
right. And I do that because then they can put their
money elsewhere. It's all revolved around money for me, that's
how I see the economy.
...to mock outrage that they had been duped by us:
Patrick:
Sam:
Patrick:
Sam:
Patrick:
Sam:
OK. [Reading:] "What is the economy?"
I think we've been duped.
I think we have. [Both laugh very heartily
.]
I think we've been duped. [Laughter]
I think I don't like any of these questions. [Laughter]
OK, so the truth is, from question one to three— I have no
idea.
A discussion followed about why the first question was easier to answer
than the second, and the second easier than the third. In the following transcript
excerpt, in which we discuss the Three Question exercise during the first training
session, there is agreement that the first question was easy to answer, but the
second one was more difficult. Kathy is speaking about her reactions to the
second question (in this exchange, I am the facilitator, Julie is another academic
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researcher, and the others are community researchers: Lyle is a sixteen year old
high school drop out, Teresa is a young Puerto Rican woman who works in a
drug dependency agency in Holyoke, Bob is a 74-year old African-American
from Springfield, active in local community politics, and Eve is a middle-aged
potter from a small northern hilltown):
Kathy. For me it s like I m totally entrenched, in this sort of white,
capitalist, uh, oppressive thing, because I pay... I mean,
electric bills, and so that supports the nuclear power
industry and all that, [speaking rapidly] and, and, and I pay
more taxes, and I get them back but they get to use them, so,
there's that and then—
Ken: As a consumer?
Kathy: — also I'm on the fringes- as a consumer, yeah- I'm also on
the fringes, because I'm also oppressed myself, in certain
ways. I don't have the capital.
Ken: So on the one hand you're inside and on the other on the
outside.
Kathy: Yeah, on the outside.
Ken: Was it an easier question than the first one, or the same?
Kathy: Harder.
Teresa: Harder.
Lyle: About the same.
Ken: What about the third question, "what is the economy?"?
Lyle: That was harder. You can't answer a question like, "It is an
apple." You can't answer a straightforward question.
[Sounds ofagreementfrom others.]
Teresa: It's so many things! Y'know?
Lyle: It's like a, uh, uh,. . . One of these things with that, kinda
meshed with those. [Someone laughs.]
Teresa: It's a great question because it's a... a phil... a philosophy
question. .
.
Bob: Yeah.
Lyle: Yeah, you can really brainstorm on that one.
Eve: I think what Bob and I did is we sort of gave the ideal ans—
our ideal answer.
Ken: You said what you'd like the economy to be, in other words.
Eve: Yeah, right. What's the real. .
.
[Many voices at once.]
Ken: What's the real definition of economy.
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Kathy: Exchange, or . .
.
[Someone says something.]
Kathy: We didn t get to that. I wanted to say that it's exchange, it's
exchange, it s almost energy, like a matter of energy between
people. We didn't get there but you guys did.
Eve: Do you want to say something about that Bob?
Bob: Yes, pretty much, what is, what is... my ability to raise a
good family, educate my children,... live decent, well, pretty
much,... the way I would like to. Y'know... That's economy,
in the long run; that's it.
Julie: That's wellbeing.
[Many voices agree.]
Lyle: I think the economy is like...everything around us.
[Someone says "yup."]
Lyle: We have to go to the store every day. You get up, y'know,
summer— you mow your lawn. That—
Ken: OK, hold that because that goes right into the next activity.
The purpose of the Three Question exercise was not to attempt individually or as
group to come up with a definition of "economy." It was to construct an
encounter with both the omnipresence of the notion of "the economy" and also
its slipperiness; to suggest that when we speak of how the world works, express
economic and other desires, and so on, it appears as if the true positive meaning
of our words lies elsewhere, beyond our grasp; as if an Other who truly knows is
speaking through our words.
This proved to be a very successful exercise in directing attention to how
pervasive the language of economy is, and to how often we use the term without
consciously attending to its various possible meanings. This point was taken up
further in the next activity, exploring more explicitly the border between the
economic and the non-economic.
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The Economy/ Not Economy Activity
The purpose of this activity was to focus on the various meanings and
associations of the notion of "the economy." We explained that one of the goals
of the project was to draw attention to the arbitrary boundary between the
economic and the non-economic that they all struggled with in the previous
exercise, and maybe to stretch its location or the size of the territory it contains
Also, we emphasized that we were not interested much in arriving at a clear,
single, universal definition of "economy." We acknowledged that working with
such a floating and unfixed term could provoke anxiety.
The exercise involved drawing a circle on a blank sheet of paper, labeling
what is inside the circle as "Economy" and what is outside as "Not Economy"
(Figure 4 below), and then asking people to think of words— concepts, activities,
places, and so on— and to place them either inside or outside the circle. Terms
that could not fit unambiguously in either space could be put on the borderline.
During the first training session, for example, terms generated by the CRs that
were placed within "Economy" included "money," "trade," "education," "the
mail," "drugs," and "food." Terms seen to be completely outside included
"friendship" and "respect." And terms that were represented as on the border
(inside and/ or outside the economy, "depending on how you looked at it," or
"depending on the context") included "family," "time," "art," "kids," and "sex."
For example, it was argued that "sex" could be something within the economy if
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purchased as a commodity, and something outside the economy if it were part of
an intimate relationship.
This exercise was first done in pairs and then as a whole group, so there was
ample discussion and disagreement about the placement of the terms. The
exercise ended not with a final definition of economy, but with a discussion
drawing attention to the boundary line between the economic and non-
economic, how that line is drawn, and how activities inside or outside that
boundary receive different valuations and different distributions of social
resources.
We have used this exercise in a variety of settings and with different
populations. Reactions to the exercise have typically fallen into one of the
following patterns: (a) "Everything fits inside; everything is colonized by the
economy. For example, at first thought, a walk in the woods seems like an
Figure 4: Economy/Not Economy
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activity outside of the economy; but when you think about it, you see that you're
wearing shoes and you had to buy them; and someone owns the woods, or
they're owned by the government and our taxes go to help support the woods,
etc. So everything ultimately fits inside the circle." (b) "I don't want to put
everything inside the circle, but I have to. But I really want to keep a space
separate from the economy, (c) Some things are simply not economic (like my
faith or spiritual practice,) and some things are clearly inside the economic (like
my job, or paying taxes)."
The first, "contaminant" view was clearly the dominant reaction of people
participating in this exercise, indicating the dominance of the economy in the
symbolic order. This was part of the difficulty of getting people to see the
contingency of that dominance, suggesting that it is difficult to draw the
boundary line between the economy and the not-economy not just because
categorical boundaries are hard to maintain but because there is a desire to give
everything to the economy, to maintain that special ignorance that is our certain
knowledge that the economy governs everything, taints everything, and is
everywhere. What proponents of the contaminant view don't seem to
understand is that they are defining and categorizing agents. One may go so far
here as to say that their contextual or contingent knowledge is a poor imitation of
the knowledge of the Other, rather than a pedagogically-derived new position or
condition of knowledge.
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Economy in the News Activity
After the previous activity, some people might have felt that their inability to
nail down what the economy is was really a reflection of their ignorance or lack
of education. Here, by showing a few newspaper headlines from Vie New York
Times, we wanted to demonstrate how even in such "authorities" there is no
unequivocal nailing down of the term. In a way, this gave them permission to
say whatever they wanted about the economy, to lose some of the anxiety
associated with speaking about the economy as non-experts. The newspaper
headlines were flashed on an overhead projector, grouped in pairs by the
facilitator according to various themes: we control it vs. it controls us/ it is
uncontrollable; organic or human vs. machine; scary vs. reassuring; universal vs.
local (Figure 5).
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* We know it, but we don't know it:
A Clearer View of the Economy; The Commerce Department Answers Its
Critics"
"A Booming Economy That Confuses the Fed"
"U.S. Economy, Hotbed of Rest In Sea of Crisis And Confusion"
* We can control it, but we can't control it (and besides, it controls us):
China Manages to Keep Its Economy Humming"
Colombia Is Reeling, Hurt by Rebels and Economy"
* Don't worry, but maybe you should worry:
"The Economy's Always Good"
"World Economies On a Tightrope"
"Economy Still Strong, but Risks Are There, Greenspan Says"
* It's human, it's a machine:
"A Once-Jittery Economy Is Getting Under Self-Control"
"The Perpetual-Motion Economy; The Stronger It Gets, the Sweatier the Palms"
Figure 5: Economy in the News Overhead Transparency
The Iceberg Diagram
Although not a training activity in itself, another way in which the focus was
placed on the particular content which is used to (partially) fill in the universal
term of "economy" or "economic development" was the combination of the
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focus group video clips and the introduction of the Iceberg diagram (see figure 2,
chapter 4). The diagram operated as a reminder not only of the variety of
possible responses interviewees could generate, but as a visual and linguistic
representation of the economy as a signifier in a system of similarity and
difference. The diagram is an evolution from the diverse economy diagram
(figure 3), linked to the regularities and exclusions (Healy, 2002) of the economic
development professionals in the focus group videos, where the professionals
placed the onus of regional development on wage labor, for-market production,
and traditional capitalist firms (in particular, manufacturing). This focus on
external markets and the global realities of attracting large firms to the area in
order to generate a higher quality of life excludes those activities "under the
waterline" or in the shadowed boxes of the community economy diagram. The
format of that diagram, however, suggested a closed system, a topography in
which the boxes contained all the possible combinations available. It did not
immediately invite free association. For this reason the iceberg diagram was
developed.
What is noticeable about the iceberg diagram is that the terms under the
waterline are not commensurate qualities: there are actors (e.g., "children," "the
retired"), there are types of activities ("volunteer"), there are sites and locations
("in the street," "in the home"), and there are types of businesses ("producer
cooperatives"). The diagram does not attempt to capture all the possible
combinations of economic activity that fall outside of the regularities of the
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development professionals' model of economic development; it is instead
suggestive, a device which triggers associated thoughts, associations, links,
"aha!" moments during interviews in which other thoughts are generated and
connected to the notion of "economy." That is, it encourages lines to be drawn
rather than pre-determined boxes to be filled in. Although the CRs were given a
number of tools to help them in conducting their interviews (including a
traditional time use survey matrix), they consistently said that this diagram was
the single most useful and productive instrument.
Debriefing Activity: Reading for Difference
University and community researchers reconvened for debriefing sessions to
share what the CRs had found in their interviews and to continue the
conversation about the nature of the economy and its relationship to issues of
quality of life, development, and individual desires. Each CR was asked to give a
short biographical sketch of each of the people they interviewed, and explain
why they had chosen them. The CRs then described selected activities from the
interviews which they found interesting, intriguing, or inspiring. Brief notes on
each of these were written on index cards and stuck with masking tape to a large
sheet of paper on the wall.
We did not want to limit the debriefing activity to simply reporting back
what was found; we wanted the session to be a kind of analysis which would
relate back to the categorizations which we developed in the training sessions
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and to the notion of mainstream and alternative economic development. For this
reason, we continued to work with the index cards of activities. On the large
sheet of paper we drew a vertical line dividing it into two columns, "paid" and
not paid. We then asked the CRs to call out where each of the activities on
index cards should go, and we placed the cards in the appropriate columns.
When there was a disagreement or uncertainty where it should go, the card was
placed to straddle the line. In the second "cut," a horizontal line was drawn on
the same sheet of paper on the wall, dividing it into two rows, "for a market"
and "not for a market." Again, the index cards were moved to take into account
this further level of difference. In the final step, we asked them to decide which
of the activities were "capitalist," or in the model of a traditional firm (with
employees, wages, a boss). These were marked with a large orange sticker. The
number of cards which ended up in the top left corner marked with a sticker was
a very small proportion of the activities on the board, and the poster provided a
neat visual representation of the breadth of economic activities which fall outside
of the mainstream economic development vision.
Sorting and shifting the index cards was a lengthy process which engaged
the group in discussions over how each activity should be categorized. One
could argue that the debriefing activity reified a particular view of the economy,
a partisan one which fits the political goals of the facilitators. The final
representation of the community economy was explicitly meant to serve as a
counter to the model of the economy represented in mainstream development
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discourse earlier in the training. This does not, however, suggest that a counter-
fantastical solution was being proposed. Rather, the process by which these
different activities were read and interpreted, compared, shifted, and sorted,
suggested a different way of reading the economy, aware of the linguistic nature
of economic divisions, regularities, exclusions, differences. In other words, it
brought the economy from a realm of naming to one of "signifier-ing" and drew
attention to the role of the subject in that process. Here, the specific content and
form of the "universal" economic representation was recognized as contingent.
The following excerpts illustrate in part the enjoyment which the
participants, both URs and CRs, experienced in analyzing and debating the
activities the CRs had learned of in their interviews. During these discussions,
economic knowledge becomes a question of dialogue and debate; the focus
moves from "economic reality" to the language with which we divide up,
represent, and value certain social activities. This moves the economy from a
force (as it emerged in the earliest exercises, such as the Three Questions activity)
to a series of events, each of which can only be understood in the context of
language, that is, of signifiers metonymically linked in a discursive structure.
This shifts economic knowledge— and the valuation attached to activities— from
the province of the Other to the realm of interpretation, meaning, language. It is a
shift from seeing economic knowledge located in the Other to seeing it located in
an intersubjective and contingent linguistic structure. The end product was a
visual representation of the "community economy" with terms linked by
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similarity and/or opposition, or balanced
— by agreement provisionally and
precariously on the borderlines between the categories.
Here, early in the debriefing session, one of the CRs talks about her difficulty
in understanding the market/non-market distinction:
Just the whole market/ non-market thing. I have an idea
what market is, but it just didn't seem to fit in with what I
got out of people.
And how do you understand it now?
As in, like I mean, when Becky was explaining it, I kind of
went down to like— I thought about it like... drug dealers?
When they get caught, whether it was for their own use or to
distribute, depending on the amount? That's how I put it
together and I know what it is. [Laughter
]
It just doesn't fit
well with what I got, I don't think. You guys might find it's
in there but...
In this exchange Kris seems to have a sense that there is a correct interpretation
which "you guys" (the university researchers) may have the ability which she
doesn't have to see in her tapes. However, later in the session, Kris becomes
confident that she has the ability and the right to declare her opinion; this comes
from an understanding that how such activities are labeled— what economic
signifiers are attached to them— is a contingent process. Liberated from a concern
for "correct knowledge," she is able to make her own judgments. In the following
passage, Kris has partially taken over the card categorizing activity, asking the
other participants about their reasons for making judgments and asserting her
own opinions:
Ken: What about "Sid and Sally let others farm their land"?
Kris: That's for market for the people that are farming but not for
themselves.. .right?
Kris:
Ken:
Kris:
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Ken: It's rent... it's partial rent...?
[Voices speaking at once.]
Because they're letting them use the land in exchange... for
what?
Vegetables.
He doesn't get any money for it.
Does he get food?
Some of the people do it just for
-there's three people, two
are a couple, and one's by— The person by himself actually
grows for a market. The other people grow for themselves.
How about the people who are letting them use the land?
What about the people who gave them the land?
They get some vegetables in return...
So it's not for market.
Here there is acknowledgment both of the structure (the terms of the
categorizations) and the contingency of the content— the understanding that the
placement of activities within the categories is dependent on the moment of
interpretation. An understanding of the effects of where things get placed (the
consequences of representations) emerges in the following conversation about
the work that women have to do in order to maintain their welfare payments. In
the following conversation, Kris is assertive about how we are to represent the
work that women do in child-rearing, and how this should be considered when
valuing it with welfare payments:
Ken: "Ruby babysitting at rehab center"? And doing group
therapy?
Patrick: [Emphatically:] Free.
Ken: So no one pays—
Patrick: Well, let me explain that a little bit further. The initial
babysitting was part of community service. She was on
welfare. So... what's that?
Kris: [Tentatively:] That's still not for market.
Ken: Do the people who do...
Mary:
Sam:
Rita:
Patrick:
Sam:
Kris:
Patrick:
Sam:
Kris:
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Becky:
Patrick:
Ken:
Patrick:
Kris:
Patrick:
Kris:
AnnaMarie:
Julie:
Patrick:
Kris:
Julie:
Patrick:
Kris:
Patrick:
Kris:
Julie:
Kris:
Julie:
Kris.
Becky:
Patrick:
Kris:
Patrick:
AnnaMarie:
Kris:
AnnaMarie:
The people who receive the babysitting don't have to pay for
it?
No.
Or is it funding from the government?
It's funded... Isn't it funded? By the ... Well, who's... Why are
they giving... It is because she's working twenty hours....
It says "babysitting at a rehab center."
She was being... That was part of her community service.
That was part of her community service, but it's not...
But they would be paying somebody to do that babysitting
if...
So do the people who bring their kids pay for babysitting?
Don't know.
That's my point. They don't. This is for a rehab center. It's-
So it's not for market.
Does anybody get paid the money for that woman doing the
twenty hours? ... No.
That's what I'm saying. For what she was doing for the
welfare—
Right.
— which is, she could've done anything and said it was
community service and had somebody sign it and say it was
community service.
OK. Yeah.
So... it's not market. I mean I just can't....
Right. Because they don't sell babysitting services there.
Right, right.
But she can't receive her welfare benefits unless she—
— Unless she does it. Right.
Unless she does her community service.
So that's a kind of a line deal. [Indicating that that activity
should go on the line.] [...] You can actually still get welfare
without doing the twenty hours of community?
So that's how... that's how the women that I did the focus
group with— they figured they were being paid to raise their
children, they weren't being paid to do nothing. That's how
they interpreted welfare. They weren't being paid to do
nothing.
What did you work for?
In the focus group I did with child-care workers who had
been on welfare, and they interpreted it as that they were
being... that you could... if you were on welfare, you were
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Kris:
Julie:
being paid, because you don't get welfare for nothing,
you're expected to do something.
Is their point that it s a job to be a stay-at-home mom?
Yes.
AnnaMarie: That's their point.
That's my point too. That's awesome.
In this exchange, Kris is emotionally engaged in the question of whether mothers
going to work should be considered "for market" or "paid" work. She clearly
attaches an ethical aspect to how these activities are labeled, refusing to allow the
activities to be referred to as "paid work" when it involves instead a condition of
receiving welfare payments; for her, engaging in paid work suggests a certain
condition of choice, not coercion. She is excited by the representation AnnaMarie
offers, of viewing welfare itself as the payment mothers receive for raising their
children. This particular economic representation appeals to her because it shifts
the attribution of hard work and reward and places a new value on the socially-
necessary work of child-rearing. Her own situation as a working-class single
young mother, balancing paid work and child-rearing responsibilities, comes
through. The important thing to observe here is that Kris is insistent that how we
discuss or describe the activities of women on welfare is important. It is not a
question of revealing the reality of the economic relations as if they existed
outside of a social understanding, of their discursive and symbolic
representation.
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Training and Debriefing Activities as Pedagogy of Disharmony
Here I would like to conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of the
productive use of two related techniques in the training
— providing meaning
and sowing confusion— and the relationship of these techniques to a pedagogy
of disharmony. This pedagogy of disharmony, I suggest, may be understood as
initiating a form of traversal of fantasy, a different relationship to language and
the notion of truth.
Meaning and Confusion
Norman Holland, in The Dynamics of Literary Response (1975), builds upon
Freud's work theorizing how jokes function. Holland suggests that when
meaning is "framed" by the form (such as a dirty joke or a deliberately difficult
art film), we are able to have a freer play with the content. This freer play
involves pleasures, such as the pleasure of word play (the sliding signifier) or the
release of aggressive or libidinal drives. That is, "meaning" becomes a kind of
shield, occupying the ego or subject's level of consciousness, which allows these
other unconscious forces to come to the forefront. In a similar way, I might
suggest that the frame or meaning which the trainings established— the seminar
table, the location (in a library or in a seminar room in the university's economics
department), the affiliation of the training facilitator (myself) with the world of
academia, the presence of the university professors in the room; or in the case of
the Urban League youths, though located in their own familiar afterschool
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program space, our affiliation with the university, our positions as (two white,
one Latina) elders, university graduate students from the north of the Valley -
framed the trainings in such a way that the participants had a certain level of
confidence that there was a meaning to the exercises. Confusions could enter the
process but the egos of those participating could take comfort that there was a
greater meaning. The point one can make here is that in a pedagogical situation,
as in the analytical situation, the conventional context of the classroom or
couch -of the masterful position, the expert, the credentialled scholar, and so
on— can be and should be used rather than rejected out of hand.
The second, related point is about the deliberate "confusion" or lack of clear
and definitive answers that confronted the community researchers. While
providing for a comfortable, amiable atmosphere, the facilitators also allowed (or
required) the CRs to speak about and use terms that we did not define
beforehand, as in the Economy/ Not Economy and Three Questions exercises
described above. Bruce Fink spoke of this in the analytical setting as preventing a
too easy understanding:
With neurotics, the therapist must work hard to stop them from
understanding too quickly, because they see what they want to see,
understanding what it is pleasing to them to understand. Since the
ego recrystalizes or reconstitutes itself around every new meaning,
every new understanding, the therapist tries to disrupt the
neurotic's all too quick and convenient meaning-making activity,
hoping to affect what is unconscious, not the ego. (Fink 1997, 108-9)
In other words, the confusion the participants felt, and our deferral of defining
the economy for them, was a deliberate strategy. It was not simply one of
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refusing to occupy the role of the subject supposed to know, because it was
always clear that however pleasant the training session was, we were clearly
representative of the academic world and, in addition, that were paying them to
do a job. It was rather a strategy of not permitting a too rapid understanding,
with the aim of maintaining a focus on the inter-related issues of language, the
unconscious, and desire. If we were to approach the training as experts seeking
to alter their knowledge of the economy, they may have reacted either by
obeying or by rejecting/ resisting the content of the knowledge offered. In other
words, this would have reinitiated a kind of relationship of transference which
would have strengthened existing ego structures. Again, reference to the
psychoanalytic relationship is useful here. The two common reactions of
analysands in analysis are (1) to want to please the analyst, adopting his or her
traits and accepting his or her interpretations, or (2) to act out an aggressive
opposition of the analyst. And indeed the analyst can also act out similar
counter-transferences. In either case, these personal struggles maintain the
analysis at the level of the imaginary rather than engaging with the symbolic —
that is, at the level of language, the unconscious, and desires.
In a similar vein Lacan describes how the analyst must avoid strengthening
the subject's "mirages" and the certainties that the ego constructs, avoid
providing the analysand interpretations which the analysand reintegrates "as
silent parts into his narcissistic discourse":
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The danger involved here is not that of the subject's negative
reaction, but rather that of his capture in an objectification- no less
imaginary than before -of his static state or of his "statue," in a
renewed status of his alienation. Quite the contrary, the art of the
analyst must be to suspend the subject's certainties until their last
mirages have been consumed. And it is in the discourse that the
progress of their resolution must be marked. (Lacan 1977a, 43)
Following Mallarme, Lacan compares the communication between analysand
and analyst to the exchange of a coin which is passed back and forth even though
the markings on its surface have been worn away. In other words, speech, even
though empty of a real content, serves a purpose in the analytical setting,
drawing the analysand back again and again to the rhetorical nature of language
and its central role in the psychic economy of subjective identifications and
desires.
The Teacher's Role and the Rhetorical Nature of Truth
Drawing inspiration from such Lacanian insights, Patrick McGee (1987) has
written thoughtfully about the logic of the signifier, the rhetorical aspect of the
teaching relationship, and the important but ambiguous role of "truth" in
pedagogical encounters.
By deflecting the subject away from the cognitive function of
language that responds instrumentally to the desire for finalized
meaning, toward the rhetorical function of the word within a
symbolic system that includes moral conventions, ideologies,
aesthetic values, and so forth— analysis also makes it possible for
the subject to confront its own temporality and thus to see beyond
the illusion of autonomy to the implication of the subject in cultural
processes. (McGee 1987, 670-1)
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Reiterating Lacan, McGee explains that this confrontation with the logic of the
signifier does not simply free the subject from illusion, but- since we cannot step
outside of that logic— alters our relationship to language:
It follows that "truth" for Lacan is never empirical and verifiable,
not in and of itself knowledge, but a relation to knowledge, a
relation to language, that involves the subject's recognition of the
ground of its knowledge in a particular fiction or narrative. "Truth"
is recognition of the rhetorical dimension underlying every
cognition. With this truth, the subject rediscovers its place in a
narrative from which its consciousness has been withheld.
Thereafter, if it cannot simply step outside this fiction into a world
of total freedom, it can at least reorder and redirect its past to
anticipate and account for a future. (McGee 1987, 671)
McGee suggests that in a proper pedagogical encounter the teacher in a sense
seduces and then betrays the student, first capturing the student's desire for
knowledge and then thwarting its fulfillment. The ethical teacher does not seek
to fill in the desire of the student for knowledge, promising the full extinguishing
of that desire, but instead seeks to destabilize the student's experience of self.
This occurs when the student comes to see his or her desire as external, located in
the realm of unstable language, cultural norms, historical contingencies, and so
on (McGee, 675). This, he argues, is the path we should understand as "truth":
When students speak critically, when they see more in the words of
the teacher than the teacher knows, when they come to understand
that the knowledge they seek is neither in the teacher nor in
themselves but in the common ground that brings teacher and
student together (language, culture, history, the Other) — at such a
moment they arrive at the goal of education: truth. (McGee, 677)
Through in part providing meaning and sowing confusion, the training and
debriefing of the community researchers sought in a similar fashion to
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destabilize fixed subjectivities and economic knowledges. The pedagogical
techniques employed during the Rethinking Economy project offer glimpses not
of subjects moving beyond fantasy into a realm of pure truth and freedom, but of
subjects experiencing a shift in their relationship to fantasy itself
.
50
Focusing on the rhetorical dimension of people's knowledge of economic
reality, the pedagogical moments of the project sought to loosen up the desire of
the subject. For example, during the debriefing, both Kris and Patrick affirmed
their connection and their participation in an economy of generosity, distinct
from their initial understandings of a singular, totalizing, and essentialist
"capitalist economy." Through the process of training, interviewing, and
debriefing after the interviews, they each began to speak of their lives now— not
in some deferred future— as operating within a significant and valued economy
of gift labor. This was a new language of economy that allowed them to see and
speak of themselves in a new way. Kris spoke of the extensive network of family
and neighborhood childcare and eldercare labor that she was an integral part of;
Patrick spoke of the large on-the-job feasts he weekly cooked and served to his
co-workers on the nightshift, and of the hospice care he provided his ex-wife's
dying father. Yet they also spoke of this newly visible economy of generosity as
50 Here we might recall the ending of the film The Matrix, in which Neo does not simply step
outside of the faux-reality which has been created by computers and machines run amok, but
remains within the fantasy world, redirecting his efforts to living in a different way within that
world — e.g., flying after hanging up the phone— but in the familiar world of the late 20th century,
not the dystopic nightmare world of the 21st.
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unstable, contingent, dictated by no pre-determined laws (such as the inevitable
law of development of global late capitalism), and as the subject of political
struggle. In other words, though the story that they were now able to tell of their
own lives could still be seen as a form of fantasy, it is one to which they had a
new relation, a minimum critical distance. By emphasizing the rhetorical nature
of economic discourse, the pedagogical practice described above contributed to
the reframing of subjectivity and the loosening of desire (for other ways of
being), as Kris and Patrick were both able to name and identify with an
alternative economic subjectivity, as a space where pleasure could be
experienced in the here and now.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION: THE PEDAGOGY OF DISHARMONY
Where certainties come apart
,
there too gathers the strength that no certainty can match.
—
Jean-Luc Nancy
Introduction
This dissertation has questioned the assumption that the fundamental
negativity of identity can be overcome. Investigating alternatives to the fixed
identity of the subject and the fixed economic structure prevalent in educational
discourse, this dissertation has proposed an alternative in accordance with the
notion of unavoidable incompleteness or lack. Using Derridean deconstruction,
post-structuralist marxian economic theory, and Lacanian psychoanalytical
theory, it has explored discourses of subject and economy expressed in the
Rethinking Economy project. A symptomatic reading of the project's texts
argued for the powerful presence of fantasy in the economic narratives of
individuals, in the mainstream economic development conversation, in
progressive educational discourse, and in alternative, marginal, or daily
economic discourse.
A major goal of this dissertation has been to assert the importance of
acknowledging and incorporating lack in the theory and practice of pedagogy.
Chapter 2 described some of the negative consequences that arise in educational
theory and practice when identities, of subjects or of the (economic) structure, are
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seen to have a fixed and essential character. Chapter 3 argued that certain
poststructuralist and antiessentialist theories (deconstructive reading, marxian
economic and cultural theory, and Lacanian psychoanalysis) are useful to
counter those fixed identities of subjects and structures dominant in educational
theory. I suggested that these alternative views of the economy and of
subjectivity, based on the unavoidable negativity of identity, create the space for
alternative economic subjectivities, desires, and practices to emerge. Chapter 4
described the dissertation's methodological approaches, framed by theories that
acknowledge the lack within identity: first, deconstructively reading for
difference, and then exploring, via Lacanian theory, the relationship between
subjectivity, fantasy, and the experience of economic reality. Chapter 5 offered a
reading of the transcripts of the Rethinking Economy project informed by an
anti-essentialist view of difference in the economic landscape and by the
Lacanian formula of fantasy and the symptom. This reading explored
individuals' complex relationships to the economy in terms of lack, desire, and
enjoyment. Chapter 6 argued for the importance of engaging with the fantasies
of the economy and of the sovereign subject in order to provide the space for
alternative subjectivities to emerge. Pedagogical moments of the Rethinking
Economy project were used to suggest the possible contours of such an
engagement with economic and subjective fantasies.
In this final chapter, I will present the ethical case for a pedagogy self-
consciously oriented toward traversal, toward altering the subject s relationship
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to fantasy. Such a pedagogy rejects the fundamental fantasy of fixed identities
undergirding both essentialist humanism and structuralism in educational
discourse, and becomes a political and ethical practice of acknowledging the con-
stitutive division at the heart of individual and social identity. In this regard, a
pedagogy of disharmony is similar to the project of radical democracy, as will be
discussed below. Through a pedagogy of disharmony, we come to confront our
powerful attachments to visions of unity, wholeness, and pure speech, and
recognize ourselves as fantasizing subjects. Rather than trapping us in
disappointment over the failure to cross the lack in identity, this recognition
provides us with the distance from our fantasies necessary to enact new
practices. A pedagogy of disharmony may then be seen as offering a certain
freedom, from pursuing hopeless projects doomed to failure. It also offers us the
possibility of inhabiting new subjectivities and enacting new social practices in
relation to the abundance made visible in the social field.
Radical Democracy: A Politics of Disharmony
Laclau and Mouffe's seminal Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985)
established the framework for the anti-totalitarian project of radical democracy.
Weaving together Marxism, Gramscian notions of hegemony, poststructuralist
linguistic theory, and the psychoanalytic insights of Lacanian thought. Hegemony
defines political struggle as the practice of maintaining the gap inherent in
identity, the lack signalling the failure of identity to fully constitute or provide a
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full meaning. Laclau and Mouffe argue that this failure of identity should not be
seen as undermining politics
.
51 Rather, just as the failure of identification to
achieve closure is a condition of existence for further identification, the failure of
politics to achieve a final order should be understood as a condition of existence
of politics itself. As Butler, Laclau, and Zizek argue, "that incompleteness is
essential to the project of hegemony itself. No social movement can, in fact, enjoy
its status as an open-ended, democratic political articulation without presuming
and operationalizing the negativity at the heart of identity" (Butler, Laclau, Zizek
2000
,
2).
Yannis Stavrakakis explains that through the institutionalization of
democratic practices, such as elections, democratic society acknowledges that
there is no a priori reference point at the heart of society, the point which would
be filled by a monarch or by God in a different system of social organization. The
"unity" of a radical democratic society can therefore be understood as the unity
of recognizing that no final unity, based on some pre-given positive content, is
possible, and that society is constituted in antagonism and is hence a site of
struggle and contestation. Democracy, Stavrakakis argues, "is based on the
recognition of the fact that no such [a priori] principle can claim to be truly
universal, on the fact that no symbolic social construct can ever claim to master
51 For example, the failure of “working class" identity, or the identities "woman," or "minority,
to completely encapsulate themselves has at times been seen as a failure of politics; i.e., we failed
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the impossible real. Democracy entails the acceptance of antagonism”
(Stavrakakis, 120).
Therefore radical democracy, rather than fruitlessly attempting to fill in the
lack, or to rectify the failure to achieve a social harmony, attempts instead to
institutionalize the lack. This is analogous to the altered relationship towards
fantasy that serves as the aim of Lacanian analysis. In analysis the individual
traverses fantasy by identifying with the symptom— acknowledging his or her
implication in its creation and effectivity. In the process the fantasy does not
disappear; the subject's relationship to fantasy itself is altered, as the subject
accepts its contingent and empty content. It is this acceptance that allows for the
possibility of occupying other subjective positions. Similarly, in radical
democracy the lack in the social that precedes democracy (the gap in the
signifier, the failure of a concrete specific to fully embody a universal) is
acknowledged as the impossibility motivating and enabling political struggle.
Acknowledging this impossibility does not imply that the impossibility thereby
disappears; it suggests a different orientation to "the negativity at the heart of
identity." As a concrete, commonplace example of such an institutionalization of
the lack, Stavrakakis suggests that the practice of holding elections is a kind of
formal acknowledgment of the contingent content of the social order:
to completely corral and muster the identities of the working class wives of miners so that they
saw themselves as wholly working class. See J.K. Gibson-Graham's "Stuffed If I Know! (1994).
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if we need elections every once in a while it is because we accept
that the hegemonic link between a concrete content and its
incarnation of fullness has to be continuously re-established and
renegotiated. This is one of the ways in which democracy identifies
with the symptom (the constitutive antagonism of the social which
is usually presented as a mere epiphenomenon) and traverses the
fantasy of a harmonious social order: by instituting lack at the place
of the principle of societal organisation. (Stavrakakis, 136)52
The goal of radical democratic struggle is not, therefore, to fill in some
institutional authority, establish some positive content of the law, resolve
fundamental contradictions, or achieve some final harmonious articulation of all
the various elements of society. Rather, the goal is to acknowledge and maintain
the negativity that makes institutions, identifications, and laws changeable and
open to struggle. Laclau and Mouffe in this light are clearly anti-utopian, not in
the sense that they believe a better society is impossible, or that there are no
positive political goals possible (such as the extension of the discourse of rights
to more and more of the population). Rather, they are anti-utopian in the sense
that they believe that a finally and fully harmonious society free of antagonism is
not possible, and that the pursuit of such a goal has many negative
consequences. In particular they reject those metaphysics of order, essence, and
identity — fantasies— that have been central to numerous political campaigns on
both the left and the right, from nationalism, to environmentalism, to millenarian
52 It should be pointed out here, however, that Stavrakakis is not implying that contemporary
liberal democracies in which elections are held is the final apotheosis of radical democratic
society.
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communahsm. These are projects that propose some future and final order for
society, based on the restoration of a past wholeness or the fulfillment of some
pre-given essential identity .53 Laclau, writing with Lilian Zac, explicitly rejects a
politics oriented around a fantasy of a fully harmonious, organic, or communist
society on the grounds that such a politics would imply a subject capable of
achieving a true identity. Laclau and Zac argue, on the contrary, that "the death
of the subject and the unstable character of all identity are conditions of that
management of the incompletion of society that we call politics" (Laclau and Zac
1994
,
37).
Utopian fantasies of harmony— both individual fantasies and fantasies
experienced on the scale of the social — are rejected because they interfere with
the negativity at the heart of identity and attempt to fill up these spaces with a
positive content that restricts the possibility of democratic struggle. Accepting
this view of radical democracy entails altering one's relationship to political
struggle. It entails rejecting what Stavrakakis refers to as "traditional fantasmatic
politics" that are based on "the futile fantasmatic suture of the lack in the Other"
53 For example, nationalist anti-colonialist struggles, from Ireland to the Philippines, may be built
on a political imaginary in which all current problems, antagonisms, and alienations will be
resolved when a future national state emerges. Similar metaphysics underlie a utopian dream of
"true democracy" emerging after the elimination of a certain class of property-owners. Of course,
such utopian metaphysics may also be found underpinning many educational discourses,
building on a supposedly more harmonious past which must be returned to, blaming educational
practices for the current disharmonious state, or proposing pedagogical policies which will
ensure a future state in which there is a final congruence between individuals and the form of the
state or economy, between knowledge, language, and truth, or between God and Man, or
historical destiny and the human species.
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(120). Examples of such fantasmatic politics can be found, as we have seen in
chapter 2, in the work of the critical pedagogists, who accept the poststructuralist
implications of unfixed identity in certain social fields but not in the fundamental
identities of the capitalist economic structure or of the subjects of this particular
form of late capitalism. They claim furthermore that progressive, radical,
emancipatory, democratic political struggle, leading to a resolution of the
contradiction between capital and freedom, must be based on a clear
understanding of these self-evident truths. Such a conception of politics based on
an ultimate harmonious end is widespread. Chantal Mouffe points out that both
Habermas and Rorty, for example, see the purpose of democratic politics to be
“the creation of the liberal consensus" and "the universalization of the liberal
democratic model." (Mouffe 1996, 7). Whether democratic politics is based on
rationality (Habermas) or on the spread of tolerance, liberal institutions, and
economic growth (Rorty), these views reinforce a utopian or fantasy conception
of politics and the progression towards an ideal resolution, which is why Mouffe
argues that "neither of them is able to grasp the crucial role of conflict and the
central integrative function that it plays in a pluralist democracy" (7-8). She adds
Politics, especially democratic politics, can never overcome conflict
and division. Its aim is to establish unity in a context of conflict and
diversity; it is concerned with the formation of a "we" as opposed
to a "them." What is specific of democratic politics is not the
overcoming of the we/ them opposition but the different way in
which it is drawn. This is why grasping the nature of democratic
politics requires a coming to terms with the dimension of
antagonism that is present in social relations. (8)
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To come to terms with antagonism is, in other words, to come to terms with the
contingent, the incomplete, and the disharmonious— in Lacanian terms, with the
real. 54 Stavrakakis, taking his cue from Lacan's "Science and Truth," argues that
one can deal with this real in two ways: one can repress it, through fantasy, or—
preferably -one can institutionalize it symbolically (85). Symbolic
institutionalization of the real is the Lacanian psychoanalytic path. This
symbolization is a kind of traversal, but, again, it is a traversal that does not
imply a final crossing over of fantasy, the end of symbolization, or the ultimate
containment of the real:
Recognizing the constitutivity of the real does not entail that we
stop symbolizing; it means that we start trying to incorporate this
recognition within the symbolic itself, in fact it means that since the
symbolic entails lack as such, we abstain from covering it over with
fantasmatic constructs— or, if one accepts that we are always
trapped within the field of fantasy, that we never stop traversing it.
The guiding principle in this kind of approach is to move beyond
fantasy toward a self-critical symbolic gesture recognizing the con-
tingent and transient character of every symbolic construct. (89)
Here we may well pause to ask what is at stake in this distinction between a
fantastical pursuit of harmony and a post-fantasmatic acknowledgment of
54 Mouffe's use of "antagonism" here is important. Laclau (1990) distinguishes "antagonism"
from "contradiction." Antagonism is conflict without necessity; it indicates the contingent,
historical elements which are not determined in advance (18). Contradiction, on the other hand, is
something logically internal and inevitable. Laclau argues that both are present in Marx; class
conflict is an antagonism (there is no necessary conflict between the worker and the capitalist),
while the inevitable opposition between the forces and relations of production in Marx's
representation is a contradiction inherent to capitalist development. Laclau takes the position that
reducing the historical process to one of unfolding contradiction rather than contingent
antagonisms limits the possibilities for radical democratic transformation. His aim "is to depict
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disharmony or lack. For Laclau the threat of totalitarianism is ever present in
social fantasy, with an apocalyptic universalism poised to occupy the political
space surrendered by those who shirk their democratic ethical responsibility to
maintain the space of antagonism and disharmony. Stavrakakis also sees the
threat to democratic society in dark dystopian tendencies (Stavrakakis 124-6).
The two great threats to democracy, he argues, are totalitarianism and
particularism. In totalitarianism, one group claims to represent the whole of
society, asserts legitimacy on the basis of this, and seeks to crush dissent and
opposition; this is a kind of assertion of democratic legitimacy based on a natural
or true identity (for example, when a political party claims to democratically
represent the people because it stands for and promotes "true Serbian national
identity"). This totalitarian position is based on the fantasy of a harmonious and
unified future society, and the creation and subsequent oppression of the alien,
scape-goat, or symptom obstructing this future state is the predictable outcome.
Particularism is another form of identity politics, based on the supposition that
the different parts of society can never be articulated in any way. Such a view of
society as an inevitably disconnected set of separate entities, each of which has its
own particular true and singular meaning, is also, like totalitarianism, based on a
fantasy of fixed identity, and is a threat to the democratic space of antagonism.
the nature and depth of the changes in our social and historical outlook which stem from
privileging the moment of negativity" (17).
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Pointing to William Connolly's work, Stavrakakis argues that both of these
threats attempt to remove the ambiguity from democracy, which is tantamount
to de-democratizing democracy (123). Put in other words, a politics of
harmony striving towards a utopian ideal of wholeness undermines democracy
by creating conditions where disillusionment with democracy is inevitable; when
democracy fails to deliver the utopian goods, totalitarianism or particularism
become hegemonic in the space left behind, as methods of addressing social
antagonisms. To illustrate this point Stavrakakis argues that a crisis of
democracy has occurred recently in Eastern Europe and South Africa. This crisis
came about because democracy had been pursued with a utopian vision that
promised a future democratic state in which antagonism would be eliminated.
Subsequently, when democracy arrived there was great disappointment because
antagonisms— the inherent tensions between, for example, the pursuit of
individual interests and the just organization of a commonality — were not
resolvable.
Radical Economic Democracy
The radical democrats have generally failed to extend their arguments for a
politics of disharmony to the economic sphere.55 This dissertation, however, has
55 For a discussion of this point see Ceren Ozselcuk (2002). She argues persuasively that because
they preserve empiricist and rationalist conceptions of class, and capitalocentric views of the
social field, the radical democrats tend to see the politics of disharmony (focusing on hegemonic
struggle within the fundamental lack in identity) and the politics of class struggle (limited by a
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suggested that such an extension is needed to help traverse widespread fantasies
of economic subjectivity. Indeed, just as the politics of harmony and utopian
fantasy undermine democratic possibility and open the door to a de-
democratizing forces, the fantasy constructions associated with certain
representations of subjects and economies as fixed or resolvable identities may
effectively constrain the creation of new economic subjectivities and practices, as
discussed in previous chapters.
A simple manifestation of this danger became clear when a number of
researchers involved in the Rethinking Economy project attended a regional
conference for members of worker cooperatives. In a session on hiring
procedures, we heard many speakers agree that when seeking to hire a new
member they generally did not seek out individuals overly invested in the ideal
of worker cooperatives as the solution to social ills and individual alienation, as
the space in which contradiction, hierarchy, and power are replaced by a
harmony. Such individuals tended to rapidly become disillusioned with their
actual cooperative experience when it failed to provide the wholeness they were
seeking, either disrupting the practice of the cooperative with demands for
satisfaction of their fantasy or abandoning the enterprise altogether.
fixed view of class identity) to be inherently irreconcilable. This leads them to disregard the field
of economic subjectivity as a site of hegemonic struggle.
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Indeed, entire worker cooperatives may be enmeshed in a fantasy
conception of the cooperative, in which the communal firm is invested with the
ability to provide a wholeness or singular identity, ensuring that the
antagonisms between individual desires and the communal interest are resolved.
This may result from a view of the fixed identity of the subjects involved in the
enterprise— for example, that it is innate human nature to cooperate, or to take
pleasure in creative labor; or it may take the form of an a priori conception of the
common good. In such cases, antagonisms are seen as pollutants disrupting what
should be the harmonious state. Over the years a number of worker cooperatives
in the region have either closed or have been transformed into traditionally-
organized firms (in some cases becoming, in class terms, exploitative capitalist
firms) in response to the disillusionment produced by the utopian fantasy of
resolution. In other words, these alternative economic practices are threatened
when antagonism has not been acknowledged as an unavoidable condition of the
social field.
However, at the regional worker cooperative conference, and in the course of
conducting research for the Rethinking Economy project, we found a number of
successful worker cooperatives engaged in economic practices that suggested a
different relationship to the notion of incompleteness, lack, antagonism, the gap
in identity — in other words, that suggested a kind of acknowledgment or
institutionalization of the lack. We came to refer to these as instances of radical
economic democracy" (Byrne and Healy 2003). These firms appear to have
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become sites of anti-utopian economic practice - sites where a kind of post-
fantasmatic economic politics of disharmony provides them with the possibility
of enacting alternative economic subjectivities, not limited in advance by the
fixed identity of the subject or structure.
It was clear, for example, that the kind of fantasmatic economic subjects
represented above by Sid and Stanley were not very well tolerated at the worker
cooperative conference. When a writer for an alternative newsletter stated that it
was essential that worker coops become part of a larger movement organized to
smash the vicegrip of global capitalism, this call to arms failed to elicit any sort of
engagement from the audience. In contrast, technical questions about how to run
a coop— accounting techniques, or different approaches to patronage dispersal,
for instance— produced enthusiastic exchanges and revealed the range of
practices within worker cooperatives. Interestingly, the diversity of approaches
to these issues met with no hostility from the coop members in the audience but,
rather, tended to inspire people to relate how wage scale, hiring, and so on,
worked in their own cooperative enterprises.
It appeared that the lack of an overwhelming institutional authority was
already functioning in worker-coop discourse, that the tyranny of the desire for a
pure language, the love/ hate relationship with an external enemy, and the
insistence of a purity of practice were not dominant here. Instead, there seemed
to be a genuine airing of differences in how coops were conceived, how their
spaces of production were organized, how accounting was done, how expansion
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was managed or conflict mitigated. For example, in a lively discussion on pay
ratios begun at the conference and extending to an on-line discussion list,
cooperative members explained the history of their present systems, either how
they started out with flat rates and went to a ratio, or vice versa, in the context of
their particular circumstances (the size of the company, the nature of the process,
whether highly technical or not, the market conditions putting pressure on
skilled workers, powerful idealism or moral-political-aesthetic commitment to an
idea, and so on.) What was striking was how each of the speakers framed their
comments with the insistence that there was no rule which should apply in all
circumstances; it was overwhelmingly the case that each speaker declared that it
was an issue to be determined through an ongoing process of negotiation among
members.
Successful worker cooperatives manage to keep the space of decision open,
to keep the negativity of identity— of individual subjects, the collective firm, and
the community in which it is embedded— intact and open to ongoing
contestation. The recognition of the arbitrary nature of the distinction between
necessary and surplus labor performed, the struggle over the firm's wage,
production, and accounting practices, and even over the boundaries of the firm
itself, are instances of acknowledging the inherent lack in identity. The ability of
the coop to respond to market opportunities, chance circumstances, internal
conflict and to imaginatively reconfigure their labors are all enabled by the
recognition of the fundamental negativity of identity — the recognition that the
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productive, appropriative, or distributive processes of the firm are not given and
may be transformed through struggle.
The Ethics of Disharmony
To come to terms with antagonism, the unending traversal of fantasy, or the
institutionalization of lack suggests an alternative ethical orientation, distinct
from and in opposition to an ethics based on harmony. It is an alternative ethics
that is fundamental to the practice of Lacanian analysis and Derridean
deconstruction, that is broadly applicable beyond the field of democratic politics;
and that is of central importance to the particular pedagogical stance that I have
advocated for thus far. Institutionalizing the lack requires an ethics that is not
based on a final utopian goal of unity, wholeness, and harmony; it is rather what
Stavrakakis calls an “ethics of disharmony" (Stavrakakis 127). 56 For Stavrakakis,
the model for this alternative ethics may be found in Lacanian psychoanalysis,
because "the ethics of psychoanalysis moves beyond traditional ethics of the
good, moves beyond the barrier of the fantasmatic ethics of harmony to come to
terms with the impossible real, by recognizing its ultimate irreducibility"
(Stavrakakis, 137). Chow and Zizek have also found in Lacan the necessary
ethical framework for accepting the permanence of antagonism, and the further
ethical task of attempting to symbolize the real even though this symbolization is
56 Stavrakakis traces the term to William Connolly's 1991 Identity/Difference.
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ultimately impossible (Chow 1993; Zizek 1994). This suggests that ethical practice
of necessity occurs in the gap between an action and the certainty of its success,
or in the distance between the decision and continually deferred final
knowledge. The ethical commitment (in the field of politics, education, or
analysis, any of Freud's three impossible professions I have discussed here) is to
assume responsibility for acts without certitude, without the comfort of pure
speech, fixed identities, essential subjects or social realities.
The necessary connection between uncertainty and the ethical decision is
explored further by Laclau, who argues that if we do not embrace radical contin-
gency, clinging instead to the certainty of fixed identity, then we are not
assuming our ethical responsibility for the creation of democratic society, and we
surrender society to totalitarianism. In response to the question "Why choose
between different types of society?" Laclau argues that to decide one type of
society over another, to accept that our beliefs and values are contingent and
historical, and to fully acknowledge the lack of certainty that accompanies such a
choice, is to accept not only democracy but our humanity itself, "as an entity to
be constructed" (Laclau 1990, 83). "To reformulate the values of the
Enlightenment in the direction of a radical historicism and to renounce its
rationalistic epistemological and ontological foundations, then, is to expand the
democratic potentialities of that tradition, while abandoning the totalitarian
tendencies arising from its reoccupation of the ground of apocalyptic
universalism" (83)
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Derrida s explorations of the paradoxes of undecidability, identity, choice,
and politics also shed light on this alternative ethical framework. "If there were
continual stability, he writes, "there would be no need for politics, and it is to
the extent that stability is not natural, essential or substantial, that politics exists
and ethics is possible. Chaos is at once a risk and a chance, and it is here that the
possible and the impossible cross each other" (Derridal996, 84). In other words,
if there were no doubt, and no chaos, there would be no opportunity for making
a decision; without the decision, there is no ethical moment. Derrida goes even
farther: without the gap there is not only no ethical decision, there is no subject.
"If one knows, and if it is a subject that knows who and what, then the decision is
simply the application of a law. In other words, if there is a decision, it
presupposes that the subject of the decision does not yet exist and neither does
the object" (84). Indeed, "the transcendental subject is that which renders the
decision impossible. The decision is barred when there is something like a
transcendental subject" (84). Derrida asserts that "If one does not take rigorous
account of undecidability, it will not only be the case that one cannot act, decide
or assume responsibility, but one will not even be able to think the concepts of
decision and responsibility" (86).
A Pedagogy of Disharmony
Just as the aim of radical democracy is not to provide positive content to
achieve an ultimate closure of the social, the goal of such a pedagogy is not to fill
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in the lack in the identity of the subject or the fantasy of a particular economic or
other social structure. As in the politics of disharmony, a pedagogy of
disharmony would seek to assume the ethical responsibility of acknowledging
the lack inherent in identity. Such an acknowledgment may take the form of
directing attention to the deconstructive paradoxes of language (as in the
training activities described in chapter 6,) or to highlight how even the most
intimate aspects of our subjective experiences of self are in part constituted by
what is exterior to us, in the symbolic order. Or it may involve confronting the
paradoxically pleasurable attachments we have to the various symptoms that
both complete and disrupt our fantasies.
It is important to stress here that I am advocating for a certain orientation to
the practice of pedagogy; I am not suggesting a definitive and totalizing rule
which must be applied in all educational encounters. I am not suggesting, in
other words, that every lesson plan carried out in every schoolroom should be
constructed with the intention of institutionalizing lack, or within the constraints
of a vigilant self-conscious awareness of the sliding signifier, the symbolic order,
and the failure of identification; it is not necessary that every essentialist identity
or every utopian fantasy be challenged as it appears. 57 What I hope to have
57 In this regard we may take a cue from psychoanalytical practice. Aware of the constant
presence of the unconscious, the analyst does not attempt in all situations to confront the
analysand with the truth of this knowledge (which, in any case, may well engender counter-
productive transference, imaginary rivalry, or the strengthening of the ego) Rather, the analyst
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shown is that it matters how educators stand in relationship to fantasy, identity,
the relationship between subjects and the social - whether their practice is
marked by the repression of the traumatic real or by the attempt to facilitate the
traversal of fantasy.
But why does this matter? What is at stake? Why should we care whether an
educational encounter is guided by a harmonious ideal, or by a rigorous anti-
utopianism? What are the consequences of a pedagogical stance that either does
or does not seek to maintain and bring to the forefront the gap in identity?
Laclau and Stavrakakis fear of anti-democratic and totalitarian forces emerging
from within the fantasy dream of wholeness, unity, and harmony suggests how
high the stakes may be. In the current climate of patriotic injunctions, demanding
the unquestioned love of country, we can imagine the rise of an even more
dangerous fantasy of nationhood, national destiny, and so on. The danger of
finding the required symptom obstructing a harmonious order -the alien figure
of the Arab, the Muslim, the French, the unpatriotic dissenter— is of course
palpably real in such a climate.
Less dramatic perhaps than the threat of nationalist or xenophobic fantasies
encouraged by educational practices are the more mundane and long-standing
fantasies of fixed identity (subjects, structures, speech) that we see even in less
strategically directs the course of analysis so that at certain moments the analysand is capable of
confronting lack, fantasy, the symptom, and so on.
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uncertain times. Let me describe briefly a number of educational situations
which illustrate the role of fantasy and fixed identity, and the potential for
traversal, in the most conventional of educational contexts: the formal classroom.
It All Comes Down to You
In a first-year college writing class, I have assigned an essay attempting to
show the multiple, complex, overdetermined factors that make some people
successful athletes and others less so. The students react with agitation to the
essay because it doesn't come down on any one single explanation. Forced by
their own desire to find final meanings, the students invariably settle on two:
individual effort and genetics.
First, there is an overwhelming belief among the undergraduate students
that in the final accounting "it all comes down to your self." The students'
strongest defenses tend to be reserved for the defense of this essentialist
individualism. If you just have enough personal drive, they argue, you will most
certainly achieve great things. At the same time, in the same essay, they may also
express the somewhat contradictory position that "it all comes down to
genetics." It is clear that both of these assertions share the comfortable ground of
a common fantasy of fixed identity. In the first, the individual, irregardless of his
or her historical or cultural circumstance, succeeds or fails based on their own
effort and personal drive. (Interestingly, many of the lowest-achieving students
assert this most vehemently; as if acknowledging their own implication in their
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failures.) They express impatience with arguments that appear to ascribe position
in life to the social meanings of race, ethnicity, gender, and so on. For these
students, as for Margaret Thatcher, "society does not exist." There is no symbolic
order, and no lack in their own identity. In the second fantasy, there is also a
fixed and whole subjective identity; the students seem quite comfortable with
hard scientific evidence that DNA and genetic programming make us who we
are. Intelligence, personality, ability to do well in math— these most intimate of
personal attributes are dictated by an unfolding code present from birth. Why
they can hold both of these narratives in their mind simultaneously is that they
both share the common fantasy structure: there is a self-contained subject,
bounded and discrete, advancing under its own intrinsic logic toward a
decidable future.
In a sense, although less dramatic in scope, we can see these as analogous to
the two threats to democracy that Stavrakakis identifies. The individualist
position is similar to a particularism that announces that no articulation between
the different elements of society exists. The individual is ultimately unaffected by
and not responsible for the other individual members of society. The DNA
fantasy is similar to the totalitarian position; here, the genetic code is identified as
the singular element uniting the universal notion of "human." Hence the
frenzied attempts to uncover the singular piece of code that distinguishes the
human from the animal, or to find the genetic code that marks the abnormal
(homosexual, autistic, violent) or aberrant. To suggest that this search for the
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missing yet once-and-for-all defining element of human-ness will forever fail is
to trigger a reaction similar to an attack on one's faith. And in the end, this is a
form of faith.
Alternatively, a pedagogy oriented towards acknowledging lack would in
this context bring to the forefront the students' own assumptions, about
causality, faith in final explanations, epistemology, and to explore the various
paradoxes of identity, the ways they are constituted symbolically even before
birth, the contingencies of birth in different cultures, historical epochs, and
economic contexts.
Multi-Culturalism
Addressing multi-culturalism in the classroom is neither inherently utopian
nor anti-utopian. On the one hand, multi-culturalism may speak from a position
of fixed identities; this represents an ethics based on the familiar "accepting
difference." However, to accept difference in other individuals, societies,
cultures, is to still be in the realm of a positive (albeit shrouded, mysterious, or
exotic) content of that other identity, and of one's own positive identity as the
ground for that difference. It can, in certain circumstances, assume the character
of both a particularism (we have our particular identity, they have theirs) and a
totalitarianism (our identity is both different and the universal standard against
which others should be judged). Alternatively, multi-culturalism may be treated
as an opportunity to institutionalize the lack in identity. Zizek suggests that
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identifying with the lack in others actually offers a different basis for
communication, among individuals and across cultures:
This is the Lacanian wager: is not our culture, the way we structure
the symbolic edifice of our culture, only an attempt to come to
terms with some kind of traumatic impossibility? If we recognize
our culture as an ultimately failed attempt to symbolize some
antagonism, some real deadlock, this allows us to read the other's
culture as an attempt to symbolize the same deadlock. What unites
cultures is not the neutral, universal set of meanings that
Chomskyan linguists are trying to establish; you don't find it at that
level. You find it at the level of an impasse. All cultures are
different answers to the same question, arising from the same
deadlock; its is precisely the deadlock, the antagonism, that unites
us. The problem is to recognize in a foreign culture a different
attempt to avoid the same deadlock that we tried to avoid. That we
can identify with the other at this point of failure is an almost
hysterical paradox. This is the basic Lacanian answer to the
question of how can we be sure that we communicate with the
other: we don't communicate with ourselves. The other is already
in our own split; because we are split, our discourse is already, as
Lacan would say, the discourse of the other. (Zizek interview with
Canning 1993, 89
)
A multiculturalist approach incorporating this Lacanian insight might focus not
on the positive content of cultural difference, but on the traumatic gap present in
all identity, and would direct the student towards the presence of the other
within his or her own fantasy of self, desire for fixed meaning, or pure speech.
Poetry in the Hilltown Schools
In a meeting I recently attended, an English professor spoke of the program
she directs that places creative writing graduate students in local schools in the
region, to spend a few hours a week leading the students in poetry writing
workshops. The schools are largely rural, underfunded, and serving low income
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populations in Franklin County. She described the pressure on administrators to
cut the arts during budget crises, and the pressure on teachers to limit creative
arts and spend more time preparing students to take the new high-stakes tests
the state of Massachusetts mandates. In this climate, and especially for this low-
income population in a region which has suffered significant job loss in recent
years, the conservative notion of schooling as preparation for work, with its
focus on training for specific technology and the proper values required in
today's workforce, come to the forefront. (We have seen a similar focus in the
Roxbury Charter High School, discussed in chapter 2.) Significantly, the director
of the program asserted that poetry writing gets cut because there is a
widespread sense that language should be instrumental - that you should say
what you mean directly and clearly and that should be the way language is
taught to young people.
This discussion forcefully brought to mind the analytical practice of bringing
subjects to confront and acknowledge the presence of the unconscious, through
the operations of the sliding signifier. During this discussion I was struck for the
first time how vitally important it is that young people learn poetry; to learn not
only that language is a source of pleasure but that metaphor, metonymy,
slippages, word associations, surpluses of meaning, and so on, are already
present in speech, are unavoidable and constitutive elements of language. To
believe that language can be instrumental is a form of utopian fantasy directly
tied in this case to the economic possibilities available to these emerging subjects
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of economy. It is a fantasy of pure speech, allied with a fantasy of the economic
subject, that must be challenged.
Of course, poetry can also be taught in a particularly fantastic way,
reinforcing the boundedness of the true subject identity, the "inner self," and so
on. Simply teaching poetry is not a guarantee that an institutionalization of the
lack is taking place. Similarly, institutionalization of the lack can take place in
other disciplines: science, social studies, economics, health, and so on. How are
the categories of study defined? How is the relationship between identity and
what is outside of it represented? How are necessity and contingency treated?
How are epistemological stances and assumptions discussed? What attention is
paid to the language of the discipline? How are contradictions, paradoxes, and
logical aporias treated? How is the performative nature of the discipline's
discourse discussed? These questions suggest some of the paths by which an
anti-utopian pedagogy of disharmony may be employed in a variety of
pedagogical situations and disciplines.
Final Thoughts: Permitting the Necessary
Foucault, speaking of the ethical use of history but in terms applicable to the
practice of pedagogy, asserts that knowledge must be wielded as a tool, but one
that unsettles rather than brings about a new solidification:
History becomes "effective" to the degree that it introduces
discontinuity into our very being— as it divides our emotions,
dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our body and sets it against
itself. "Effective" history deprives the self of the reassuring stability
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of life and nature, and it will not permit itself to be transported by a
voiceless obstinacy toward a millennial ending. It will uproot its
traditional foundations and relentlessly disrupt its pretended
continuity. This is because knowledge is not made for
understanding; it is made for cutting. (Foucault 1984b, 88)
A Pedag°gy of disharmony strategically intervenes and directs attention to the
emptiness of the contingent signifier, to the movement of language along the
lines of metaphor and metonymy, to the presence of the unconscious and the
grammar of the symbolic order. It is a pedagogy with an ethical obligation to
take into account the negativity of identity and to defer any final resolution.
This, however, raises a question. If it is true, as I argue, that identity
inevitably fails, that there is a central lack or negativity fundamental to
experience then why is it necessary, as I also argue, that we maintain this
openness, keep clear the ground of this undecidability? In other words, why do I
appear (like the Oedipal father) to be prohibiting what is impossible, the
impossible closure or filling in of what is in the end an unavoidable gap?
It is important to ask here what the effects are of maintaining the fantasy that
this lack can or could be filled, in some deferred or obstructed future. There are
consequences in attempting such a closure, even though such attempts are not
capable of succeeding. As we have seen, a by-product of fantasy may be the
authoritarian imposition of a harmonious order, accompanied by a sense of
frustration directed at an alien force standing in the way. But a further danger is
that in promulgating such fantasies of a future harmonious state, other non-
fantastic and anti-utopian desires or social visions are cut off, are made less
221
available, have less ability to become hegemonic. The critical pedagogists' notion
of fixed identity leads them, ironically, to abandon the field of the economy as a
site of struggle and contestation. A worker cooperative entrenched in the fantasy
of a harmonious work environment may collapse, leading to the disillusionment
of its members, when antagonism and conflict can not be acknowledged and
integrated in daily practice. Fantasies are problems not only because they
contribute to a dangerous utopian form of politics, but because they contribute to
the fixity of subjectivities, by suspending subjects in the compromise desires of
the fantasy narrative, in the repetitive circuit of desire that fixes the subject in the
unhappy pursuit of an unattainable identity. This is what Foucault means when
he says, startlingly, that "the soul is the prison of the body;" the notion of the
transcendental self, the subject's true singular identity imprisons the body,
circumscribing the exercise of other forms of bodily practice.
We might again ask what opportunities such an anti-utopian acceptance of
disharmony, failed identity, and impure speech might engender. What would be
the advantages of seeing pedagogical practices, from formal schooling of pre-
adults, to informal and non-formal education of adults, as "restoring the dialectic
of desire and reinitiating the coming-into-being of the subject"? How might such
a pedagogical stance, acknowledging and institutionalizing division and the
central lack in identity, reinvigorate current educational debates, undermine
essentialist arguments about the relationship between economic structure and
individual subjectivity, and encourage alternative social practices? This
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dissertation has probed how this kind of self-conscious awareness of the
negativity of human experience might provide the space for alternative social
and individual practices, beyond fantastic or utopian thought. Rather than
viewing this as prohibiting the impossible, it can be viewed instead as
"permitting the necessary." Such permission can come as a great relief.
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APPENDIX
NODES DEVELOPED IN NVIVO FOR CODING TRANSCRIPTS
1) Tree Nodes :
Transactions Market
Alternative Market
Non-market— Barter
Non-market— Gift
Non-market- Gift- Charity
Sectors Care— Child care
Care— Elder care
Care— Elealthcare
Arts/ Crafts/Culture
Agriculture & Farming
Education
Religion
Fitness
Retail Sales
Food Service
Maintenance & Construction
Class Process Capitalist
Alternative Capitalist
Non-Capitalist— Self-provisioning
Non-Capitalist—Communal
Non-Capitalist— Self-employment
Non-Capitalist— Worker collective
Non-Class— Producer coop
Non-Class— Consumer coop
Non-Class— Rent or landlording
Uncertain Class Process
Labor Wage
Non-Wage—Volunteer
Non-Wage— Work within family or household
Non-Wage— Alternative wage labor
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Economic site Community
School
Church or temple
Firm
Household
Government
Prison
Neighborhood
2) Free Nodes:
Community
Co-op
Economic subjectivity
The Iceberg
Localism
Money
Moonlighting
Ownership
Potential projects
Power
Priceless quotes
Quality of Life
The project
Transcriber's Notes
Under-the-table work
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